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The Model Rules are premised on the fallacy of the monolithic
attorney-client relationship .... [Elach rule purports to address
an issue for all walks of lawyer, regardless of the nature of their
practice [or non-practice] or of the clients they represent ....
Lawyers, however, are not all the same.,
INTRODUCTION

During the last century, the legal profession has experienced a
drastic change in the roles and functions of its members. Its modern

1. Steven C. Krane, Ethics 2000. What Might Have Been, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
323, 329 (1999) (discussing the American Bar Association's formation of "Ethics 2000,"
a Commission established to undertake the first comprehensive review of the MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED (2003) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] and
criticizing the Commission in taking an "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" approach to
reviewing the effectiveness of the Model Rules); see also ABA Starts "Ethics 2000"
Project for Sweeping Review of Rules, ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT:
CURRENT REP. 140 (1997) (discussing the role of the Ethics 2000 project as the
undertaking of an in-depth review and assessment of the ABA ethics rules during the
end of the second millennium).
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composition no longer consists solely of practicing lawyers, judges,
and law professors but has steadfastly transformed to include an
increasingly large number of lawyers who function in positions that
fall outside the traditional practice of law. Today, it is commonplace
to find practicing lawyers who have become either disillusioned with
the routine nature of their practices or for countless other reasons,
decide against practicing law upon passing the bar examination.2
There are numerous explanations for making this choice. Many
lawyers leave the profession to seek non-legal employment in private
or public sector jobs.3 For instance, a growing trend towards the
legalization of many industries and professions has resulted in the
creation of complex federal and state regulations that often require
legal training and expertise to comply with and follow. Other lawyers
remain in the practice of law but pursue additional professional
degrees in order to obtain the flexibility to participate in dual
practices.4 A growing number of lawyers leave the profession each
year to enter into public service as public officials elected through the
political process or appointed by federal or state executives.5
2. See AT THE BREAKING POINT (A.B.A. ed., Airlie House 1991) (discussing an
ABA study on career satisfaction and dissatisfaction) (noting several reasons for
lawyer discontent with the practice of law such as long workdays, the emphasis on
billable hours, the intensely competitive partnership struggle, disgruntled clients, and
the strain of constantly enacting an adversarial role); see also Kevin Hopkins, Law
Firms, Technology, and the Double-Billing Dilemma, 12 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 95, 98101 (1998) (discussing double-billing and the pressures placed on new associates in
pursuing partnerships in law firms).
3. Lawyer dissatisfaction with the practice of law has prompted numerous
publications by legal career counselors and programs sponsored by local bar
associations to discuss non-legal career options. See, e.g., DEBORAH ARRON, WHAT CAN
You Do WITH A LAW DEGREE? A LAWYERS' GUIDE TO CAREER ALTERNATIVES INSIDE,
OUTSIDE, AND AROUND THE LAW (4th ed. 1999); HINDI GREENBERG, THE LAWYER'S
CAREER CHANGE HANDBOOK: MORE THAN 300 THINGS YOU CAN DO WITH A LAW
DEGREE (1998); see also Ilana DeBare, When the Boss Has Wrong Image of the
Workers, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 1, 1997, at Bi (noting that other positions include legal
head-hunting firms and the business world); John Murawski, D.C. Bar Panels on
Career Change Pack 'Em In, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at 1 (noting that many
lawyers seeking to change careers often consider positions in legal publishing and
university administration).
4. For discussions of the ABA's handling of dual practices, see ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (June 1972) (lawyer-accountant);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 83-1497 (lawyer-doctor);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 1192 (1971) (lawyerpublisher); and ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 1248
(1972) (lawyer-psychologist).
5. As used in this Article, the term 'lawyer-politician" is defined as a lawyer who
has chosen the career path of public official as his or her primary occupation. As
defined by the Supreme Court, a public official is one who is "among the hierarchy of
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt v.
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Although the majority of state and federal politicians are not
lawyers,6 there has always been a close relationship between law and
politics.7 Throughout American history, the legal profession has
played an important role in the lives and careers of many
politicians.8 Law schools have become the training grounds for many
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). In Rosenblatt, the Supreme Court held that public
officials are persons who occupy positions in government that are of such importance,
that the public has an independent interest in their qualifications and performance
beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all
government employees. Id. at 86. Although the term is broad enough to encompass
lawyers who operate in both federal and state policy-making positions that are
executive and legislative in nature, it can also include lawyers who are elected to or
nominated for offices that are judicial or quasi-judicial. The use of the term in this
Article is limited to those lawyers who are elected or nominated to the federal
executive policy-making position of President and Vice President and the federal
judicial and quasi-judicial offices of Supreme Court Justice, Attorney General and
Solicitor General.
6. See, e.g., Ryan Keith, Public Service or private practice? Lawmakers feel tug
between legislature and legal practices, THE STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield,
IL), Aug. 14, 2000, at 7 (noting that nationally, the average percentage of lawyers in
state legislatures was 16% in 1995, a decrease from 22% in 1976). The drop in the
number of lawyers in the U.S. Congress fell from 58 percent in 1969 to 43 percent in
1999. Id. See also Allan Freedman, Lawyers Take a Back Seat in the 105th Congress,
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 27, 29 (Jan. 4, 1997) (noting that approximately 40% of the
members of the 105 th Congress were lawyers).
7. For example, thirty of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence
were judges or lawyers and thirty-one of the fifty-five members of the Continental
Congress were lawyers. See ROBERT F. BODEN, THE COLONIAL BAR AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 3 (1976); MARK C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS:
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 31 (1995). Lawyers also

dominated the state conventions organized to ratify the Constitution. MILLER, supra,
at 31. More than half of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention were lawyers.
See HARRY W. JONES, POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY xiiv (1976). Also,

four of the five persons appointed by the Continental Congress to prepare the
Declaration of Independence possessed legal training including Thomas Jefferson, the
actual drafter. Id. at xiii. John Dickinson, a Philadelphia lawyer, prepared the initial
draft of the Articles of Confederation. Id. John Jay and John Adams, both practicing
lawyers during the colonial period, were the principal negotiators of the Treaty of
Paris, an agreement that consolidated the independence of the United States and
continues to be regarded as the "greatest diplomatic triumph of American history." Id.;
see Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and his Britannic
Majesty, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80 (1867).
8. The legal profession often comes into play during several stages of the typical
career of a politician. First, being a lawyer provides one with the flexibility to make his
or her first run for office. Once in the political arena, the legal profession often acts as
a way station between a lost election and the next campaign. Finally, the legal
profession provides the politician with a place to retire after completing her
responsibilities in public office. See The Rodent, On Law and Politics, 40 ORANGE
COUNTY LAWYER 22, 22 (1998). For instance, lawyer Richard Nixon retreated back to
the practice of law between serving as Vice President and running for governor of
California in 1962. See MELVIN SMALL, THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON 21 (1999).
Mr. Nixon also practiced law after losing the gubernatorial election in 1962 and up
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of the nation's leaders. While not a requirement for fulfilling the
responsibilities of public office, a law degree is an attractive asset for
politicians seeking federal and state elected offices and cabinet
positions. Today, more attorneys run for and hold public office than
members of any other profession.9 During the past decade alone,
lawyers have held the governorships in approximately two-thirds of
the states, and twenty-five out of forty-two U.S. presidents have been
lawyers.lo Even at the state level, more legislators are selected from
the ranks of lawyers than from any other profession."
Lawyer-politicians and dual practitioners confront interesting
predicaments for purposes of professional regulation for conduct
occurring outside the practice of law. Consider the following scenario
as an illustration of the problems that can occur in applying the
American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional
Conduct to the lawyer-politician:
Lawyer A has developed a distinguished family law practice. As
a result of her advocacy of children's rights issues, she has
become well known in her state and throughout the nation.
Because of her recent notoriety in this area and in furtherance
of her interests in children's rights, she leaves her law practice
and decides to run for a vacant U.S. Senate seat in her state.
She is successful. Several months prior to the election however,
Lawyer A receives and accepts a multi-million dollar offer from
a national publishing company to write her memoirs. The
publishing company is a subsidiary of a larger parent
corporation-a broadcasting company that will likely be
adversely affected by upcoming Congressional legislation
designed to establish a new television rating system to protect
children from prime-time programs showing acts of violence
and strong sexual content. Lawyer A is not covered under the
Senate ethics rules until she takes office in January. Upon
until the time he ran for and was elected to the Presidency in 1968. See id. at 22.
9. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 31-46 (noting that in the United States, lawyers
have occupied the heads of the executive branches of both state and federal
government, federal agencies, and the U.S. Congress); see also Freedman, supra note
6, at 29 (noting that approximately 40% of the members of the 105th Congress were
lawyers); 51 CONG. Q. ALMANAC B-8 (1995) (noting that the legal profession was
representative of the largest occupational group in Congress); James J. Brudney,
Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretationsof Statutes: Idle Chatter or
Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49 n.194 (1994) (noting the percentages of
lawyers occupying past Congresses).
10. See Miller, supra note 7, at 31; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332
(2003) (noting that currently, persons with law degrees occupy approximately half of
the state governorships, more than half of the seats in the U.S. Senate, and more than
a third of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives).
11. See ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION,
AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT
82 (1981).
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taking office, Lawyer A's previous acceptance of the book
contract, on its face, would be appropriate and ethical12 despite
the fact that her acceptance of the book contract could
ultimately raise conflicts of interest concerns in violation of the
Senate Ethics Rules.13 As expected, the House passes the
legislation. Lawyer A, who is now a U.S. Senator, however,
votes against the legislation. Believing that her book contract
with the subsidiary company may have influenced her voting
behavior, Senators from the opposing political party prompt the
Senate Ethics Committee to hold hearings on the matter. 14

How should the Bar respond to Lawyer A's acceptance of the
book contract and the current Senate investigation into the ethics of
Lawyer A's voting? Technically, Lawyer A is bound by the Model
Rules despite the reality that most of the rules, if not all of them, are
inapplicable to her day-to-day operations as a government official.15
As a United States Senator, Lawyer A is not required to possess a
law degree and law license. She does not represent clients in court
proceedings, advise clients, or prepare legal documents. In short, her
role and job function are no different than any non-lawyer employed
in the same capacity. Thus, she is not engaged in the practice of

12. See SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, U.S. SENATE, 108TH CONG., SENATE ETHICS
at
2003),
available
(Comm.
Print
MANUAL
97
http://ethics.senate.gov/downloads/pdffiles/manual.pdf. Senate Rule 36 bans members
of the Senate from receiving honoraria as a payment of money or anything of value for
appearances, speeches or articles. Id. at 98. Assuming fair dealing between the
Senator and publishing company, the rule exempts payments received for writings to
be published as books. Id. at 100.
13. Senate Rule 37(2) provides that "[n]o [m]ember, officer, or employee shall
engage in any outside business or professional activity or employment for
compensation which is inconsistent or in conflict with the conscientious performance of
official duties." See S.R. 37(2), reprinted in SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 12.
The legislative history for this provision notes that the rule was designed to prohibit
any outside activities that could represent a conflict of interest or the appearance of
one.
14. This example is modeled after the potential ethical concerns that were lodged
against former First Lady and lawyer, Senator Hillary R. Clinton (D. N.Y.), on the eve
of her induction into the United States Senate, after she had received one of the
largest book publishing deals in the nation's history for her memoirs as the First Lady.
See Linton Weeks, Hillary Clinton Seals $8 Million Book Deal; Memoir to Detail White
House Years, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2000, at A01.
15. The Model Rules expressly refer to "lawyers holding public office" on only two
occasions. See MODEL RULES R. 7.5(c) (providing that a law firm may not include "the
name of a lawyer holding a public office. .. in the name of a law firm, or in any
communications on [behalf of the firm] during any substantial period in which the
lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm"); MODEL RULES R. 8.4
cmt. 5 (providing that "[l]awyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities
going beyond those of other citizens" and noting that an "abuse of public office can
suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of [attorney]").
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law.16 However, as a result of her bar membership, she can be
subjected to an additional layer of discipline over and above her nonlawyer counterpart. In fact, recent incidents of discipline by state bar
associations for acts of misconduct occurring outside the practice of
law and committed by bar members holding high public office have
ranged from suspension to disbarment.17
Is there a legitimate rationale for treating the lawyer-politician
who does not practice law any differently than the non-lawyer
politician who has committed the same act of misconduct? The
answer to this question is unclear under the current Model Rules.
Legal scholars have also shied away from addressing this reoccurring
issue.1 Although the primary goal of the drafters of the Rules was to

16. Defining the "practice of law" is not easy. For example, one commentator has
defined the practice of law broadly to include "anything usually done by lawyers." Alan
Morrison, Defining the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Some New Ways of Looking at
an Old Question, 4 NOVA. L.J. 363, 365 (1980). Courts, however, have provided a more
specific definition. See R.J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 416 (Okla. 1972)
(defining the practice of law as "the rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interests of another with
his consent"). Both commentators and the courts, however, have agreed that indicia of
the practice of law will include the following:
(1) representation of parties before judicial or administrative bodies, (2)
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, (3) management of such action and proceeding, and non-court
related activities such as (4) giving legal advice and counsel, (5) rendering a
service that requires the use of legal knowledge or skill, (6) preparing
instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured.
State ex rel. Norvell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquerque, Inc., 514 P.2d 40, 45 (N.M.
1973). See also Morrison, supra, at 366-371 (noting that the cases and definitions of
the practice of law can be categorized into three areas: "representation in court,
drafting of legal documents, and giving legal advice..."); 7 AM. JUR. 2D, Attorneys At
Law § 118 (1997) (noting that "the practice of law is not limited to conducting
litigation [but will] included giving legal advice and counsel, rendering a service that
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill, and preparing instruments and contracts
by which legal rights are secured...") (footnotes omitted).
17. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 336 (1974)
[hereinafter Formal Opinion 336] (noting that a lawyer acting within her professional
capacity or otherwise is bound by the applicable disciplinary rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility); In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305 (App. Div. 1976)
(discussing disbarment actions taken against President Richard Nixon for his role in
Watergate). In a more recent context, the disbarment proceedings against President
Clinton was the third form of punishment against the President for giving false
testimony in the Jones case. James Jefferson, Panel: Disbar Clinton; President's
'serious misconduct' cited, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 23, 2000, at 1. The first punishment
was the U.S. House impeachment with Senate acquittal; the second punishment was
U.S District Court Judge Susan Webber Wright's finding of contempt; and finally, the
Arkansas Supreme Court's recommended disbarment. Id.
18. Currently, there has been very little legal discussion or commentary on the
regulation of lawyer-politicians under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See
generally Nancy B. Rapoport, Presidential Ethics: Should A Law Degree Make A
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provide a legal structure for the ethical practice of law, legal scholars
have questioned the viability of a "one-size-fits-all"19 application of
these rules to the unique features of many specialized practice
areas. 20 Specifically, they have suggested either a modification of the

Difference?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 725 (2001) (discussing the importance of high
standards of professional ethics and conduct with respect to a law degree and the
effect of lawyer misconduct on public perception).
19. Although the Model Rules provide some guidance for lawyers who leave the
practice of law to become government officers and employees, lawyers who work as
government prosecutors, lawyers who work for organizations and corporations, and
lawyers who are involved in law-related services, they do not provide specific guidance
for lawyers disengaged from the practice of law or law-related activities. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES R. 1.11 (discussing conflict of interest rules for lawyers resuming the
practice of law after serving as officers and employees of the government); MODEL
RULES R. 1.13 (discussing the role of lawyers representing corporate clients); MODEL
RULES R. 3.8 (regulating the conduct of lawyers serving as government prosecutors);
MODEL RULES R. 5.7 (discussing the responsibilities of lawyers participating in lawrelated services).
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, at I-ii (Discussion Draft 1980) . See
generally Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging
Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969 (1992); Roberta K.
Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the NonAdversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923 (1996); J. William
Futrell, Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Codes of ProfessionalResponsibility,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 825 (1994) (noting conflicts between the Model Rules and the
operation of environmental law); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of ProfessionalConduct
Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996) (evaluating the need for uniform rules of professional
conduct in federal proceedings); Steven H. Hobbs & Fay Wilson Hobbs, The Ethical
Management of Assets for Elder Clients: A Context, Role and Law Approach, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 1411 (1994) (noting conflicts in applying the Model Rules in family
law); Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum Federal Practice: Ethics and Erie, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 89 (1995); Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need For A
Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45 (1998); David B.
Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers after Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1147 (1993); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal
Prosecutors,Or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?:Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 429 (1996); Fred C. Zacharias, FederalizingLegal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335
(1994) (discussing the advantages of a uniform code of ethics); Elizabeth A. Allen,
Note, FederalizingThe No-Contact Rule: The Authority of the Attorney General, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 189 (1995). See also Federal Bar Ass'n, Model Rules of Professional
Conduct for Federal Lawyers, CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Rena A.
Gorlin ed., 3d. ed. 1994) (federal lawyers); Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America, Code of
Conduct, CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d. ed. 1994)
(litigators); Academy of Family Mediators, Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation, CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d.
ed. 1994) (dispute resolution/arbitration); American Arbitration Ass'n, Code of Ethics
for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Rena. A. Gorlin ed., 3d. ed. 1994) (arbitration); Ethical Standards of Professional
Responsibility, CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d. ed.
1994).

HeinOnline -- 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 846 2004-2005

2005]

THE POLITICS OF MISCONDUCT

current ethics rules,21 or a separate code of ethics to accommodate for
the unique differences inherent in specific areas of practice.22 The
Model Rules also raise similar concerns in failing to adequately
recognize and accommodate the diverse roles assumed by nonpracticing lawyers. A rethinking of the applicability of the Model
Rules in regulating the conduct of lawyer-politicians is both timely
and appropriate in light of the Arkansas Bar Association's recent
dilemma of determining the appropriate disciplinary measure to be
taken against former President William Jefferson Clinton for giving
false and misleading deposition testimony in a sexual harassment
case against him.23
This Article evaluates the Model Rules' one-size-fits-all approach
to regulating federal lawyer-politicians and examines a few of the
political problems that can arise when courts and bar associations
attempt to discipline these lawyers for unethical conduct committed
while in office. The thesis of this Article is that applying the current
ethics rules to the non-practicing lawyer-politician fails to
acknowledge and to take into account the significant changes in the
roles and functions of the modern lawyer. In regulating the conduct
of lawyer-politicians, the Model Rules fail to consider the specific and
inherent federal constitutional safeguards governing the political

21. See Gwen Thayer Handelman et al., Standards of Lawyer Conduct in Employee
Benefits Practice,24 J. PENSION PLANNING & COMPLIANCE Summer 1998, at 10; Malini
Majumdar, Ethics in the InternationalArena: The Need for Clarification, 8 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 439 (1995) (attempting to fill the gaps left open under the Model Rules);
Jocelyn Lupert, Note, The Department Of Justice Rule Governing Communications
With Represented Persons: Has The Department Defied Ethics?, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1119 (1996) (considering a Justice Department rule deviating from Model Rules Rule
4.2's prohibition against communications with persons represented by counsel).
22. See Major Bernard P. Ingold, An Overview and Analysis of the New Rules of
Professional Conduct for Army Lawyers, 124 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing the
Army Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated in 1987); Rapoport, supra note 18, at
46-47, 57-64 (advocating the adoption of a federal bankruptcy code of ethics and
discussing four distinct practice areas in which specialized codes are already in
existence: federal prosecutors, military law; family law; environmental law); Stanley
Sporkin, Commentary, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the
Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993). Currently, Congress has
endorsed specific regulations for lawyers practicing maritime and tax law, and for
federal executive branch employees. See 46 C.F.R. § 502.30 (2004) (regulating
maritime practice); 31 C.F.R. § 10.20-10.34 (2004) (regulating practice before the IRS);
5 C.F.R. § 2635 (2004) (regulating executive branch employees); 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (2005)
(regulating immigration lawyers).
23. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1131-32 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (holding
the President in contempt of court and ordering him to pay plaintiffs reasonable
expenses due to his willful failure to obey the court's discovery orders); Pete Yost, Ark.
Court Gives Clinton 30 Days to Respond to Legal-Ethics Complaints, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Feb. 11, 2000, at A28 (discussing the Arkansas Bar Association's decision to proceed in
disciplinary proceedings against President Clinton).
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process and politicians. Finally, disciplinary actions against lawyerpoliticians run the inherent danger of becoming entangled in the
politics surrounding the alleged misconduct. Thus, partisan politics
may ultimately affect the bar's ability to effectuate a fair and
unbiased sanction. For these reasons, this Article proposes that bar
associations adopt a legal-realist approach that considers specific
contextual factors surrounding the lawyer's misconduct in
determining when and how to regulate non-practicing lawyerpoliticians.24
Part I discusses the lawyer-statesman ideology which continues
to have an overriding influence in the discipline of lawyers. First, it
considers the pivotal role that lawyers played in colonial America in
helping to develop the new republic. It argues, however, that the
recent changes in modern society such as the growing national trend
towards increased governmental regulations and increased lawyer
specialization have resulted in a steady decline in the need for the
lawyer's historic and once critical role as a statesman. Thus, this
section contends that as a result of these changes, a broader
perspective of the roles played by lawyers is warranted and an overreliance on the use of this one factor in lawyer disciplinary decisionmaking is impractical.
Part II provides an overview of the development of lawyer
discipline in the United States. It briefly discusses the goals of
discipline and the available sanctions for regulating the professional
misconduct of lawyers along with the inherent and statutory powers
of the courts and bar associations to regulate lawyers.
Part III looks at Comment 5 of Rule 8.4 (misconduct) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and its applicability to
regulating the conduct of lawyer-politicians. This section begins by
discussing the theory behind the current judicial application of
Comment 525 to both practicing and non-practicing lawyers. It
evaluates the application of the comment to lawyer-politicians and
the soundness of the ABA's rationale for holding these lawyers to a
higher level of accountability under its ethics rules. In doing this,
24. Although I recognize the complexities in considering the larger issue of the
regulation of non-practicing attorneys in general, my focus on the lawyer-politician is
to create a common reference point that could be used to prompt a discussion of the
larger but more general question of how to regulate the non-practicing lawyer.
25. In 2002, the ABA adopted many of the changes proposed by its Ethics 2000
Commission, a group charged with studying and evaluating the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The changes included the addition and deletion of rules and the
addition of several new subparagraphs and significant amendments within the
existing rules. As a result of the changes, former Comment 4 of Model Rule 8.4 has
been renumbered and is currently Comment 5 of Rule 8.4. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) 5, 459 (amended 2002), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS
& ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS (2003).
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Part III examines the ABA's failed attempt to regulate the nonpracticing areas of lawyers participating in dual practices as a
foundation for evaluating its legitimacy and rationale for holding
lawyer-politicians to a higher ethical standard than practicing
lawyers who commit similar acts of misconduct.
Part IV considers the applicability of legal realism as a model in
determining how and when to regulate the conduct of federal lawyerpoliticians and considers a few of the constitutional and political
considerations that justify a deviation from applying the current
Model Rules to federal lawyer-politicians who commit acts of
misconduct.26
Part V proposes that bar associations adopt a functional
approach to regulating lawyer-politicians. This approach considers
such variables as the office and job function of the lawyer-politician,
the forum for the misconduct, the legal nature of the misconduct (e.g.
criminal or civil), and the respective interests of the bar, judiciary
and the political process in determining whether to discipline these
lawyers for their actions or to defer discipline to other branches of
government such as the executive branch, legislature or judiciary
that may have a more significant interest in the lawyer-politician's
actions. Part V concludes by advocating the creation of, and reliance
upon, functional zones that consider these variables within the
context of several areas of questionable or improper conduct.

I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LAWYER-STATESMAN
The quintessential role of the lawyer in American society has
evolved over time from one of public contempt to a more respectable
view of the lawyer as a statesman. 27 The "lawyer-statesman" concept
is a model of professional excellence that has single-handedly
influenced and shaped the collective aspirations and identity of the
modern lawyer. It is often referred to as the ultimate character trait
for lawyers-one that combines both a generalized conception of the
political virtues of statesmanship and the ordinary circumstances
26. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism For Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 469
(1990) [hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Realism]; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 844 (1992).
27.

See, e.g., MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY,

1776-1876, at 39-40 (1976) (discussing the public hostility towards the bar at the time
of the American Revolution); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4-

10 (1911) (noting that throughout the Seventeenth Century, a lawyer was a person of
disrepute and suspicion and providing several reasons for the slowness in the change
in public attitudes towards lawyers). Currently, public esteem for lawyers remains
low. See W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers:
Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REV. 527, 528
(2002); Dave Orrick, Survey says: Lawyers beat only media at bottom of public opinion,
CHI. DAILY HERALD, June 14, 2002, at 1.
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surrounding legal practice.28 The idea embraces such attributes as
public service and the civic-mindedness associated with it, along with
prudence and practical wisdom.29
The notion of the lawyer as statesman, however, is broader than
just a generalized belief that the virtues of prudence and public
service are desirable attributes. It implies that these qualities have
special importance and value to lawyers. Thus, legal scholars and
practitioners have construed the concept to mean not only that the
practical experiences of lawyers promote these qualities but also that
their professional responsibilities require them.30
Although bar associations and courts sometimes fail to expressly
acknowledge the virtues of the lawyer-statesman idea, they often
either consciously or unconsciously rely on the concept as a
significant gauge in deciding when and to what extent discipline
should be imposed upon practicing and non-practicing lawyers who
commit professional misconduct. Whether such reliance is
warranted, however, requires a review of the critical role played by
lawyers during colonial society that fostered the growth and
development of the lawyer-statesman idea and some of the recent
societal changes that have contributed towards its decline.
A. The Lawyer in ColonialAmerica
The lawyer's presence in colonial America prior to and shortly
28. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 109 (1993). Chief Justice
William Rehnquist has described lawyer-statesmen as "people who held high public
office but also dealt easily with ideas [and who] left their marks not only by their acts
but by their spoken and written words." See William H. Rehnquist, The LawyerStatesman in American History, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 537, 553 (1986). Included in
the list of men throughout American history whom Chief Justice Rehnquist would
nominate as lawyer-statesmen are: Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison and John Marshall for the period immediately following the adoption of the
United States Constitution and Abraham Lincoln, Stephen Douglas, Salmon Chase
and William Seward for the period directly preceding the end of the Civil War. Id. at
537, 546.
29. See KRONMAN, supra note 28, at 109. Kronman notes that it is the lawyer's
judgment or wisdom that is the most important value of the lawyer-statesman and
argues that statesmanship is the "skill or excellence at making judgments about the
public good." Id. at 3, 87. See also Timothy J. Sullivan, The Legal Profession and its
Future: Recapturing the Ideal of the Statesman-Lawyer, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 47879 (1998) (describing the lawyer-statesman as an idea that embodies three principle
attributes: (1) the learned person who is broadly and deeply educated in both
techniques and values; (2) the helper or counselor who can provide counsel to "the
heart as well as to the head," and (3) the civic leader who is capable of using lawyerly
skills outside of the lawyer-client relationship to provide service to the community atlarge).
30. See KRONMAN, supra note 28, at 109. See generally Sullivan, supra note 29, at
478-79; Rehnquist, supra note 28, at 553 (noting the significance of legal education and
law practice in the development of the lawyer-statesman of colonial times).
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after the Revolution was unwelcome by most of the colonists. There
was great animosity towards lawyers and the organized bar during
this period.31 Many of the early colonies had enacted statutes making
the practice of law impractical or prohibited.32 Judges were appointed
who had no legal training.33 The overwhelming majority of colonial
lawyers were men who had received their only legal training through
colonial clerkships and not through a system of formalized legal
education.34 At times, even radical groups rioted against lawyers in
protest to excessive litigation.35 By the eve of the American
Revolution, however, the public's attitude towards lawyers began to
change significantly.
The colonists' growing respect for and acceptance of lawyers

31. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY To MODERN TIMES 132
(1953) (noting the public hostility towards lawyers in England during the era of the
Puritan Revolution and holding that "this hostility was exaggerated in the colonies");
id. at 233 (noting that public antagonism towards early bar associations was the result
of such factors as a general belief in the right of every person to pursue the profession
of his choice, the distrust of specialization and special training requirements, and the
fear that professionalism might result in the creation of privileged and exclusive
classes of individuals).
32. See, e.g., Richard B. Morris, The Legal Profession in America on the Eve of the
Revolution, printed in HARRY W. JONES, POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL
CONTINUITY 5-6 (1976) (discussing statutory provisions in colonial Virginia, South
Carolina and Massachusetts that prohibited lawyers from receiving compensation for
appearing on behalf of clients in courts). See also POUND, supra note 31, at 137 n.14
(citing Act VII of 1645, 1 Hening, 304 which acknowledged the multiplicity of
troublesome lawsuits brought by the "unskillfulness and covetousness of attorneys"
during this period and required that all "mercenary attorneys be wholly expelled from
that office except as to cases already undertaken or depending").
33. Only a few of the colonial judges were men who had acquired formal legal
education. See POUND, supra note 31, at 132 n.3. The limited number of colonial judges
with legal education was the result of low salaries and the uncertainties of job tenure
that discouraged young attorneys from seeking judgeships. See LORRETA A. NORRIS &
LARRY M. BOYER, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AMERICAN COLONIAL COURTS AND LAWYERS:
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1976). Thus, the colonial courts provided little
assistance in the creation of a trained and effective organized bar.
34. See JONES, supra note 32, at 11 (discussing the two possible routes to
admission to the colonial bar: (1) formal legal training at the Inns of Court in England;
and (2) apprenticeships with established attorneys). Because of the costs for study at
the Inns of Court, many colonial parents chose to apprentice their sons as law clerks
for practitioners. Id. See also PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL
AMERICA 65 (1992). Thomas Jefferson, who had studied law under the mentorship of
Judge George Wythe of the Virginia Court of Chancery, was himself an avid critic of
the apprenticeship system and was instrumental in introducing more formal
instruction in American legal training. See JONES, supra note 32, at 17. The fruits of
his efforts resulted in the first law professorship at the College of William and Mary in
1779 which was held by Jefferson's mentor, George Wythe. Id.
35. See WARREN, supra note 27, at 214-18 (highlighting a few examples of the
intense public outcries and riots in response to excessive litigation for debts and
mortgage foreclosures shortly after the Revolution).
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during this junction in history can be attributed to several things.
First, at the end of the Seventeenth Century, many of the colonies
had begun to establish official court systems to administer justice.36
These courts required formal legal training for persons acting as
agents or advocates for litigation.37 By the Eighteenth Century, many
colonial families with sufficient resources had begun to send their
sons abroad to England to study law in the Inns of Court.38 In
addition to their formal legal training, a significantly large
proportion of lawyers during this period, unlike their predecessors,
also had obtained general academic training and degrees from
colonial and English universities and colleges, thus better preparing
themselves to serve as lawyers and community leaders in any
capacity.39
Second, the colonies had established formal qualifications and
rules for admission to the practice of law and for monitoring the
professional responsibility of lawyers, thus fostering some sense of
lawyer accountability. For example, in Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Maryland, where the colonies had
adopted the traditional English approach to bar admission, every
court possessed the power to admit lawyers to practice before it.40 In
Rhode Island, Connecticut and Delaware, all courts of general

36. See POUND, supra note 31, at 144-45 (noting the establishment of court
systems in the principle colonies of Virginia (1705), Massachusetts (1699), Maryland
(1692), New York (1691), Pennsylvania (1722), New Jersey (1704), and South Carolina
(1721)).
37. Id. at 145.
38. During the period from 1760 up to the Revolution, more than 100 lawyers were
studying law in the Inns of Court. Id. at 157. Lawyers who were admitted by the Inns
of Court were generally recognized as qualified to practice law in the colonies. Id. at
156-57.
39. A majority of the lawyers during the era of the Revolution were college
graduates. See id. at 158. For example, in South Carolina, fifteen of the fifty-eight
lawyers admitted to practice prior to the Revolution had received legal training in the
Inns of Courts and a number had graduated from English and colonial universities.
See id. at 153. Colonial colleges in existence during this period were: Harvard (1636),
William and Mary (1696), Yale (1700), College of New Jersey (now Princeton) (1746),
King's (now Columbia) (1754), College of Philadelphia (now University of
Pennsylvania) (1756), Brown (1764), Queen's (now Rutgers) (1766), and Dartmouth
(1769). Id. at 158.
40. See id. at 145-46 n.49 (citing Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the
Law, BULLETIN

15 OF THE

CARNEGIE FOUNDATION

FOR THE ADVANCEMENT

OF

TEACHING 67-68 (1921)). In Massachusetts, there were three levels of lawyers: lower
court lawyers, superior court lawyers, and barristers. Id. at 148-149. "Only barristers
were [allowed] to argue in the Superior Court[s], then the highest court." Id. at 150. To
achieve the level of barrister, a lawyer was required to have at least three years of
study under a preceptor. Id. This generally resulted in four years of practice as a
lawyer in both the lower and superior courts. Id.
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jurisdiction retained the authority to admit lawyers to practice.41 In
South Carolina, Virginia, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina,
the colonies had adopted a "principle of centralized control over" bar
admission, one where control was vested in either the highest court
of the colony or through a special examining board appointed by that
court.42 Where control of bar admission into a jurisdiction was vested
in the highest court of a colony, that court also possessed the powers
to suspend or disbar lawyers for improper conduct.43
Probably equally, if not more, significant in changing the public's
attitude towards lawyers during this period were the serious social
and legal issues resulting from the imminent political crisis that
confronted the colonists on the eve of the Revolution and the colonial
bar's response to it.44 The magnitude of this crisis alone necessitated
the critical leadership skills and legal expertise possessed by the
colonial lawyer in assisting the colonists in their secession from
England and in establishing a new republic.
The colonial bar's contributions during the American Revolution
were numerous. First, although often overlooked, lawyers were
critical in shaping America's commitment to the "Rule of Law" and
creating a legal framework for articulating the issues surrounding
the Revolution.45 More specifically, the colonial lawyers were
successful in convincing the colonists that rebellion against England
was an appropriate legal recourse under the principle of Rule of Law
which these lawyers believed was both embedded in and supported
under English law.46 Because the political crisis was jurisprudential
in nature, lawyers played key roles in defining and defending the
41. See id. at 146. Generally, bar admission in a court in any of these jurisdiction
was sufficient for admission to practice before any other court in that respective
jurisdiction. Id.
42. Id. at 146-47. For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court retained the
power to control admission into the practice of law in South Carolina, while in
Virginia, an examining board appointed by the highest court held the power to control
bar admission. Id.
43. Id. at 147.
44. See Rehnquist, supra note 28, at 537 (noting that the lawyer-statesmen played
crucial roles in the development of the United States during two significant periods:
(1) the creation and adoption of the Constitution after the Revolutionary War; and (2)
the decade leading up to the Civil War).

45. See Robert MacCrate, 'The Lost Lawyer' Regained: The Abiding Values of the
Legal Profession, 100 DICK. L. REV. 587, 588 (1995) (defining "Rule of Law" as law
originating from the people, based on their consent, expressed through their chosen
representatives and articulated in a written document).
46. See JONES, supra note 32, at xiv (pointing out that "ideas of constitutionalism,
civil liberty and procedural due process" were embedded in English constitutional and
legal tradition); see also BODEN, supra note 7, at 1, 7 (noting that the American
Revolution started as one for the Rule of Law and members of the colonial bar were
instrumental in characterizing the legal cause as one for the Rule of Law).
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American position and in unifying the colonist around it.47
Second, colonial lawyers also acted as watchdogs for the Colonies
during this period. As a result of their legal training, they were able
to successfully anticipate the future and detrimental impact of
British statutes imposed upon the colonies and to counsel the
colonists accordingly.48
Third, colonial lawyers were instrumental in managing the
Revolution by insuring that it would remain on track as a revolution
for liberty under the law, and not one that would result in a lust for
power such as a dictatorship or monarchy.49 For instance, as an
imminent war with England approached, colonial lawyers took the
lead in assisting the colonies in creating individual state
governments to prevent against the possible threat of military
dictatorship or a reign of terror that could have resulted from the
void left by the collapse of British control of the colonies.50
Finally, colonial lawyers provided critical leadership in the
47. See generally BODEN, supra note 7, at 7-30 (discussing the role of colonial
lawyers in the American Revolution). Relying on the position taken by Sir Edward
Coke, the late Chief Justice of England, colonial lawyers were vital in articulating the
American position that law was not what Parliament stated that it was, but that there
existed some higher law such as natural law that even the lawmakers were required to
obey. Id. at 8. Chief Justice Coke held the position that "the powers of Parliament were
circumscribed by fundamental common law principles." Id. In short, his position was
one that supported the supremacy of the British common, or constitutional, law which
the colonists also believed was expressive of natural law. Id. This view of law and
respect for law was the single underlying factor that made the creation of the Union
possible. Id. at 18.
48. Id. at 14. Colonial lawyers recognized that the Declaratory Act, although later
repealed, was an attempt by Parliament to preserve its control over the colonies by
declaring that the colonies were subordinate to its legislation. Id. (citing to 6 Geo. III c.
12 (1766)). Their ability to anticipate the consequences of Parliamentary legislation
permitted the colonial lawyers to articulate well-reasoned objections for each
subsequent grievance. Id.
49. See id. at 22. For example, in 1776, Parliament issued a statute that allowed
the King to assume the payment of judicial salaries in the colonies rather than
continuing with the current process at that time of paying judges from the
appropriations of the colonial legislature raised through local taxes. Id. at 23. After
Parliament's announcement that the five judges of the Boston Superior Court would
have their salaries paid by the King under the statute, four of the five judges refused
their salaries. Id. Chief Judge Peter Oliver, a Tory, accepted his salary and announced
that he would never reject it. Id. When backlash towards Oliver developed, the colonial
bar was quick to respond by instituting impeachment proceedings against him in the
Massachusetts House of Representatives. Id. at 24. John Adams and other Boston
lawyers played key roles in managing the impeachment proceedings which were
modeled after the procedures used in the British House of Commons. Id.
50. Id. at 27. All of the colonies had created provisional state governments in some
form prior to the declaring of their independence from England. Id. Eight state
constitutions were completed and in operation by the end of 1776 while two additional
constitutions were adopted by 1777. Id.
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creation of the U.S. Constitution and other legal structures for the
new federal and state governments. 51 In addition to their leadership
roles, these lawyers were actively engaged in the daily practice of
law.52 However, they readily agreed to take time off from their
established law practices to perform the important public service of
creating the United States of America.53
In short, the formal training that these college-educated lawyers
brought to the bar, their impressive social credentials as established
practitioners and their numerous acts of public leadership displayed
during this critical period in American history, no doubt contributed
to the elevation of the legal profession in the eyes of the public during
despite
these
Century.54
Unfortunately,
the
Eighteenth
contributions, the feelings of public distrust and dislike for lawyers
that had plagued the legal profession prior to the Revolution quickly
55
began to reappear.
B. The Decline of the Lawyer-Statesman
Despite its continued pervasiveness as a model of professional
excellence by bar associations, legal scholars and practitioners are
swift to agree that in the eyes of the public the lawyer-statesman
idea no longer carries with it the weight and prestige that it once did
during the colonial period. Several reasons exist to explain the
decline of the presence of the attributes of the lawyer-statesman in
modern legal practice and in the eyes of the public.

51. See supra note 7 (discussing specific contributions of the colonial lawyers in the
formation of the United States).
52. See BODEN, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that the biographies of the lawyersigners of the Declaration of Independence reveal that they were legal practitioners
and not just lawyers in name only).
53. See id. Because of their practical experience, colonial lawyers were able to
provide both political acumen and sound jurisprudential insights that were
instrumental in keeping the revolution on course. Id. Although most of the colonial
lawyers returned to their law practices upon completion of their service during this
period, a few lawyers such as John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were called to even
higher public service through the Office of the President of the United States. See id.
54. See JONES, supra note 32, at 18. Ultimately, the fruits of the colonial bar's
labor would culminate into the development of a system of government that would be
envied throughout the world by the eve of the Twenty-First Century. Id.
55. See WARREN, supra note 27, at 212. Legal historians have attributed this
revival of the previous sentiments of public contempt for lawyers to the loss of large
numbers of the most reputable and older members of the bar who, being Royalists,
either left the country or retired from the practice of law after the Revolution. Id. at
212-13. This loss resulted in leaving the practice of law into the hands of a lower
quality of lawyers and to the collapse of the social and financial structures of the
nation resulting from the Revolutionary War that led to enormous public debt,
increased taxation, and increased litigation brought by lawyers to collect on debts and
mortgage foreclosures. Id. at 212-15.
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One explanation for the declining role of the lawyer-statesman is
the simple recognition that the political issues and exigencies that
confronted the colonists and the colonial bar no longer exist today. As
noted earlier, one significant distinction between colonial society in
which the lawyer-statesman idea developed and flourished and
modern American society was the nature and extent of the national
crisis facing the colonists. Both the leadership and legal expertise
provided by colonial lawyers were important and necessary
contributions for assisting the colonists in establishing and
developing a new and effective governmental structure to replace the
former British control of the colonies after the war. However, the
nation will never again confront such a national state of affairs of the
magnitude present during the colonial period. The colonial bar's
historic and one-time role in the creation of the United States was
limited solely for that specific period.
A second explanation can be attributed to the growth and the
prominence of administrative agencies in American government.
Although administrative agencies are not mentioned in the
Constitution, they have become an important and powerful part of
the federal and state governmental structure and have provided a
greater opportunity for non-lawyer participation in modern
lawmaking.56 Unlike during the colonial period where lawyers were
essential in assisting the colonies in creating federal and state
constitutions and other legislation,57 administrative agencies have
become invaluable in assisting Congress and state legislatures in
creating legislation because of their expertise and efficiency in the
creation and administration of public and private regulations, and
their independence from the influence of partisan politics.58
Consequently, the analytical and reasoning skills once monopolized
and exercised by the lawyer-statesman during the colonial

56.

See WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE

UNITED STATES 15 (West 2d ed. 1999). The first federal agency, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, was established in 1887; the largest growth in federal
administrative agencies occurred during the 1930s when Congress delegated
significant powers to administrative agencies in order to assist in regulating the
national economy and providing relief to victims of the Great Depression. Id. The
unrestrained growth and transformation of federal legislative power to administrative
agencies has often led some to refer to agencies as a "fourth branch" of government
and the resulting government structure as the "administrative state." See President's
Commission on Administrative Management, Report with Special Studies (1937),
quoted in ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (West

2001) [hereinafter AMAN & MAYTON].
57. See generally supra note 7.
58. See BURNHAM supra note 56, at 193-94. For a good discussion of the delegation
of congressional power to administrative agencies, see AMAN & MAYTON, supra note
56, at 9-11.
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lawmaking process can now be found in the numerous state and
federal bureaucrats who participate in agency rulemaking and
adjudication.
Significant changes in the culture of law practice and in
Twentieth Century legal education have also contributed to the
decline of the lawyer-statesman.59 Today's consumers unlike their
colonial counterparts demand both increased innovation and quicker
responses for legal problem solving. As one would have expected,
however, these increases in consumer demands and expectations
have detracted from the legal-generalist stance that once
characterized the members of the colonial bar and have resulted in
an implied requirement and societal expectation of more lawyer
specialization.60 Unfortunately, modern trends toward specialization
in legal practice have resulted in fewer lawyers who hold themselves
out as competent in more than one area of expertise.
In addition, a drastic shift away from the earlier prevailing
notion of the practice of law as a learned and distinguished
profession to the more general notion that the legal profession is no
different than any other business or occupation has resulted in the
promotion of the single-minded goal of personal wealth accumulation
over the professional goal of public service.61 Today, many lawyers
and law firms have retreated from the once sacred line that
separated them and the legal profession from their clients. Because
lawyers are evaluated primarily on their short-term financial
performance as represented by the number of billable hours they
submit and record, there is an enormous amount of pressure for
lawyers to spend much of their time billing hours to meet and
surpass the firm's yearly billing quotas and achieve partnerships.62
59. See Richard A. Posner, J. Byron McCormick Lecture: Professionalisms,40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (discussing the effects of specialization in the demise of the lawyerstatesman); Rehnquist, supra note 28, at 554-55 (noting the differences in the skills
taught in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century legal education).
60. See Posner, supra note 59, at 6. Judge Posner contends that an attitude of
lawyer specialization is prevalent throughout the modern legal profession and alludes
that specialization has resulted in the creation of additional professional hierarchies
even within the practice of law that have further contributed towards the demise of
the generalist nature of the lawyer-statesman. Id. For example, within the federal
judiciary where most judicial work once was performed solely by the federal judges,
much of the work today has been divided and reallocated amongst interns and externs,
staff attorneys and law clerks, federal magistrates, and finally district judges, circuit
judges, and Supreme Court Justices. Id.
61. See POUND, supra note 31, at 5 (discussing public service as an important
characteristic that separated a profession from a trade or occupation); see also
Sullivan, supra note 29, at 479 (contending that the pursuit of money has driven the
lawyer-statesman from the focal place in legal profession); Rehnquist, supra note 28,
at 556 (discussing the change in focus of modern lawyering from service to money).
62. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 98 (discussing the intense pressure placed on
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Needless to say, the pressure to bill has virtually eliminated any
quality time left over for participation in public affairs.63
The nature and formal structures of Twentieth Century legal
education have also contributed to the demise of the lawyerstatesman. Contemporary legal education has become more
institutionalized, time-consuming and demanding than during the
previous century. Students desiring to become lawyers must now
participate in rigorous educational programs that require numerous
hours of legal studies and the passing of a state bar examination.
This institutionalization of modern legal education has eliminated
much of the emphasis and concentration on the development of those
practical skills (e.g. logical reasoning and trial advocacy) that were
essential for the successful lawyer-statesman of the past Nineteenth
Century.64
Finally, the decline of the lawyer-statesman of yesterday can be
attributed to changes in modern political campaigning.65 For
example, the logical reasoning and oratorical skills taught during
Nineteenth Century legal education were easily transferable to the
"stump speeches and printed tracts" that dominated political
campaigns during that period.66 However, as a result of the creation
of mass communications such as widely-circulated newspapers, radio
and television, modern political campaigning has placed less of an
emphasis on these skills. Political campaigning is no longer the
forensic battle that it once was but has evolved into a media fight
where a candidate's success is more heavily dependent upon
successful marketing techniques.67
In short, the lawyer-statesman idea as conceptualized during the
colonial period and applied today is simply more idealistic than

lawyers by law firms to bill and the potential for double-billing in order to meet this
demand); see also Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62
IND. L.J. 151, 155 (1987) (noting the temptations to exaggerate hourly billing figures to
meet yearly billing quotas imposed by law firms).
63. See Rehnquist, supra note 28, at 556 (contending that the manner of
organization of the modern legal profession has militated against a lawyer's ability to
spend large amounts of time in political activity of any kind including campaigning for
public office or the drafting of speeches and position papers for such candidates).
64. Id. at 553. Chief Justice Rehnquist has argued that Nineteenth Century legal
education prepared lawyers for public leadership by teaching them to deal logically
and easily with ideas and to articulate and express their thoughts both verbally and in
writing. Id.
65. Id. at 554-55.
66. Id. at 554. Chief Justice Rehnquist has contended that renowned lawyerstatesmen throughout American history were men who had succeeded in "the practice
of law, the administration of high public office, and... with the spoken and written
use of the English language." Id. at 555.
67. Id. at 555.
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practical. Although the concept is an admirable one, it is
unreasonable to place an over-reliance on it when disciplining
lawyers. Society has changed radically since colonial times and the
need for the specific skills provided by lawyers during the founding of
America has steadily declined. The role of the modern lawyer has
had to readapt to these changes in order to survive. Consequently,
the skills and resources necessary to meet these changes have made
it much more difficult and at times even impossible for lawyers today
to fully achieve and realize the attributes of the lawyer-statesman
than at any previous period in the history of the legal profession.
II. THE

REGULATION OF PRACTICING LAWYERS

Generally, the goals of lawyer discipline are threefold: (1) to
protect the public;68 (2) to protect the administration of justice;69 and
(3) to preserve the public confidence in the legal profession.70 In
protecting the interests of the public and the profession, a primary
concern of both the courts and the bar has been to provide the public
with sufficient safeguards against "the objectionable activities of
persons unfit to practice law .... "71 Similarly, in protecting the
administration of justice, an important concern has been to protect
the legal system from "lawyers who subvert the judicial process by
misrepresenting the facts or law to the court, [commit or encourage]
perjury, or... engag[e] in conduct that unfairly interferes with the
truth-seeking process of the courts or functioning of the legal
system."72 Finally, in preserving the public's confidence in the legal
profession, the courts and the bar have recognized that because of

68. See, e.g., In re Imbriani, 694 A.2d 1030, 1035 (N.J. 1997); ABA STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 1.1 (1991) (amended 1992) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS].
69. See, e.g., In re Bourcier, 939 P.2d 604, 608 (Or. 1997); ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 68, at Standard 1.1.
70. See, e.g. In re Agostini, 632 A.2d 80, 81 (Del. 1993); In re Addams, 579 A.2d
190, 199 (D.C. 1990). Although many courts often combine the disciplinary goal of
preserving the public's confidence in the legal profession with the goal of protecting the
administration of justice, some courts have noted that preserving public confidence in
the legal profession may also entail the separate concern of preserving the professional
status of lawyers. See, e.g., Emil v. Miss. State Bar, 690 So. 2d 301, 327 (Miss. 1997)
(acknowledging a concern for the diminished status of lawyers and the need to
preserve the dignity and reputation of the legal profession).
71. See In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 65 (Cal. 1998) (quoting 1
B.E. WITKEN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 623, at 737 (4th ed. 1996)). See also ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 68, Standard 1.1 (noting that a primary purpose of lawyer
discipline is to protect the public and administration of justice from lawyers who have
failed to or are unlikely to discharge their professional responsibilities to clients, the
public and the legal profession).
72. Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards
For Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 17 n.78 (1998).
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the specific legal training of lawyers and their almost exclusive
monopoly of the practice of law, the public has consistently viewed
73
lawyers as the gatekeepers for access to the law and the courts.
Thus, imposing appropriate sanctions on lawyers who act improperly
helps to maintain the public support and respect for the law
74
necessary for the effective operation of the legal system.
There are numerous sanctions available in disciplining lawyers.
Although most courts and the bar probably would insist that the
purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish lawyers, many of the
sanctions typically imposed fit within the classic definitions of
punishment and can be supported by the traditional utilitarian
justifications for criminal punishment: incapacitation, rehabilitation
and deterrence.75 Sanctions falling within the incapacitation group
are the most severe and are reserved for the worst types of lawyer
misconduct. For instance, these sanctions usually include disbarment
and suspension and are imposed not only as a means to discipline
lawyers but also as a means to protect the public and the
administration of justice by the temporary or permanent removal of
the lawyer from the practice of law.76
Sanctions designed to facilitate lawyer rehabilitation, however,
provide less drastic alternatives to the removal from the practice of
law. They are sufficiently flexible to take into account the increased

73. See id. This perception may be changing, however, as more states begin to
relax their rules concerning the unauthorized practice of law to allow non-lawyers to
perform services traditionally provided by lawyers, and as more persons in need of
legal services turn to self-help measures. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery
of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 214-16 (1990) (noting
the increased market for legal services provided by non-lawyers).
74. See In re Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. 1988) (acknowledging that
severe sanctions are needed to restore the public's confidence in the legal system); In
re Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 974 (Wash. 1990) (noting that stern disciplinary sanctions
help to maintain public confidence in the legal system and enhance respect for the
law).
75. See Levin, supra note 72, at 71 (arguing that legal sanctions fit within the
classic definition of criminal punishment and can be supported by its traditional
justifications); see also In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1967) (noting that
disbarment involves adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature that require
procedural due process); but see Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882) (holding that
disbarment proceedings are civil by nature); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 139-41 (1986) (discussing other available sanctions such as mandatory
apologies, conservatorship, supervised practice, recertification, and the imposition of
costs and fines). Although the non-utilitarian justification of retribution is not listed,
the Arkansas Bar Association may have been influenced by this in deciding to take
disciplinary action against President Clinton after his acquittal by the Senate during
his impeachment. See Jefferson, supra note 17, at 1 (discussing the U.S. House
impeachment of President Clinton with Senate acquittal).
76. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550 (noting that disbarment is designed to
protect the public); Levin, supra note 72, at 20; WOLFRAM, supranote 75, at 129.
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pressures under which lawyers practice and the relationship of those
pressures to lawyer misconduct. Rehabilitative sanctions typically
include such measures as probation and mandatory education in
professional responsibility.77 Those sanctions falling within the
deterrence category are the least restrictive and are designed to deter
current and future lawyer misconduct by warning the violating
lawyers, other lawyers, and the general public of both the
blameworthiness of the violators conduct and the bar's disproval of
it.7s Deterrence sanctions typically include public and private
censures. 79
Finally, most courts and bar associations consider several
mitigating factors when determining the severity of the sanctions to
impose for lawyer misconduct. For example, they may consider such
factors as the absence of a prior disciplinary record or dishonest or
selfish motive, the presence of personal or emotional problems, and a
"timely and good faith effort to make restitution or to [correct] the
consequences of the misconduct."o They may also consider the
violating lawyer's attitude towards the disciplinary proceeding, her
character or reputation, the imposition of additional penalties or
sanctions, remorse, and the remoteness of the prior acts of
misconduct.81
In the following sections, the Article will provide an overview of
the development of the powers of the courts and bar in regulating the
conduct of practicing lawyers. As one will see through the evolution
of the bar's regulatory powers, the organized bar has not always lived
up to its stated goals of protecting the public interest and the
administration of justice. At times, the bar's regulatory powers have
been used to protect and promote its own political interests.
A. The Powers of the Court and Bar
Historically, the power to regulate the professional conduct of
lawyers in the United States has consistently fallen within the hands
77. See Levin, supra note 72, at 23; see also Segretti v. State Bar, 544 P.2d 929,
936-37 (Cal. 1976) (noting that the California Supreme Court routinely requires that
during the period of suspension, a lawyer must take and pass the state's version of the
multistate bar examination on professional responsibility); In re Barket, 424 So.2d
751, 752 (Fla. 1982) (requiring that a suspended attorney pass all portions of the state
bar examination prior to reinstatement).
78. See WOLFRAM, supra note 75, at 126-28; Levin, supra note 72, at 21-22.
79. See WOLFRAM, supra note 75, at 126-28 (discussing private and public
reprimands and admonitions).
80. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, Standard 9.32 (discussing factors that may be
considered in mitigation). See also WOLFRAM, supra note 75, at 119 (outlining factors
that courts have used when determining the appropriate discipline for lawyer
misconduct).
81. See ABA STANDARDS, supranote 68, Standard 9.32.
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of both judges and members of the organized bar. From as far back as
the enactment of the Statute of Westminster in 1275,82 the conduct of
lawyers has always been subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts in
which they practiced.83 Even today, courts continue to order and
impose sanctions such as fines and orders of contempt against
lawyers who file frivolous claims or defenses in support of their
clients' interests,84 use abusive trial tactics,85 and disregard or
disobey court orders.86
While the judiciary has always reserved the ability to regulate
lawyers practicing within its tribunals, the formal regulation of
lawyer conduct by the organized bar is a relatively recent
phenomenon.87 Despite Alexis de Tocqueville's depiction of the bar in
82. See Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., ch. 29 (1275). The Statute of
Westminster I was directed at allegations of lawyer misconduct that included actions
of extortion, bribery, deceit, collusion or malfeasance committed by lawyers in the
Kings Court. Id.
83. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. at 265. In Ex parte Wall, the Supreme Court held
that a judicial proceeding to exclude an attorney from the practice of law was one
within the proper jurisdiction of the court of which the lawyer practiced and did not
violate the Constitution. Id. at 288-89. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that
disciplinary proceedings are "not for the purpose of punishment, but for the purpose of
preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them." Id. at 288. For a more detailed discussion of the inherent powers of
courts to regulate lawyer conduct, see WOLFRAM, supranote 75, at 22-33.
84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (providing for the striking of pleadings and the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions by the court as a means to check abuses in the
signing of pleadings); Leonard v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Minnesota's
equivalent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and noting that the Rule was
designed to deter frivolous claims and defenses brought by lawyers or parties).
85. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
52-55 (Del. 1994) (finding that a lawyer's conduct during the taking of a deposition was
an abuse of discovery when the lawyer "improperly directed the witness not to answer
certain questions; was extraordinarily rude ... and vulgar" to opposing counsel, and
obstructed opposing counsel from eliciting testimony necessary to assist the court in
the case).
86. A court may find a lawyer in "contempt of court" for the disobedience or
disregard of a court order or command of judicial authority. See, e.g., Chambers v.
Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1990) (noting that "[clourts of justice are universally
acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence,
respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates"
(quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227 (1821))); Hodges v. Gray, 901 S.W.2d 1,
4 (Ark. 1995) (noting that "[t]he court's contempt proceedings are to preserve the
power and dignity of the court, to punish for disobedience of orders, and to preserve
and enforce the rights of the parties"). For a more recent example of the court's
exercise of its power of contempt, see Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 which
held lawyer and President William Clinton in contempt of court and ordered him to
pay plaintiffs reasonable expenses due to his willful failure to obey the court's
discovery orders.
87. Although evidence exists to indicate that the country's earliest bar associations
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its early days as the "American aristocracy,"ss its prestige in the eyes
of the public was low. For instance, during the 1830s to the end of the
Civil War, public hostility towards bar associations was high, causing
many of them to disappear.89 By 1875, the organized bar had begun
to struggle in determining whether its purpose and focus should be
geared towards commercialism or professionalism.90 The rise of
commercialism in the practice of law ultimately began to create a
fear in the minds of many members of the bar that the profession
was quickly moving away from being a respected arm of the judiciary
to just an ordinary trade association or occupation whose primary
focus was to make money. 91 The bar's success in acquiring
professional status, however, involved a tradeoff. To secure a
desirable position in the eyes of the public, the organized bar chose to
set in place its own procedures for self-governance and regulation of
its members.92 Consequently, in order to accomplish this, state and
local bar associations began to adopt formal codes of ethics.
In 1887, the Alabama Bar Association adopted the first official
ethics code.93 Shortly afterwards, the ABA appointed a committee to
were concerned with gaining political power over the profession, these organizations
were primarily established as avenues for fellowship. See POUND, supra note 31, at
208-09 (noting that the Detroit Bar Association held occasional meetings to discuss the
issues of lawyer discipline for professional misconduct); WOLFRAM, supra note 75, at
34, 36 (noting that in their earliest form, bar associations began as eating clubs and
social gatherings for lawyers).
88.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 125 (Richard D. Heffner ed.

1984) (1835).
89. See POUND, supra note 31, at 233 (noting that public antagonism towards early
bar associations was the result of such factors as a general belief in the right of every
person to pursue the profession of her choice, the distrust of specialization and special
training requirements, and the fear that professionalism might result in the creation
of privileged and exclusive classes of individuals).
90. The tension facing the early bar associations can be fully appreciated by
reflecting on a discussion of the term "profession" by former Harvard Law School Dean
Roscoe Pound. Dean Pound noted that the central attributes of a profession are
organization, learning, and public service. See id. at 6. In comparing the commercial
nature of a profession to that of an occupation or trade association, he notes that in a
profession, "[g]aining a livelihood is incidental, whereas in a business or trade it is the
entire purpose." Id. at 5; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 75, at 14-16 (discussing nine
features that are commonly shared by most professions).
91. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 24-25 (Greenwood Press pub. 1980); see
also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 12 (1908).
92. See Laurie Hatten-Boyd, Ebbs And Tides And Water Rise-What's The 'Real'
Concern With MDPs?, 53 TAX LAW. 488, 492 (2000).

93. See DRINKER, supra note 91, at 23. After the adoption of the Alabama State
Bar Association's Code of Ethics in 1887, bar associations in ten states followed suit
and adopted their own codes that were modeled heavily after the Alabama Code. See
id.; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 75, at 54 n.21. Even the ABA's Canons of
Professional Responsibility in 1908 were significantly influenced by the Alabama Code
of Ethics. See 33 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 56-57 (1908).
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determine whether it also should create uniform ethical standards
for its membership.94 In 1908, the ABA adopted the Canons of Ethics,
its first formal ethics code, primarily as a response to a perceived
threat of commercialism.95 Even after its adoption of the Canons,
however, the ABA continued to demonstrate its concern with the
ethics of legal practice by periodically appointing special committees
to review the effectiveness of its rules.98 These committees were
given the task of identifying problem areas in the rules and
recommending appropriate revisions.97 In a response to the
recommendations by one committee that the scope of the Canons be
expanded and that sanctions be imposed to enhance their
effectiveness, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1969.98
Even after the adoption of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, however, criticisms by practitioners along with
changes in the legal system and Supreme Court decisions striking
down the ABA's attempt to regulate fees and advertising prompted
additional revisions of its ethics rules.99 As a response to these
concerns and in furtherance of preserving its self-regulatory status,
the ABA abandoned this code and in 1983 adopted the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct.100

94.
95.

See DRINKER, supra note 91, at 24; A.B.A. REPORTS 680 (1907).
See DRINKER, supra note 91, at 24-25.

96.

See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 128-29

(1975) (noting that special committees were appointed in 1928, 1933, 1937, 1954, and
1964). In 1977, the president of the ABA appointed Robert J. Kutak, a lawyer from
Nebraska, to chair a new commission designed to prepare a new set of ethics rules. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 75, at 61 n.72. In 1997, former ABA President Jerome J.
Shestack announced the formation of Ethics 2000, a commission to undertake the first
comprehensive review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct since their
adoption in 1983. See Krane, supra note 1, at 323; Steven Keeva, ProfessionalismTops
Shestack Agenda, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 96.
97. See FREEDMAN, supra note 96, at 129.
98. See ABA SPEC. COMM. ON EVAL. OF ETHICAL STANDS., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (Final Draft, July 1, 1969). The Model Code was a significant
departure from the Canons. It consisted of nine sections with each section containing a
Canon, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. Id.
99. See infra notes 112, 116 and accompanying text; see also Justice Department
DismissesAntitrust Suit against ABA, 64 A.B.A. J. 1538, 1541 (1978). The ABA's Code
of Professional Responsibility was plagued by major criticisms even before its adoption
in 1969. For example, critics of the Code argued that it had been corrupted by
revisions during the drafting period, thus eliminating the opportunities to make it
more responsive and clearer to the realities of modern practice. See WOLFRAM, supra
note 75, at 60. Others argued that the Code failed to provide sufficient guidance on
issues facing practitioners. Id.
100. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 25. As of fall 2002, approximately 44 states
and the District of Columbia had adopted all or significant portions of the Model Rules
of ProfessionalConduct. A few states such as California and Maine have adopted their
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B. The Exercise of Self-Regulation
An important characteristic of a profession is the need to develop
its cultural identity and social authority. Unlike many occupations, a
valuable and distinguishing asset of a profession is the power of selfregulation. Self-regulation provides a profession with the ability to
articulate its own view of the world and to define the role that it will
play in society.O1 Many professions in the United States have long
enjoyed the freedom of self-regulation and the concept has continued
to develop and flourish right alongside of the more traditional forms
of government regulations, rather than being displaced by them.102
In theory, the rationales behind professional self-regulation for
lawyers are often benevolent in nature. First, self-regulation can
provide a basic level of protection for consumers of legal services.
Implicit in the concept is the noble belief that lawyers will consider
and protect the interests of their clients and the general public, and
will place these interests above their own.10 3 As a justification for this
rationale, some lawyers have argued that self-regulation can raise
the quality or lower the costs of services in areas in which nonprofessionals, due to their lack of knowledge and training, have been
ineffective in achieving those goals.104 Second, self-regulation can be
used to limit or terminate the practices of the incompetent members
of a profession long before market forces begin to work.105 Finally, it
can be used to set standards of excellence or at the very least,
uniformity amongst professionals so that inadequate service will be
discouraged and minimized.06
From the standpoint of the modern legal profession, the
necessity for self-regulation is relatively straightforward. The
organized bar has contended that public confidence in lawyers is
critical for the proper functioning of the legal profession, and
own rules of ethics while Iowa, Nebraska, New York, Ohio and Oregon continue to
follow versions of the former ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Id. at 3.
101. See William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of SelfRegulation in the CaliforniaState Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 488 (1995).
102. See, e.g., JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 1-2 (1994) (noting that some
industries have enjoyed a long history of self-regulation while others have adopted
standards of self-regulation in response to public crises affecting the organization or in
anticipation of government regulation of the specific industry).
103. See POUND, supra note 31, at 5-6. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at
12 (noting that the legal profession has a responsibility to insure "that its
pmbl.
regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or
self-interested concerns of the bar").
104. See Jack R. Bierig, Whatever Happened to Professional Self-Regulation?, 69
A.B.A. J. 616, 617 (1983).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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therefore, effective self-regulation is necessary to preserve public
faith in the integrity of the administration of justice and to maintain
the profession's reputation for trustworthiness.107 Because of the
complexities of the legal profession, lawyers themselves are in the
best position to observe and police the misconduct of fellow
lawyers.los Many legal scholars, however, have criticized the
principle of self-regulation. They have contended that "Itihe heritage
of Bar associations, like that of all trade organizations, rests initially
in self-interest and protectionism rather than any noble spirit of
public service."109 Reflections on several actions taken by the Bar in
the past provide some support for this contention.
The bar's exercise of its power of self-governance, however, has
not always been legitimate. Historically, the organized bar has
shared the popular "religious, racial, and national prejudices of
middle-class Americans."110 For example, from their inception up to

107. See, e.g., State ex rel Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, 267 (Okla. 1982);
Gregory Dunbar Soule, Note, Attorney Misappropriationof Client's Funds: A Study in
Professional Responsibility, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 415, 420 (1977). Currently,
public regard for lawyers is in decline. One major factor contributing to this decline is
the numerous lawyer involvements in public scandals over the last few decades such
as Watergate, Iran-Contra, the savings and loan crisis during the 1980s; judicial
hearings for Supreme Court nominees Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas; and the
numerous continued scandals that marred the Clinton Administration. See also United
States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting the conviction of former
Attorney General John Mitchell and other top Nixon advisors); George H. Brown,
FinancialInstitutionsLawyers as Quasi-PublicEnforcers, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637
(1994) (discussing the role of lawyers in the collapse of savings and loan institutions);
Jill Abramson, Culture of Scandal Turns Inquiry into an Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
26, 1998, at 22.
108. See David C. Olsson, Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service To Ethical
Standards Is Not Enough, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 657, 658 (1989) (arguing that "[t]he
complexity of the profession makes it desirable, perhaps even necessary, that the legal
profession be regulated by lawyers themselves").
109. See Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism,"41
Emory L.J. 403, 409 (1992); see also Richard L. Abel, Taking Professionalism
Seriously, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 41, 41 (arguing that occupations commonly invoke
the term "profession" for such self-serving purposes as the advancement of social
status, protection as a shield from moral accountability, and a justification for
restrictive practices); Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money
Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 250 (1996) (arguing that self-regulation
permits professionals to "extract higher rewards for their services and avoid sanctions
that would be part of societally-imposed regulatory schemes").
110. JAMES WILLIARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
255 (1950); see, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 264-65 (1976) (discussing the complicity of the southern
bar in preserving unequal justice under the law" for whites during Jim Crow);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 275-76, 282 (rev. ed.
W.W. Norton & Co. 1998) (noting the ABA and state bar associations' early resistance
in admitting blacks and women as members).
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the early decades of the 20th Century, bar associations used the
power of self-regulation to dampen the internal competition between
lawyers for clients, and to minimize and eventually eliminate the
outside competition in performing legal services by non-lawyer
professionals."'1 During the Great Depression, bar associations
promulgated and adopted minimum fee schedules in response to a
fear that competition for diminishing business would lower the prices
for legal services.112 Consequently, lawyers who charged below the
minimum fee schedule were subject to discipline by their respective
state bar associations.
In response to the growing public and political concerns over the
spread of Communism during the Cold War era, the ABA took an
active and public role in recommending that state bar associations
expel all members with Communist Party affiliations or those who
advocated a Marxist-Leninist doctrine.113 In addition, the ABA took a
"guilt by representation" stance towards those lawyers who insisted
upon representing clients affiliated with the Communist Party.114
This unfortunately resulted in "provid[ing] a hunting license for
[state] bar associations to punish those who strayed from the

111. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 112-26 (1989). Bar associations
have also used the power of self-regulation as a means of "control over the production
of the producers" of legal services. Id. at 112. Today, however, the Association of
American Law Schools has superseded the profession as the controller of the number
of producers of legal services while state courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies have replaced the profession as the principle controllers of the production by
the producers. Id. at 125.
112. Id. at 124-25. Minimum fee schedules were enacted to prevent attorneys from
price-cutting. Id. This restriction continued until 1975 when the Supreme Court
invalidated the practice as a violation of The Sherman Act. See Goldfarb v. Va. State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975). For other examples of abuses by the bar in
attempting to curtail business competition, see generally, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973) (holding that it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause to exclude a person from the practice of law solely on the basis of national
citizenship) and Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988) (holding that it
is unconstitutional for a state to impose a state domicile requirement as a precondition
for being admitted into the bar).
113. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE
IN THE COLD WAR 152-55 (1982) (discussing the 1949 Smith Act prosecution of
Communist Party leaders in America and the ABA's role in influencing state bar
associations to disfavor all members affiliated with the Communist Party or
representing clients with such affiliations). The ABA's public stance followed Attorney
General and former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark's admonition made during
this period in a 1946 speech before the Chicago Bar Association. Clark's speech
specifically noted the rise of Communism and Fascist groups and warned lawyers to be
careful in their choices of clients and causes. Id. at 153-54. For a more detailed
discussion of the organized bar's behavior during the Cold War era, see AUERBACH,
supra note 110, at 232-62.
114. See KUTLER, supra note 113, at 152-55.
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prescribed line of orthodoxy."115
By the middle of the 20th Century, the ABA and local bar
associations had begun to promulgate rules that prohibited lawyer
advertising.16 Although the practice of lawyer advertising was
generally widespread during the start of the century, enforcement of
bans on lawyer advertising became more frequent during the
Depression when opportunities for providing legal services were
greatly diminished."17 The elite and prominent lawyers, who had
already established ongoing relationships with their corporate
clientele, supported the prohibition on the belief that it would
enhance the profession's image while not significantly affecting their
own promotional activities.118 As a means to secure client loyalty,
large firms encouraged their partners to accept positions as board
members for their corporate clients.119
Non-elite lawyers, however, were significantly affected by the
bans. Their clients were mainly individuals with sporadic, yet
distinct, needs for legal services. Their only means to attract
potential clients was by joining organizations whose members might
need legal representation, running for public office, or registering
with lawyer referral services. 120
During the latter part of the century, bar associations had begun
to create substantial barriers for lawyers seeking specialization in
specific practice areas as another way to reassert control over the
market for lawyers during a time of increased demand for legal
services.121 Elite lawyers, who were typically associated with large,
highly specialized law firms, favored the bar's move towards
formalization of specialty practices. Non-elite lawyers, who were
typically associated with smaller general practice oriented law firms,

115. See id. at 154.
116. See ABEL, supra note 111, at 119. In 1977, the Supreme Court invalidated all
total bans on lawyer advertising as a violation of the First Amendment. See Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 382-83 (1977).
117.

See ABEL, supra note 111, at 125.

118. The founders of the ABA in the 19th century were prominent and successful
business lawyers of old American stock whose goal was to create an exclusive
organization consisting of the best men of the bar. See Amy R. Mashburn,
Professionalism As Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L.
REV. 657, 669 & n.56 (1994) (quoting John A. Matzko, 'The Best Men at the Bar" The
Founding of the American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 75 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984)). By the end of the century,
the organized bar was controlled by upper class white males who had attended elite
law schools and who worked in large big-city law firms. See ABEL, supra note 111, at
208-11; Mashburn, supra, at 674.
119. See ABEL, supra note 111, at 119, 125.
120. See id. at 120.
121. See id. at 122, 125.
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opposed it. Despite the bar's unsuccessful attempts at regulating
attorney fees and legal advertisements, however, specialization
requirements have survived as a legitimate exercise of the bar's
power of self-governance.122 A few of the obstacles to acquiring
specialist status include the requirements of competency
examinations, significant trial experience, peer review, and
continuing legal education. 123
In the aftermath of the lawyer-dominated Watergate scandal
during the 1970s, the organized bar quickly recognized that a
continuing and major threat to its self-regulatory nature was the
negative image of lawyers in the eyes of the public.124 As a response
to the sharp decline in the public image of lawyers, and as a general
reminder of the value of self-regulation as a means to avoid
government regulation, the drafters of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct expressly incorporated into its ethics code,
specific language discussing its privilege of self-regulation and
indicating that this feature alone should be a sufficient reason for
members of the bar to act ethically.125 Finally, in addition to periodic
and continual revisions of its code of ethics, the organized bar has
developed high-profile educational programs and a legal ethics
component of the bar examination in an attempt to rekindle public
confidence in the profession and to preserve its self-regulatory
character.126
III. THE REGULATION OF NON-PRACTICING LAWYERS, LAWYERPOLITICIANS AND DUAL PRACTITIONERS

Although the Model Rules are silent with regards to expressly
regulating the conduct of non-practicing lawyers and dual
practitioners, the ABA and state bar associations have consistently
advocated a one-size-fits-all approach to regulating the conduct of

122. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 7.4 (permitting a lawyer to indicate her
areas of specialty in communications about her services).
123. See ABEL, supra note 111, at 123.
124. Lawyer involvement in the Watergate scandal during the 1970s was notorious.
See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (discussing
the convictions of former Attorney General John Mitchell and several other lawyers for
conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury); In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 306
(discussing the alleged and substantiated criminal charges against President Richard
Nixon for his involvement during the Watergate cover-up); Jay Sterling Silver,
Professionalism and the Hidden Assault on the Adversarial Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J.
855, 867-68 (1994) (noting that the public perception that lawyers are "greedy and
unprincipled" could very well result in a "public outcry for government intervention").
125. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, pmbl.
10 (providing that the continued
enjoyment of the privilege of self-regulation alone is a paramount reason to act
ethically).
126. See Silver, supranote 124, at 868-69.
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non-practicing lawyers despite the nature or function of their jobs.
For example, in 1974 and during the aftermath of the Watergate
scandal, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 336, which held that a
lawyer, whether acting in her professional capacity or otherwise, was
bound by the applicable disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.127 Even before 1974, state bar associations adopting
versions of the ABA ethics codes had consistently demonstrated their
ability to discipline both practicing lawyers and non-practicing
lawyers alike for misconduct occurring outside the practice of law. 128
Currently, state bar associations have relied on Model Rule 8.4
as the legal basis for disciplining lawyers who commit crimes that
reflect adversely and directly on honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness
to practice law, or who engage in acts that involve dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.129 They have also construed the rule to
provide a basis for regulating misconduct in areas remote from the
practice of law such as other types of criminal behavior,130 business

127. See Formal Opinion 336, supra note 17. In 1974, the Code of Professional
Responsibility was the ABA's primary disciplinary code.
128. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 216 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ind. 1966) (disbarring a lawyer
who, while serving as a member of the city council, received several thousand dollars
from construction companies and other companies doing business with the city when
the companies had performed no actual services); In re Chernoff, 26 A.2d 335, 339 (Pa.
1942) (disbarring a lawyer found "guilty of soliciting bribes and extortion in connection
with his position as detective in [the] coroner's office").
is professional
129. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 8.4 (stating that "[ilt
misconduct for a lawyer to: ...(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . .
130. See, e.g., In re Nevill, 704 P.2d 1332, 1333, 1338 (Cal. 1985) (disbarring a
lawyer convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing his wife); People v. Lowery, 894
P.2d 758, 758, 761 (Colo. 1995) (suspending a lawyer for sexually harassing employees
at his law office); In re Christie, 574 A.2d 845, 851, 854 (Del. 1990) (suspending a
lawyer for showing pornographic films to a minor); In re Sandbach, 546 A.2d 345, 347
(Del. 1988) (suspending an attorney for failing to pay income taxes); In re Goffe, 641
A.2d 458, 463-64, 468 (D.C. 1994) (disbarring a lawyer for fabricating charitable
deductions used for income tax purposes); In re Runyon, 491 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ind.
1986) (disbarring a lawyer when the lawyer was convicted of possession of unlicensed
firearms and after forcing himself into his ex-wife's home with a machine gun);
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Dunn, 965 S.W.2d 158, 159-60 (Ky. 1998) (suspending a lawyer
for six months after being arrested on two occasions for driving under the influence of
alcohol); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Bensabat, 378 So. 2d 380, 382 (La. 1979)
(disbarring an attorney convicted of conspiracy to import and possess cocaine);
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Painter, 739 A.2d 24, 32 (Md. 1999) (disbarring a
lawyer for repeated acts of violence committed towards his wife and children); In re
Discipline of Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375, 383 (Minn. 1988) (publicly reprimanding a law
school dean for sexually harassing four employees, two of whom were law students); In
re Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378, 1381 (N.J. 1997) (imposing a three-month suspension of
an attorney found guilty of simple assault of his wife); In re Magid, 655 A.2d 916, 91819 (N.J. 1995) (publicly reprimanding a lawyer convicted under the state domestic
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and employment activities,131 and political activities to the extent
that they suggest a serious deficiency in those qualities deemed
relevant to the practice of law.132
In the following subsections, the Article considers the application
of Comment 5 of Model Rule 8.4 to lawyer-politicians and dual
practitioners. As one will see, a review of the state precedent
applying Comment 5 and the ABA's lack of any legitimate rationale
for prohibiting lawyers from participating in dual practices further
support the premise that a one-size-fits-all approach to regulating
lawyer-politicians is unwarranted.
A. Lawyer-Politiciansand the High Bar for Public Service
The Model Rules are silent with regards to providing direct and
expressed directives for the regulation of lawyer-politicians. The
ABA, however, has indirectly indicated an intent to regulate these
professionals under Comment 5 of Model Rule 8.4.133 Comment 5
provides:
[1]awyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities
going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public
office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of
lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust
such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and
violence law); In re X, 577 A.2d 139, 142 (N.J. 1990) (disbarring an attorney who was
convicted of incest with his three daughters that occurred over an eight year period);
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 963, 975 (Wash. 1990)
(suspending a lawyer who was convicted for vehicular homicide that occurred while
driving under the influence of alcohol).
131. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bar, 570 P.2d 1226, 1229-30 (Cal. 1977) (disciplining a
lawyer for the intentional deception of a bank officer); In re Hadzi-Antich, 497 A.2d
1062, 1065 (D.C. 1985) (publicly censuring a lawyer for submitting false information in
a resume sent to a law school-prospective employer); In re Canter, Nos. 95-831-0-H,
96-868-0-H, 96-908-0-H, and 96-910-0-H (Disciplinary District of the Bd. of Prof l
Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Feb. 25, 1997) (suspending a lawyer
for one year from the practice of law for sending an e-mail advertisement to more than
five or six thousand Internet groups and thousands of other e-mail lists in an attempt
to solicit new clients for the lawyer's immigration practice); In re Cahill, 579 N.W.2d
231, 232 (Wis. 1998) (suspending a lawyer for six months following misdemeanor
convictions for acts involving the deception of a hotel innkeeper and writing bad
checks); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Scruggs, 475 N.W.2d 160, 162-63 (Wis.
1991) (suspending a lawyer for submitting a fraudulent law school transcript in order
to obtain employment in the legal profession and for repeatedly making false
statements concerning its validity after its fraudulent nature had been discovered).
132. See, e.g., Russell v. Kansas, 610 P.2d 1122, 1131 (Kan. 1980) (disciplining
lawyer for misconduct while running for public office); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Green, 365 A.2d 39, 40-41 (Md. 1976) (disciplining lawyer for misconduct while acting
as a county attorney).
133. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 8.4 cmt. 5; see also supra note 25
(discussing the renumbering of former Comment 4 to Comment 5).

HeinOnline -- 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 871 2004-2005

[Vol. 57:3

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
officer, director
organization. 134

or

manager

of a

corporation

or

other

The legislative history behind Comment 5 is virtually nonexistent. Although the comment was included in the final draft copy
of the Model Rules in January 1980,135 no additional discussions for
this comment exist in the draft or ABA archives as to its purpose and
reason for inclusion. What is known, however, is that the comment
first surfaced in the aftermath of the Watergate cover-up where
former President Richard Nixon and several other lawyers holding
high public offices and positions were convicted of conspiracy,
obstruction of justice, and perjury.136
Jurisdictions that have applied and relied on Comment 5 in
disciplining lawyer misconduct have emphasized the importance of
insuring that the public have complete confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the American legal system and have held that
lawyers holding public office are held to a higher standard of conduct
primarily because of their "(1) professional and (2) public trustee
responsibilities."137 In explaining these responsibilities, the courts
have concluded that "[]awyer insensitivity to ethical impropriety ...
is one of the primary sources of [a] lack of public confidence in the
bar," and that the problem is exacerbated when lawyers holding
important public offices commit ethical violations.138 They have held
that ethical misconduct committed by lawyers holding public office is
more egregious primarily because of the betrayal of the public trust
attached to the office and have attempted to neutralize any further
erosions of public confidence in lawyers by responding more
aggressively towards unethical activity committed by lawyers
holding important public offices.139

134.

See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 8.4 cmt. 5.

135.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, (Final Draft 1980).

136. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussing
the criminal charges against former Attorney General John Mitchell and several other
lawyers for their involvement in Watergate); In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 306
(discussing disbarment proceedings against lawyer and former President Richard
Nixon).
137. See, e.g., Committee On Legal Ethics v. Roark, 382 S.E.2d 313, 318 (W. Va.
1989) (applying Comment 5). See also In re Olson, 300 N.W. 398, 400 (Minn. 1941)
(noting that a public office is a public trust "created for the benefit of the public, not for
the benefit of the incumbent"); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Douglas, 416
N.W.2d 515, 529-30 (Neb. 1987) (noting that "[t]hroughout the United States, public
officers have been characterized as fiduciaries and trustees, charged with honesty and
fidelity in administration of their office and execution of their duties"); Graf v. Frame,
352 S.E.2d 31, 38 (W. Va. 1986) (emphasizing the need to insure the public's
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the legal system).
138. See Graf, 352 S.E.2d at 38.
139. White, 428 S.E.2d at 560. See also Sanders v. Miss. State Bar Ass'n, 466 So. 2d
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An examination of ABA history and state precedent in applying
Comment 5 indicates several significant points. First, the closest
discussion available to possibly explain the drafters' intent for
including the comment is found in the history surrounding the ABA's
failed but controversial attempt to regulate the dual practice of law
and accounting. During this controversy, the ABA specifically
articulated its rationale for prohibiting lawyers from participating in
multiple professions.140
Second, state judicial precedent is not helpful in supporting the
rationale for holding lawyer-politicians as contemplated in this
Article to a higher standard than other citizens for disciplinary
purposes. 141 Instances of professional misconduct committed by
lawyers holding public offices are rarely found in reported cases. In
the cases reporting such misconduct, state courts in general have
applied Comment 5 in situations where the misconduct occurred
while the lawyer holding a public-elected office functioned in a quasijudicial role (e.g. county attorney or state prosecutor).142 The
891, 893 (Miss. 1985) (recognizing that lawyers are not well loved in American society
and finding that the lack of public confidence in the bar is exacerbated when lawyers
holding important public offices commit ethical violations); Douglas, 416 N.W.2d at
550 (distinguishing between government and private attorneys and holding that the
conduct of government attorneys is required to be more circumspect because they are
invested with the public trust and more visible to the public). The court in Douglas
concluded that improper conduct by a government attorney was more likely to harm
the entire system of government in the eyes of the public. Id.
140. See infra Part III.B (for a detailed discussion of the regulation of dual
practitioners).
141. See supra note 5 (defining the term "lawyer-politician").
142. See, e.g., In re Swarts, 30 P.3d 1011, 1013-19, 1032 (Kan. 2001) (disciplining
lawyer holding office of county attorney for numerous counts of misconduct committed
during the prosecution of several cases); In re Kraushaar, 997 P.2d 81, 88 (Kan. 2000)
(disciplining lawyer holding office of county attorney after notarizing a signature on a
quit claim deed that was not signed in his presence and for fraudulent submission of
expense reports); In re Kraushaar, 907 P.2d 836, 840 (Kan. 1995) (disciplining lawyer
holding office of county attorney for conflict of interest for representing a mother in a
child neglect hearing when he had a statutory duty to prosecute "child in need of care"
cases); Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Profumo, 931 S.W.2d 149, 149-51 (Ky. 1996) (disciplining
lawyer holding dual office of attorney and executor of an estate for collecting an illegal
or excessive fee, failing to disclose information required by law, and accepting
employment presenting a potential conflict with the lawyer's personal financial and
business interests); Sanders, 466 So. 2d at 893-94 (disciplining lawyer holding dual
office of county attorney and private practitioner for accepting private employment in
a civil matter with knowledge that it would create a conflict of interest in his ability to
perform the duties of county attorney); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Jarrell, 523 S.E.2d
552, 561 (W. Va. 1999) (disciplining lawyer holding office of county prosecutor for
initiating contact with a criminal defendant outside of the presence of counsel,
knowingly disobeying an obligation of a tribunal, and failing to disclose in a court
hearing that a plea bargain had been offered and accepted but not yet reduced to
writing); White, 428 S.E.2d at 561 (disciplining lawyer holding office of county
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precedent reveals only a few occasions when the rule was applied to
lawyer-politicians.143
Finally, even if the primary reason for disciplining and holding
lawyer-politicians who commit professional misconduct to a higher
standard than practicing lawyers committing similar ethical
violations is to preserve the integrity of the bar in the eyes of the
public, then the Bar and the courts have been unsuccessful in
achieving this. Currently, public esteem for lawyers remains in a
state of steady decline.144 Recent public opinion polls have shown
public respect for lawyers slipping below that for politicians and
journalists and even approaching the levels of the public's contempt
for automobile salesmen and the news media.145 Legal scholars have
attributed this decline to such factors as the public's overall belief
that lawyers are dishonest and the public's dismay with other
manifestations of lawyer behavior such as evasion, obfuscation,
misdirection, loophole lawyering, and a willingness to advance
frivolous claims and defenses.146
Additionally, even when imposing such severe disciplinary
prosecutor when found guilty of possession of cocaine, marijuana and Percocet);
Comm. of Legal Ethics v. Hobbs, 439 S.E.2d 629, 630-31 (W. Va. 1993) (disciplining
lawyer holding office of county prosecutor for failing to inform authorities of act of
extortion directed towards him by a circuit judge assigned to his medical malpractice
case); Graf, 352 S.E.2d at 33, 38 (disciplining lawyer holding the dual office of member
of the West Virginia Board of Regents and private practitioner for conflict of interest
in refusing to refrain from representing clients with alleged claims against the Board
of Regents); but see In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1180, 1183 (Colo. 2002) (failing to
apply Comment 5 for misconduct committed by a lawyer holding office of the district
attorney and holding "[d]istrict attorneys in Colorado owe a very high duty to the
public because they are governmental officials holding constitutionally created offices,"
and that a prosecutor is an instrument and representative of the justice system);
Roark, 382 S.E.2d at 316, 318 (disciplining lawyer holding dual public offices of mayor
and prosecuting attorney for conviction of the federal misdemeanor offense of
possession of cocaine).
143. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Yoshimura, No. 24947, 2002 Haw. Lexis
197, at *1 (Haw. Apr. 11, 2002) (disciplining lawyer holding dual public offices of city
and county councilman for making false statements to a journalist regarding whether
he had been drinking immediately prior to an automobile collision); Comm. on Legal
Ethics v. Boettner, 422 S.E.2d 478, 479-80, 482 (W. Va. 1992) (disciplining lawyer
holding public office of state senator for willfully evading the payment of federal
income taxes); Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Roark, 382 S.E.2d 313, 316 (W.Va. 1989).
144. See Hodes, supra note 27, at 528.
145. See id.; see also Orrick, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing a recent ABA public
opinion poll for lawyers and reporting that Americans viewed lawyers near the bottom
and only above the news media in public opinion rankings).
146. See Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's
Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 145, 169 (2001) (referencing survey data suggesting a widespread
public sentiment that lawyers are dishonest and unethical); Hodes, supra note 27, at
528-29 nn. 3-4.
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actions as suspension or disbarment on the practicing attorney who
violates the ethics rules, the public is often left with no easy way to
discover the lawyer's misconduct after she is reinstated and
permitted to resume her former legal practice. For example, legal
notices informing of public reprimand and disbarment of attorneys
are often published in specialized journals, legal newspapers or bar
reports and only a few states publish notices of their disciplinary
actions in laymen newspapers.147 When disciplinary actions are
litigated and appealed through the justice system, appellate review
of bar association actions are reported in state case-law reporters
thus making them more difficult to access by non-lawyers. Aside
from this, attorney listings in legal directories such as MartindaleHubbell fail to reference any disciplinary actions taken against an
attorney such as suspension from the practice of law or
reinstatement after disbarment.148 Consequently, the chances that a
non-lawyer seeking legal representation would stumble across
information regarding prior disciplinary actions taken against an
attorney would be slim and the very lack of access to such
information would likely result in the undermining rather than the
promotion of public confidence in the legal system.
B. Regulating Dual Practitioners:The Lawyer-Accountant
Dilemma
The ABA's regulation of dual practitioners for misconduct
committed while functioning in their non-legal roles has raised
similar issues to those that often arise in the regulation of lawyer
politicians.49 As discussed below, the ABA ultimately abandoned its
attempt to prohibit the dual practice of law and accounting after
finding no legitimate reasons under the ethics rules to prohibit it.

147. See ABA Compilation of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures 1 Q 59 I (1996)
(unpublished). A few states refuse to publish notice of public reprimands in any form.
Id. In Kentucky, however, disciplinary rulings are available to the public on the
Supreme
Court's
website.
Kentucky
Supreme
Court
Opinions,
http://www.kycourts.net/Supreme/SC-Opinions.shtm (last visited Aug. 24, 2005). In
addition, the public can access information concerning the status of individual
members of the Kentucky Bar Association (e.g. good standing, disbarment, etc.) by
using the Lawyer Locator service of the Legal Resources file on the Bar Association's
website. Lawyer Locator, http://www.kybar.org/Default.aspx?tabid=26 (last visited
Sept. 9, 2005). Finally, Kentucky requires that the disciplinary board of the bar
transmit "notice of all public discipline imposed against a lawyer, transfers to or from
disability inactive status, and reinstatements to the National Discipline Data Bank
maintained by the American Bar Association." KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.150(7).
148. See MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (Reed Elsevier Properties, Inc.
2005) available at http://www.martindale.com.
149. A dual practitioner is one who is simultaneously employed in both the practice
of law and another profession.
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On February 24, 1961, the Professional Ethics Committee of the
ABA issued Opinion 297, an opinion expressing the ABA's view on
the ethical concerns of dual practitioners in law and accounting to
practice both professions, and whether dual practice was in the best
interest of the public.sO The Opinion was clear as to the results that
it intended to accomplish-to prevent dual practitioners licensed in
law and accounting to practice in both professions.151 Although
Opinion 297 addressed four separate aspects of the lawyeraccountant relationship, it specifically prohibited the dual practice of
law and accounting and required that the person qualified as both a
lawyer and an accountant would have to choose between holding
herself out as a lawyer or as an accountant.15 2 As a justification for
this position, the Professional Ethics Committee noted that holding
oneself out as a dual practitioner was "self-touting and a violation of

Canon

27."153

In explaining its reasoning, the Committee noted that the
lawyer-accountant who held herself out as an accountant was
prevented from practicing law primarily because it believed the
lawyer would use her activities as an accountant as a way to fuel her
law practice.154 In reaching its conclusion, the Committee stated that
the controlling factor to be considered when determining whether the
dual practitioner was practicing law while holding herself out as an
accountant was whether the activity at issue was one that would
constitute the practice of law when engaged in by a person holding
herself out as a lawyer.155 The Committee was quick to indicate,
however, that the lawyer-accountant would not violate the Canons of
Ethics when she merely made use of and applied accounting
principles while performing legal services.156
In an effort to further clarify aspects of Opinion 297, the ABA's
Standing Committee on Professional Ethics issued Formal Opinion
305.157 Formal Opinion 305 explained that even though the lawyeraccountant was licensed in two professions, she could act in her
capacity as an accountant only if, or when, she was not engaged in

150. ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal, Op. 297 (1961)
[hereinafter OPINION 297].
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. Id. See also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 27 (dealing with
direct or indirect advertising by lawyers).
154. See OPINION 297, supra note 150.
155. See id.
156. Id. The Opinion provided no examples to demonstrate the application of this
principle to the lawyer-accountant. Id.
157. ABA Comm. on ProflI Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal, Op. 305 (1962)
[hereinafter FORMAL OPINION 305].
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the practice of law.158 Interestingly, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") expressed no position on the
matter. In an opinion issued by its Committee on Professional Ethics,
the AICPA stated that the practice of law was not inconsistent with
or incompatible with the practice of public accounting. 159
Despite these opinions, the dual practice of law and accounting
continued to grow. Colleges and universities continued to offer dual
degree programs while state licensing boards and bar associations
continued to grant licenses with full knowledge that the practitioner
had been previously licensed in another profession.60 Although most
state bar associations remained neutral on the issue, several openly
disagreed with the ABA's position.161 A few bar associations even
attempted to eliminate the dual practices of particular dual
licensees.162 Legal practitioners also began to speak out publicly on
the topic and to question the bar's ability to make decisions in favor
of its own self-interest without considering the versatility of its
members or the concerns of other professions.163
In light of the controversy surrounding the ABA's exercise of its
power of self-regulation and its inability to sufficiently justify a total
prohibition against the dual practice of law and accounting under its
ethics rules, the ABA soon retreated from its earlier position. In June
of 1972, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
issued Formal Opinion 328.164 This opinion superseded all previous
ones concerning the dual practice of law and accounting and held
that a lawyer would not necessarily be subjected to discipline for

158.

Id.

159.

MORRIS W. PRIMOFF, THE DUAL PRACTICE OF LAW AND ACCOUNTING & THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 18-19 (1977).

160. See id. at v.
161. See id. at 14.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Copal Mintz, Rigidity of Ethics, N.Y. L. J., Mar. 4, 1966. Lawyer
Mintz questioned both the bar's authority to make decisions in favor of its own selfinterest without taking into consideration how its decision would affect members of
other professions, and how the bar or an accountant association could prevent the
simultaneous practice of law and accounting when the practitioner had satisfied the
appropriate licensing requirements. See also Arthur J. Levy & W.D. Sprague,
Accounting and Law: Is Dual Practice in the Public Interest?, 52 A.B.A. J. 1110, 111016 (Dec. 1966). Levy, a member of the House of Delegates of the ABA and Chairman of
its Committee on Professional Relations, and Sprague, a member of the Council and
Chairman of the Committee on Relations with the Bar of the AICPA, expressed their
lack of concern with the practicing lawyer who used her accounting training to be a
better lawyer or the practicing accountant who used her legal training to be a better
accountant. Id. at 1110.

164. ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal, Op. 328 (1972)
[hereinafter FORMAL OPINION 328] (discussing the status of dual practice as a lawyer
and as a certified public accountant).
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practicing in both professions simultaneously as long as she complied
with the requirements of the rules of ethics.165 Formal Opinion 328
further explained that justifications such as the inherent difficulties
for a lawyer to devote sufficient time to keep abreast of current
developments in two occupations, the potential misleading of the
public as a result of the lawyer's dual titles, and allegations that the
"second occupation constituted indirect solicitation and served as a
feeder to the [lawyer's] law practice," were unsupportable under the
applicable code of professional responsibility. 166
The ABA noted that a greater ethical difficulty would be
encountered, however, in addressing the question of whether the
legal ethics rules might apply to conduct occurring while the lawyer
functioned in her role as an accountant. In considering this issue, the
ABA resorted back to a basic application of the concept of what it
means to be engaged in the practice of law. For example, the ABA
explained that if the "second occupation was so law-related that the
work of the lawyer in [her non-legal] occupation involve[d,]
inseparably, the practice of law, then it would consider the lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law" while functioning within that
occupation.167 Accordingly, it then concluded that the dual
practitioner would be "held to the standards of the bar while
conducting the second occupation."168
In defining law-related activities, the ABA cited with favor, an
opinion issued by the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New
York State Bar Association that distinguished between a second nonlaw-related occupation "such as the operation of a shopping center,
retail store or manufacturing plant, and other ... occupations" that it
deemed as law-related "such as marriage counseling, accountancy,
labor relations consulting, the operation of an insurance agency, a
real estate brokerage office, or a loan or mortgage brokerage
office."169 Finally, the ABA concluded that lawyers who were engaged
in law-related occupations would almost inevitably participate to
some extent, in the practice of law, despite the fact that laypersons
could perform the same activity without engaging in the practice of
law. It emphasized, however, that a lawyer would be subject to the
ethics rules when performing those services while functioning in her
role as a lawyer.170
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profil Ethics, Opinion 206 (1971)).
170. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Prof1 Ethics, Op. 57 (1932)) (noting that in carrying
on law-related occupations and professions, the lawyer will inevitably engage in the
practice of law, despite the fact that the activities if performed by a non-lawyer would
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The Bar's failed attempt at prohibiting the dual practice of law
and accounting is instructive for several reasons. First, it provides
still another instance of an exercise of self-regulation by the ABA
that could not be supported under its ethics rules. Second, it explains
the ABA's reasons as to when it believed that conduct and activities
performed in a lawyer's non-legal capacity would be subject to
regulation under the legal ethics codes. Finally, the ABA in reliance
on an opinion issued by the New York Bar Association, considered
the concept of "law-related activities" and expressly indicated its
willingness to defer the regulation of the lawyer who functioned
either solely as an accountant or when functioning in the dual
profession of law and accounting, when the function of her role as an
accountant did not involve her participation in law-related
activities.171
IV. LEGAL REALISM AND LAWYER-POLITICIANS

A. Legal Realism and the Model Rules
Legal realism has had a tremendous influence on American law
and legal education for more than seventy years. It is a legal
philosophy widely attributed to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and
law professors Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank and has had an
important impact on how lawyers and judges view their legal roles in
society.172 Legal realism is a descriptive theory about the nature of
not constitute the unauthorized practice of law). The ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics noted that even in cases where a lawyer performs services for a client that
could be performed by a non-lawyer, when performing them in the course of her legal
services, she will be acting as a lawyer and subject to the Canons. Id.
171. Currently, MODEL RULES Rule 5.7(a), (b) provide that a lawyer is subject to the
Rules of Professional Conduct when providing law-related services and defines lawrelated services as "services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with
and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not
prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer."
172. The legal realist movement finds its roots in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
early attack on legal formalism. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5
(Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., Little Brown and Co. 1963) (1881); see also 0. W. Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66, 469 (1897) (noting that historical
circumstances and social experiences shape the law rather than logical reasoning).
Professor Karl Llewellyn was the principle drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code.
In 1930, he published a controversial article on legal realist jurisprudence that
criticized Roscoe Pound, renowned dean of the Harvard Law School. Llewellyn's article
prompted a response by Pound attacking the legal realist movement and culminating
in a heated debate amongst the two on the nature of legal realism. See Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930);
Roscoe Pound, The Call For a Realist Jurisprudence,44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); Karl
N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism- Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222 (1931). Professor Jerome Frank's theory of reliance "on factual
interpretation, rather than the application of rules of law" when examining legal
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judicial decision-making, one which contends that judges when
deciding a case, first exercise unfettered discretion in reaching a
result based upon their own personal tastes and values and later
rationalize their decisions with appropriate legal rules and reasoning
to support them.173
From an academic standpoint, legal realism developed as a
challenge to the Langdellian case method of teaching in legal
education, a teaching pedagogy that originated at the Harvard Law
School and spread to law schools throughout the country.174 Upon its
inception, legal realists began to criticize the case method's emphasis
on studying appellate opinions as the only method for teaching law
students how to identify general legal principles. Their primary
concern with the case method was that it strove to isolate rules and
principles of law believed to be critical for judicial decisions from
their proper context in society.175
In critiquing the common law decision-making process of the
United States, legal realists have argued that judges actually make
law rather than attempt to hide this fact under the guise that they do
not make law but only discover and rely on an already existing body
of law when creating their decisions. They have embraced the notion
that the content of the law in a judicial opinion is "affected by all
manner of social, political, economic, historical and other trends in
thinking that operate either consciously or unconsciously through the

judge making

it."176

In short, they believe that the law is

problems was later embraced and adopted by the legal realist movement. See Gerald
R. Ferrera, Ethics in Legal Education: An Augmentation of Legal Realism, 18 PEPP. L.
REV. 893, 898-99 (1991).
173. BURNHAM, supra note 56, at 42-43; Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:
Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267-68 (1997).
174. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927 - 1960, at xii (1986).
175. Id. Christopher Columbus Langdell was the dean of Harvard Law School
between 1870 and 1895. Dean Langdell viewed law as a science that could be better
taught as a system of rules and principles. He looked to appellate cases for these rules
and later collected and organized the rules for publication into casebooks. His
approach in using the case-method of teaching law quickly spread throughout the
United States. Id. For a good discussion of Langdell and the case method of teaching,
see W. Burlette Carter, ReconstructingLangdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1 (1997).
176. See BURNHAM, supra note 56, at 42. Legal realists believe that "[s]ocial context,
the facts of the case, judges' ideologies, and professional consensus critically influence
individual judgments and patterns of decisions over time." Joseph William Singer,
Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 470 (1988) (reviewing KALMAN, supra note
174). A few of the common principles shared amongst legal realists are that: (1) the
empirical reality of the application of rules rather than formal rules constitute legal
reality; (2) the goals and policies are important in understanding the law and its
reasoning; (3) the law is what law-related officials do and in order to predict how they
will react requires a knowledge of legal doctrine, past precedent, social trends and
relevant science; and (4) understanding, predicting and advocating for certain legal
results requires taking a craft-like approach to the law. Richard 0. Brooks, Legal
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indeterminate and is influenced by many sociological and contextual
dynamics.
As a result of the significant challenges by the legal realists to
the dominant but formalistic attitudes and approaches to law used by
judges during early American legal history, many jurists and law
professors today have begun to view law more pragmatically. For
instance, more judges have embraced and accepted the notion that
law cannot be considered solely in a vacuum and such external
factors as social experience, public policy, and morality can and do
play vital roles in fully understanding and appreciating the law.177
Additionally, it is common for law professors to discuss public policy
considerations and ramifications in explaining and rationalizing
judicial decisions despite the fact that many continue to embrace the
formalistic Langdellian teaching methodology.178
Although discussions concerning legal realism often focus on the
role of the judge in legal decision-making, its underlying premise
advocating the consideration of contextual factors and the social
realities before applying legal concepts, however, has both relevance
and merit to regulating lawyers who perform roles and functions that
fall outside of the parameters of the Model Rules for two significant
reasons. First, nineteenth century ethics rules emerged during a
period where the prevailing view was that lawyers as a group were
homogeneous and monolithic. The drafters of the early ethics codes
envisioned the lawyer as a practitioner, one whose primary if not sole
job function was to represent clients in litigation or to offer legal
counsel. Consequently, current and earlier versions of the ethics
codes were designed to regulate the behavior of the practicing lawyer
and spent no time distinguishing between even the different legal
tasks performed by practicing lawyers.179 Contemporary expansions
in the roles and functions of lawyers and evidence indicating that

Realism, Norman Williams, And Vermont's Act 250, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 699, 701 (1996).
177. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (concluding that "[c]ontext matters when
reviewing race-based governmental actions under the Equal Protection Clause"); see
also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1960) (emphasizing that "in dealing
with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an
interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations,
based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be
applied out of context in disregard of variant controlling facts").
178. See Singer, supra note 176, at 473-74 (discussing several ways in which legal
realism has influenced law teaching).
179. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROF'L STANDARDS,
DISCUSSION DRAFT: MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT i-ii (1980) ; Murry L.

Schwartz, The Professionalismand Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669,
670-71 (1978) (contending that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility adopted
in 1969 failed in clearly distinguishing between the ethics of litigation and the ethics
of counseling).
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most lawyers today specialize along with increased diversification in
clients seeking legal services, however, have steadily negated this
traditional view of the lawyer for purposes of professional regulation.
These expansions have ultimately lead the ABA and state bar
associations to create and incorporate into their ethics codes
additional context-specific rules to account for a few of the differences
that exists amongst legal practitioners.180
Second, since their inception, both current and earlier versions of
the ABA legal ethics codes were based also on the presumption that
the ethics rules would be applied uniformly to all lawyers without
considering any distinctions between the different types of lawyers,
their clients or their activities. At one time, bar disciplinary
committees acting on behalf of state supreme courts were vested with
the sole responsibility for enforcing these ethics rules. This is no
longer the case. Formal codes of professional conduct do not comprise
the sole source of the rules and regulations governing the various
aspects of legal practice. For example, in addition to being regulated
by state disciplinary codes, legal practitioners may be subject to
judicial sanctions for improper conduct occurring within a court
proceedingls and the professional conduct rules contained in various
governmental regulations.182
In short, disciplinary bodies during the past few decades have
become increasingly concerned with such factors as job function and
context when applying the Model Rules. They have begun to accept
that context is important and principles of legal realism can offer
both a reasonable and responsive nexus to bridging current gaps in

180. The Model Rules recognize that even practicing lawyers operate in different
legal capacities with divergent responsibilities. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.13
(discussing the role of lawyers representing corporations and governmental
organizations); MODEL RULES R. 3.7 (regulating the conduct of lawyers serving as both
advocate and witness in the same trial); MODEL RULES R. 3.8 (regulating the conduct
of lawyers serving as government prosecutors); MODEL RULES R. 5.1 (discussing the
responsibilities of partners, managers and supervisory lawyers for the activities of
subordinate lawyers); MODEL RULES R. 5.7 (regulating the activities of lawyers
participating in law-related services).
181. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b), (c) (allowing federal courts to impose sanctions
against a lawyer who acts in bad faith when signing, filing, or submitting a pleading).
182. See Ingold, supra note 22, at 1 (discussing U.S. Army Rules of Professional
Conduct); 46 C.F.R. § 502.32 (2004) (regulating lawyers appearing before the Federal
Maritime Commission); 31 C.F.R. § 10.20 (2004) (regulating lawyers appearing before
the Internal Revenue Service); 5 C.F.R. § 2635 (2004) (regulating executive branch
employees); 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (2005) (regulating lawyers appearing before the
Immigration and Naturalization Service); see also BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P.
HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (2d ed. 1985) (discussing

Internal Revenue Service standards regulating the conduct of tax lawyers); William R.
McLucas et al., SEC Enforcement: A Look at the Current Program and Some Thoughts
about the 1990s, 46 Bus. LAW. 797 (1991) (discussing SEC enforcement efforts).
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the ethics rules when dealing with lawyers who function within
specialized legal practice areas.
Legal scholars have also advocated the use of context as a means
to reconcile the present disconnect in applying the Model Rules to
every practicing lawyer. For instance, Professor David Wilkins at
Harvard has considered the application of legal realism principles to
account for the vagueness of the Model Rules when applied to the
different legal roles and functions performed by practicing lawyers.
In an attempt to bridge the gap and to make the ethics rules more
responsive, Professor Wilkins has suggested the adoption of a
"middle-level" approach to regulating the activities of the practicing
lawyer.183 Utilizing a contextual-analytical approach similar in
theory to that attributed by legal realists to judicial decision-making,
Professor Wilkins has argued that bar associations and courts should
take into consideration five broad categories of factors designed to
encompass not only the realities but also the distinctions of modern
legal practice: task, subject matter, status, lawyer and client.184 He
has explained that the first set of factors such as "task (for example,
litigation versus counseling), subject matter (for example, civil versus
criminal), and status (for example, plaintiff versus defendant) highlight differences in the roles that practicing lawyers play and the
procedural and substantive contexts in which they are asked to play
them."185 He has noted that the final two categories such as "lawyer
(for example, sole practitioner versus large firm) and client (for
example, individual versus corporate) - refer to differences among
those performing and consuming legal services."186 Professor Wilkins
has concluded that the factors of subject matter and status have
become standard features in constructing the current system of
lawyer regulation and several leading proposals for its reform.187
Even a contextual approach to regulating practicing lawyers has
its problems. A move towards a pure contextual-based system of
regulation would deny the fact that some common features still exist
amongst the roles of practicing lawyers or in the practice of law.188 By
183. See Wilkens, Legal Realism, supra note 26, at 516; see generally supra note 20
(listing additional articles addressing the conflict between the Model Rules and specific
areas of practice and suggesting the consideration of context).
184. See Wilkens, Legal Realism, supra note 26, at 517. See also David B. Wilkins,
Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1145, 1154-56 (1993) (considering the categories of subject matter and task in
evaluating the arguments used by the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") to justify its
enforcement practices against the Kaye, Scholer law firm for alleged violations of OTS
and Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations and Kaye, Scholer's defense).
185. Wilkens, Legal Realism, supra note 26, at 517.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See David B. Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate
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denying this truth, adopting a contextual approach to legal ethics
would run the risk of either further subdividing the profession into
little empires where distinct groups of practitioners would fight over
ethics for their own self-interest or would create a totally
decentralized system of lawyer regulation.189 Finally, utilizing any
context-based approach to regulating practicing lawyers would first
require a determination of which specific "contextual differences
among particular lawyers, clients, and regulatory settings are
relevant and for which purposes."190
These concerns tend to be minimal, however, when one considers
whether to apply a contextual approach to regulating the nonpracticing lawyer-politician. By definition, lawyer-politicians are not
engaged in the day-to-day practice of law. Because of a lack of
common areas of overlap in the job functions of the legal practitioner
and the lawyer-politician, the potential for the creation of additional
subdivisions and tension in the application of the current ethics rules
regulating legal practitioners is nil. Consequently, the only major
concern remaining in applying a contextual approach to regulating
lawyer-politicians is to determine the specific factors to be selected,
their relevance and justification.
In the following subsections, the Article examines a few of the
safeguards inherent in the Constitution and political process that
justify a deviation from the current one-size-fits-all approach when
regulating the conduct of federal lawyer politicians.
B. Constitutionaland Political ConsiderationsRequiring a
Departurefrom the Status Quo When Regulating Federal
Lawyer-Politicians
1. Disciplining Lawyer-Politicians Under the Model Rules
May Upset The Proper Balance of Powers Required by
Federalism
"Federalism" is a constitutional principal that involves a
distinctive territorial division of powers along with legal and political
mechanisms to settle inter-level disputes.191 It is a term used to
describe the American structure of government: a system where

Lawyers? -Managing Conflict and Context In ProfessionalRegulation, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 465, 483 (1996).
189. See id.
190. Id. See also Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1597 (1990) (considering the problems in determining which contextual factors
are relevant and for which purposes).
191. DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD
WASHINGTON 19 (2d ed. 2000).
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political power is constitutionally allocated and divided vertically
between the federal and state governments and where each entity is
provided with substantial functions.192 In short, federalism is "a
device for dividing decisions and functions of government."193
"Federalism" does not appear in the text of the Constitution and
there is much disagreement in defining it. The Framers of the
Constitution's selection of a federalist form of government was a
compromise that was designed both to insure the existence of a
strong central government, which was lacking under the Articles of
Confederation, 194 and to accommodate and protect the interests of the
existing state governments.195 Although historical exigencies
significantly influenced the creation of American Federalism, its
viability has rested upon its functionality. For instance, a strong
national government has the capacity to handle problems that extend
beyond the boundaries and interests of the individual states while
the state governments have the capacity and are much more
equipped to focus on the specific impact that a problem may have in a
196
limited geographical or economical area.
192. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A TEXTBOOK 45 (2d ed, 1979),
Schwartz describes the main features and elements of American federalism as:
(1) a union of autonomous states; (2) the division of powers between the
Federal government and the states; (3) the direct operation of each
government, within its assigned sphere, upon and within its territorial
limits; (4) the provision of each government with the complete apparatus of
law enforcement; and (5) federal supremacy over any conflicting assertion of
state power
Id. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990) (defining federalism as
including the "interrelationships among the states and relationship between the states
and the federal government").
193. RICHARD H. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1 (1970).
194. The Articles of Confederation were the first governing instrument for the
thirteen American States after their independence from England. They were drafted in
1777 and ratified by the states in 1781. Under this plan of government, each state
retained its sovereignty, freedom and independence while expressly delegating only a
few powers to the national government. WALKER, supra note 191, at 39-40; see also
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988) (discussing the Framers' rationale for a
federal system of government).
195. KERMIT L. HALL, FEDERALISM: A NATION OF STATES ix (Kermit L. Hall ed.,
Garland Publishing 1987) (1987) (providing that the Federalist delegates to the 1787
Constitutional Convention were concerned with finding a way of "accommodating
existing state governments while enhancing the authority of the new central
government").
196. See William G. Bassler, The Federalizationof Domestic Violence: An Exercise in
Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal JudicialResources?, 48 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1139, 1165 (1996) (noting, in arguing against a federal cause of action, that
"[s]ince all of the states have domestic violence statutes, an existing legal
infrastructure with the capacity to deal with the problem of domestic violence is now
in place").
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The Supreme Court has recognized that federalism has both
sociopolitical and economic benefits and has stated that "the
principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on the abuses of
government power."197 The Framers believed that such a
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the states and
the federal government would reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either and thus protect individual liberties.198
Inherent in the concept of federalism is political accountability
and responsibility. Federalism allows both the national and state
governments to check the abuses of the other by providing citizens
with the ability to switch their confidence between each distinct
government and to use each as a means of redress if either invades or
abuses their rights.199 Thus, it is one of the Constitution's structural
safeguards of liberty and acts as a double security to protect the
rights of the people.200 In order for the double security to be effective,
however, the Constitution requires that there must be a proper

197. Gregory v. Aschcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1990). In Gregory, the Court noted
that a federalist structure of joint sovereigns provides several additional benefits, "[i]t
assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of
" Id. For a more detailed discussion of the sociopolitical
a heterogeneous society ..
and economic benefits of federalism, see RALPH A. ROssUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 78-79 (2001); Dennis M. Cariello, Federalism For the New Millennium:
Accounting For the Values of Federalism, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1558-66 (1999);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative"Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 440-41 (2002); Merritt, supra note 194, at 3-10; but
see LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS 289 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing
several of the problems with federalism such as its costliness, lack of efficiency, and
complexity).
198. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458-59 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 180-81
(Alexander Hamilton), No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)).
199. Ryan C. Squire, Note, Effectuating Principles of Federalism:Reevaluating the
Federal Spending Power as the Great Tenth Amendment Loophole, 25 PEPP. L. REV.
869, 879 (1998); see THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 138-39 (Alexander Hamilton) (George
W. Carey and James McClellan eds., 2001); id. No. 46, at 244-45 (James Madison);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). The Framers believed "that
freedom was enhanced by the creation of two governments." United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 270 (James Madison). In discussing his vision
of the structural form of government for the new republic, Madison stated:
[i]n the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people
is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence,
a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other; at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.
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balance between the powers of the state and federal governments. 201
A proper balance of powers "helps to ensure that citizens are able to
hold... state [and] federal officials "accountable for their actions and
that those "officials will be responsive to the needs of their respective
[constituencies] ."202
Because the starting point rather than the final answer to every
inquiry into questions of federalism is the text of the Constitution,
one must first look to the literal language of the Constitution and the
underlying postulates behind the specific grants of authority that
20
limit and control the powers of the federal and state governments. 3
The constitutional boundaries for a federalism analysis revolve
around two primary provisions: the Supremacy Clause204 and the
Tenth Amendment.205 At one end of the spectrum, the Supremacy
Clause provides the national government with a decided advantage
in determining the delicate balance of powers between the state and
federal governments. It declares that the Constitution and the laws
and treaties of the United States constitute the supreme law of the
land and its effect is to provide a federal preemption of all state and
local laws that conflict with any federal laws.206 At the other end, the
Constitution is clear in indicating that the federal government is one
of limited powers and in leaving most of the responsibilities and
201. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.
202. Squire, supra note 199, at 880. See also FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S.
621, 636 (1992) (noting that "[f]ederalism serves to assign political responsibility, not
to obscure it"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing federalism and noting that the inability of citizens to hold the appropriate
branch of government accountable "is more dangerous even than devolving too much
authority to the remote central power"); Cariello, supra note 197, at 1560 (noting that
"modern scholars recognize [that an] increase in responsiveness [is] one of the greatest
values of decentralized government").
203. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985) (stating
that "[blehind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
control").
204. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause provides:
[tihis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides: "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
206. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
210-11 (1824) (holding that otherwise valid state laws must give way to federal laws in
which they conflict); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435 (1819)
(holding that a state tax that interfered with the function of the federal government
violated the Supremacy Clause).
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powers to the states in the absence of an express delegation or
20 7
prohibition of power to the national government.
Disciplining lawyer-politicians under the Model Rules may upset
the proper balance of powers required under federalism when the
lawyer-politician holds the high-level executive office of President or
the judicial office of Supreme Court Justice and his or her conduct
falls within the constitutionally protected spheres of activities
peculiar to those offices such as pardons, foreign affairs and the
independence and autonomy provided to members of the Supreme
Court. The following subsections discuss how principles of federalism
might be circumvented when state courts and bar associations
discipline federal lawyer-politicians for conduct falling within the
discretionary leeway provided for high-level executive and judicial
officers under the Constitution.
(a) Presidential Pardons
Presidential pardons offer relief from harsh judgments, biases,
and prejudices in the operation and enforcement of criminal laws and
penalties.208 In Knote v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted
the following definition of "pardon":
[a] pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released
from the consequences of his offence, so far as such release is
practicable and within control of the pardoning power, or of
officers under its direction. It releases the offender from all
disabilities imposed by the offence, and restores to him all his
civil rights. In contemplation of law, it so far blots out the
offence, that afterwards it cannot be imputed to him to prevent
the assertion of his legal rights. It gives to him a new credit and
capacity, and rehabilitates him to that extent in his former
position.209
207.

208.

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
See Ashley M. Steiner, Remission Of Guilt Or Removal Of Punishment? The

Effects Of A PresidentialPardon,46 EMORY L.J. 959, 987 (1997).
209. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877). Although it is settled that a
presidential pardon restores basic civil and political rights such as the right to vote,
testify in court proceedings, and to run for public office, legal scholars and judges have
differed concerning the full effect of a pardon. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Nature of
a Pardon Under The United States Constitution, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 36, 61-62 (1978);
Samuel Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 HARV. L. REV. 647, 653 (1915)
(contending that a pardon removes disqualifications resulting from the conviction of a
crime but would not prevent a subsequent disqualification for character resulting from
the pardoned offense). Modern courts have followed one of three approaches when
determining the effect of a presidential pardon. One approach is rooted in earlier
Supreme Court precedent and provides that a pardon eliminates both the conviction
and guilt of the defendant and restores the defendant to the position that he or she
would have been in prior to committing the offense. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866); accord United States v. McMurrey, 827 F. Supp. 424, 425-26
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Article II of the Constitution provides that "[t]he President...
shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."210
Historically, the pardon power was intended to function both as a
check on the legislative and judicial branches of the federal
government by providing the President with a means to soften the
punishments issued by Congress and the federal judiciary.211 It was

(S.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Hamilton, 48 F.3d 149 (5th Cir. 1995);
State ex rel. Sokira v. Burr, 580 So. 2d 1340, 1344-45 (Ala. 1991). A second approach is
that a pardon eliminates the conviction but does not wipe out the underlying guilt of
the offense. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 91, 94 (1915) (acknowledging
that the acceptance of a pardon implies a confession of guilt); Carlesi v. New York, 233
U.S. 51, 59 (1914) (implying that a pardon does not necessarily wipe out the fact of
guilt if it has been established by a previous conviction); Lettsome v. Waggoner, 672 F.
Supp. 858, 864 (D.V.I. 1987) (a pardon does not provide a court with the power to
expunge a criminal record); FED. R. EVID. 609(c) and accompanying NOTES OF
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY H. R. REP. No. 93-650 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7085 (providing that evidence of a prior conviction cannot be used
to impeach a witness who has been pardoned for a specific offense but only if the
pardon was granted for the defendant's rehabilitation or innocence). Finally, some
courts have held that a pardon neither eliminates the conviction nor the guilt of the
defendant. See United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 956, 960 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that a pardon does not eliminate a conviction or wipe out the record of a conviction);
Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253, 266 (5th Cir. 1968) (same); Dixon v.
McMullen, 527 F. Supp. 711, 718 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that a pardon does not
wipe out the fact that the offense occurred and does not wash away the guilt of the
offense); Kellogg v. State, 504 P.2d 440, 441 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (same). Although
Supreme Court cases post Ex parte Garland imply that a pardon would not eliminate
the guilt of a conviction, the Court has neither expressly overruled nor spoken against
its broad statement of the effect of a pardon articulated in Garland.
210. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1. The form of a pardon can include such actions as:
remittal of fines and forfeitures, reprieves, grants of amnesty to a group of offenders,
commutation of sentences, and general grants of pardons prior to convictions. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 4.5 (2d ed.
2002); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERs, 1787-1984 at 180-89
(5th rev. ed. 1984); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-10, at
719-20 (3d ed. 2000); see also NAT'L GOVERNORS' ASS'N CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH,
GUIDE To EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 164 (1988) (discussing
survey results indicating the types of clemency available in each state). Finally, a
presidential pardon may be absolute or conditional. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 4483, 3
C.F.R. 4 (1977) (discussing President Jimmy Carter's full, complete and unconditional
pardon of Vietnam draft evaders); Proclamation 4311, 10 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC.
1103 (Sept. 13, 1974) [hereinafter Proclamation 4311] (discussing President Gerald
Ford's full and absolute pardon of Richard Nixon for all crimes committed during the
Watergate cover-up); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (noting that a pardon
may be conditional as long as the condition does not offend the Constitution).
211. See THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 385-86 (Alexander Hamilton) [hereinafter
FEDERALIST No. 74] (defending the pardon power as a check on legislative motive); see
also Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 613 (1991) (noting that the pardon power acts as a
check on the judicial system by allowing the President to commute a prison term on
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also intended as a means for furthering the public welfare.212
The pardon power is plenary and is applicable to all who have
been accused or convicted of offenses against the federal government.
It permits the President to offer and grant pardons for any reason
whatsoever and does not require the President to provide
justifications for his actions.213 Textually, the Pardons Clause
restricts the President's powers to grant pardons in only three ways.
First, the act to be pardoned must constitute an offense against the
United States.214 Second, the act must not be the subject of
the grounds of a perceived injustice or prejudice in a prisoner's conviction).
212. In defending the pardon powers as a means to promote the public welfare,
Alexander Hamilton noted:
in seasons of insurrection or rebellion there are often critical moments, when
a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the
tranquility of the commonwealth .... The dilatory process of convening the
legislature or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction,
would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity.
See FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 211, at 386. In 1868, President Andrew Johnson
granted a universal amnesty and pardon for members of the Confederacy who had
participated in the Civil War. Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155
(1871) (quoting Proclamation No. 15, 15 Stat. 711 (1868)). The express purpose of the
proclamation was "to secure permanent peace, order, and prosperity throughout the
land, and to renew and fully restore confidence and fraternal feeling among the whole
people .. " Id.; see also Stephen L. Carter, The Iran-ContraPardon Mess, 29 HOUS. L.
REV. 883, 887 (1992) (contending that President Gerald Ford's pardon of President
Richard Nixon after his resignation from office for the crimes that Nixon may have
committed during the Watergate scandal could be supported on the grounds that the
national interest would be better served by enabling Nixon to avoid prosecution that
would have inevitably resulted in numerous legal proceedings and would have
continued to fuel a national obsession with Watergate); Bob Cohn, Anatomy of a
Pardon: Why Weinberger Walked, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 1993, at 22-23 (discussing
President George Herbert Walker Bush's justification for his 1992 pardon of
participants in the cover-up of the Iran-Contra scandal as a means to heal the nation
from a lingering scandal and to protect patriotic public servants from an overzealous
independent counsel).
213. The Constitution provides the President with the sole and complete discretion
in granting or denying a pardon. Current federal regulations governing the
submission, consideration, and granting of pardons are advisory in nature and serve
only as internal guidelines for Department of Justice personnel conducting
investigations of petitions and supporting documentation for pardons. See 28 C.F.R. §§
0.35-0.36, 1.1-1.11 (2003); see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U. S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL:
STANDARDS FOR CONSIDERATION OF CLEMENCY PETITIONS § 1-2.112 (2002), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/pardonlpetitions.htm [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CLEMENCY]
(discussing objective criteria used to assess an application for pardon such as: (1) the
applicant's post-conviction conduct, character, and reputation; (2) the seriousness and
length of time that has passed since the offense; (3) the applicant's acceptance of
responsibility, remorse, and atonement; (4) official recommendations and reports; and
(5) any specific need for relief).
214. Under principles of federalism, the President lacks the authority to grant
pardons for offenses against the states. See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 113
(1925) (holding the pardon power was designed to operate upon offenses against the
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impeachment proceedings.215 Finally, the pardonable act must be
committed prior to the grant of pardon.216
Generally, the presidential pardon power is exclusive and
congressional attempts to limit it have been unsuccessful.217 From a
practical standpoint, the exercise of the pardon power is subject only
to those individual constraints that each President has placed upon
himself. For example, the President, with the aid of the Justice
Department, will make the final determination whether to grant a
pardon based upon the factors that he or she deems important,
including political ones. 218 However, legal scholars have observed
several societal checks on its abuse.219 First, the President may be
impeached and removed from office for corruptly granting
clemencies.220 Second, if an incumbent President grants a
controversial pardon prior to a re-election, the President may suffer
public rebuke at the polls. 221 Third, if the President is at or near the

United States as distinguished from those against the states); Carlesi v. New York,
233 U.S. 51, 59 (holding a presidential pardon for a crime against the United States
does not restrict the power of a state to punish crimes subsequently committed by a
defendant).
215. The Pardon Clause impeachment exception borrows from British precedent
and prevents the President from nullifying congressional proceedings to remove
executive or judicial officials through impeachment. See Kobil, supra note 211, at 58588 & n.108 (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 399-400) (providing an
historical development of the impeachment exception under British law).
216. See id.
217. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 626-27 (Max
Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1937) (1911) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION] (noting that a proposal that sought to require Senate approval
of presidential pardons was rejected overwhelmingly by the members of the 1787
Constitutional Convention); see also Schick, 419 U.S. at 266 (holding that the pardon
power "flows from the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and
that it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress"); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. at 381 (holding that Congress could not restrict the consequences of a
pardon through legislation); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1871)
(holding that the Constitution does not allow Congress to change the effect of a
pardon).
218. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.35-0.36, 1.1-1.11 (2004) (describing the Justice Department's
role in assisting the President in reviewing petitions for clemency and providing
investigation into matters deemed relevant in support of the petition); STANDARDS FOR
CLEMENCY, supra note 213.
219. See TRIBE, supra note 210, § 4-10, at 721-22; Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the
Pardon Power During the Twilight of a PresidentialTerm, 67 MO. L. REV. 13, 18-19
(2002) (discussing in detail the limited checks on the abuse of the pardon power).
220. See TRIBE, supra note 210, § 4-10, at 721. This check, however, will likely be
ineffective for a President who grants a controversial pardon during the final hours of
his closing term in office.
221. See id.; see also Carter, supra note 212, at 887 (noting that the "wrath or
approbation of the voters is one of the very few checks on the pardon power that
exist"). For example, President Gerald Ford lost the 1976 election for presidency to
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end of his or her term at the time of granting a pardon, the President
may be fearful that a controversial pardon could lead to a
disreputable placement in the nation's history.222 Finally, a
presidential pardon will be invalid if it violates any other
constitutional provisions.223
Federalism concerns will arise if a state bar association or court
attempts to discipline a lawyer-President for professional misconduct
when the President grants a controversial pardon. The basis for
disciplinary action under Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct could be as simple as an assertion that the President abused
the powers entrusted to him or her under the Constitution or that
the President has violated the public trust by granting a pardon that
could not be legally or morally justified. For example, on the eve of
the competition of his last term in office, lawyer-President William
Clinton granted 140 pardons and 36 commutations of prison
sentences, several of which were impossible to defend or political in
nature. 224 The most infamous pardon recipient was billionaire
fugitive Marc Rich who fled from the U.S. and renounced his
citizenship when faced with charges of tax fraud and illegal trading
in oil with Iran at a time when Iran had seized the U.S. embassy and
held American citizens as hostages.225 Other questionable pardon
recipients included Roger Clinton, the president's brother, who was
pardoned from his conviction for conspiring to distribute cocaine and
Susan McDougal, who was pardoned from her conviction of bank
Jimmy Carter after granting a controversial pardon to former President Richard
Nixon. See Proclamation 4311, supra note 210.
222. See TRIBE, supra note 210, § 4-10, at 721-22.
223. The Supreme Court has exercised judicial review of the constitutionality of
certain aspects of the clemency powers. See, e.g., Schick, 419 U.S. at 266 (upholding
the President's ability to attach a condition on a pardon when the condition did not
violate the Constitution); Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1915)
(balancing the clemency power against a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination as a witness in a related criminal proceeding); Knote, 95 U.S. at 15456 (holding that a pardon must not affect the constitutional rights of others and could
not be used to contravene the appropriations powers reserved to Congress under
Article I of the Constitution).
224. See BARBARA OLSON, THE FINAL DAYS 121-23 (2001) (providing a full list of
President Clinton's pardons and commutations issued on his last day in office);
William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, § 4
at 13.
225. See Aaron Lucchetti et al., Open for Business: While Marc Rich Was Fugitive,
Firm Dealt with PariahNations, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2001, at Al (noting that after
Marc Rich had fled from the country, he and his business partner continued to engage
in oil and other trading through non-U.S. subsidiaries with countries that had
supported terrorism or engaged in human rights abuses). Shortly after pardoning Mr.
Rich, President Clinton indicated his remorse. See also Jonathan Alter, Life is
Fleeting, Man, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 2002, at 43 (noting that President Clinton admitted
that the Rich pardon had damaged his reputation and was "terrible politics").
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fraud and who had been jailed for contempt for refusing to testify
of and alleged
President Clinton's knowledge
concerning
participation in fraudulent financial transactions in connection with
a failed Whitewater land development corporation in which the
President and Susan McDougal were partners.226
As discussed earlier, in evaluating a federalism claim, the initial
inquiry involves a review of the text of the Constitution and the
underlying postulates behind the specific grants of authority. The
Constitution expressly gives to the President the plenary power to
grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States. It
provides no restrictions on the President's exercise of the pardon
powers. Although the only real check on the abuse of the pardon
powers is impeachment from office by the citizenry, even the grant of
a controversial or questionable pardon would remain intact.227 In
addition, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides the
federal government with an advantage in determining the proper
balance and limits of powers between the national and state
governments. Under it, state laws or actions in conflict with federal
constitutional provisions or law are invalid.
State bar associations have consistently exercised an ability to
discipline both practicing lawyers and non-practicing lawyers for
misconduct occurring outside the practice of law. However, under the

226. See Amy Goldstein & Susan Schmidt, Clinton's Last-Day Clemency Benefits
176; List Includes Pardonsfor Cisneros, McDougal, Deutch and Roger Clinton, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at Al; see also Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the Pardon Power
During the Twilight of a PresidentialTerm, 67 MO. L. REV. 13, 16 (2002) (contending
that many of the pardons granted by President Clinton were the result of political
influence by the President's former lawyer, large financial contributors and the
President's brother-in-law); Whitewater. The dandy vanishes, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14,
1998, at 26. The Clinton pardons fueled a congressional investigation that led to the
publication of an advisory report issued by the Government Reform Committee of the
U.S. House of Representatives that concluded the President had ignored the applicable
standards governing the exercise of the clemency power and to subsequent
investigations by the Justice Department concerning whether any of the pardons were
granted in exchange for financial contributions to democratic party concerns. See Dale
Russakoff, Clinton Cleared in New Square Pardon Case; U.S. Attorney in New York
Probing Other Pardons, WASH. POST, June 21, 2002, at A7. Currently, all
investigations have failed to affect the legitimacy of President Clinton's exercise of the
pardon power or any of the pardons issued.
227. See RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 217, at 626-27 (noting
the Framer's rejection of a proposal to require Senate approval of Presidential
pardons); FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 211, at 385-86 (implying the Framers'
consideration and rejection of a proposal that presidential pardons for the crime of
treason should require the assent of the legislature); see also William Duker, The
President'sPower to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475,
525 n.258 (1977) (noting that one of the counts of impeachment against President
Andrew Johnson was for "corruptly us[ing] the pardoning power") (quoting Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1867)).
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balance of powers articulated by the Framers and provided for under
the Pardon Clause of the Constitution, any attempt by a state bar
association to discipline a lawyer-President for granting controversial
pardons as was the case during President Clinton's final hours in
office would result in destroying or circumventing the constitutional
powers granted to the President and would violate the Supremacy
Clause.228 Bar discipline in this instance would run afoul of the
Framer's intent to provide the chief executive officer of the national
government with the exclusive and unlimited ability to grant
reprieves and pardons as a check on punishments issued by Congress
and the federal judiciary.229 Consequently, should the lawyerPresident decide to resume the practice of law at the end of his term
in office, any consideration by a state bar association of his exercise
of the pardon powers as a factor in determining his fitness to practice
law would violate principles of federalism.
(b) Foreign Policy and Presidential War Powers
The Framers of the Constitution entrusted matters pertaining to
foreign policy exclusively to the national government by virtue of its
sovereignty and expressly provided for a mutual sharing of powers
between the Executive and Legislative branches of government
during wartime.230 The Constitution grants to the President the

228. See supra note 204 (discussing the Supremacy Clause). See also Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 382-83 (1977) (invalidating state bar association total bans
on lawyer advertising as a violation of the First Amendment); Goldfarb v. Va. State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) (invalidating state bar association actions that
required minimum fee schedules as a violation of The Sherman Act). The discretion
and protections provided to the President to grant even controversial pardons,
however, would not shield the President from impeachment and removal from office
along with subsequent criminal liability for bribery when the President accepts
financial contributions in exchange for granting a pardon. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl.
7 (providing for criminal process to be brought against public officials after
impeachment and removal from office); U.S. Const. art. II § 4 (providing for
impeachment and removal from office if a public official is convicted of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors). Accord RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 217, at 639 (Statement of George Mason, Sept. 15, 1787)
(discussing George Mason's concern that the Constitution provided the President with
the unbridled power to grant pardons even to those whom he had secretly instigated to
commit crimes thus preventing the discovery of the President's guilt); id. at 626
(Statement of James Wilson, Sept. 15, 1787) (reassuring the delegates that if the
President is a party to the guilt he can be impeached and prosecuted).
229. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
230. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (holding that foreign affairs is
an area that "the Constitution entrusts to the President and Congress"); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (holding that "the federal government is entrusted
with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign
sovereignties"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(holding that "the powers to declare war.., to make treaties [and] to maintain
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power to conduct certain diplomatic and military affairs. Article II,
sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution provide that "[t]he President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States,.. .when called into the actual service of the United States"
and empower the President to make treaties with other nations and
to appoint and receive both ambassadors and other public ministers
with the advice and consent of the Senate.231 Article I, section 8
232
specifically provides Congress with the power to declare war.
Although the Constitution entrusts the power to declare war to
Congress and empowers the President to supervise the military
operations of all congressionally declared war, United States history
provides many instances in which the President has ordered and
executed the use of military force abroad without gaining
congressional approval in advance. Harvard Law Professor Laurence
Tribe contends that the executive use of military force even prior to
congressional acquiescence would likely be appropriate in instances
where the force is necessary to defend the United States at home or
to defend its military forces abroad from attack.233 For instance, in
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties ... would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality"); see also War Powers
Resolution of 1973, H.R.J. Res. 542 § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (adopted over presidential veto
on Nov. 7, 1973) (noting the Framers envisioned that the collective judgment of both
the Congress and President would apply when deploying U.S. troops into hostile
situations).
231. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, 2; § 3. Historical records and Supreme Court
precedent suggests that the President has the exclusive responsibility for announcing
and implementing military policies. For example, a comment by Alexander Hamilton
during the development of the Constitution suggests that the Framers believed that
providing the President with the authority of Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy was no more than empowering the President to act as the "first general and
admiral of the confederacy" as opposed to the powers entrusted to the British King
during that same period such as declaring war and raising and regulating of fleets and
armies, powers that later were entrusted by the Constitution to the Legislative
branch. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 357 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey
and James McClellan eds., 2001) [hereinafter FEDERALIST No. 69]. See also Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (noting that the
President's powers as Commander in Chief affected only the command of the military
forces and operations).
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. See TRIBE, supra note 210, § 4-3, at 638 n.6
(citing Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 132 (1971)). In one draft of the Constitution, the language
"provided that Congress should have the power to 'make war.' The phrase was later]
changed to 'declare war' in order to ensure that.., any ongoing war would not be
[constrained] by the need for consensus over tactics and strategy." Id.
233. See TRIBE, supra note 210, § 4-6, at 659 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 217, at 318-319) (noting that the Framers had
contemplated that the President, even without prior congressional approval, might use
force to repel sudden attacks). Accord War Powers Resolution of 1973, supra note 230
(providing the President as Commander-in-Chief with the ability to introduce the
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the Prize Cases,234 the Supreme Court upheld as a legitimate exercise
of executive power, President Lincoln's blockade of southern seaports
following the attack on Fort Sumter in April 1861 and the
organization of the Confederacy by southern states that had seceded
from the nation. In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledge an
inherent power, derived from the Commander in Chief Clause, to
defend against an invasion by a foreign nation or rebellion by the
States even without prior congressional approval of the use of
military force and ultimately held that the use of such power to
handle internal insurrection or invasion posed a political question
and therefore, was not subject to judicial review.235 In arriving at its
decision, the Court noted that the President was empowered to
respond by military force where the United States had been invaded
by a foreign nation or by the individual States organized in
rebellion.236
Despite the fact that presidential authority to wage defensive
war has been widely accepted, there is no evidence to suggest or
imply that the Framers contemplated the use of military force in
absence of congressional approval to defend against sudden attacks
upon allies or in the anticipation of an enemy attack on the United
States.237 Professor Tribe attributes a lack of consideration for these
concerns to the Framer's limited view of the role of the military
during that period. For example, in the Eighteenth Century, a direct
attack on the United States by a foreign enemy was probably the
only exigency that would have required instantaneous military
action. Consequently, the Framers could have reasonably envisioned
that Congress would have the ability to evaluate the available
military response to such an emergency in sufficient time when an
attack was imminent. 23s
The presidential war powers, however, are not only defined by
the text of the Constitution but also by the underlying postulates
military into hostilities in times of national emergencies created by an attack on the
United States, its territories, or its armed forces). Professor Tribe contends that even if
executive use of military force was beyond the scope of the powers vested in the
Commander in Chief Clause, the action "might still be justified as a necessary
concomitant of [national] sovereignty." See Tribe, supra note 210, § 4-6, at 659.
234. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
235. Id. at 668, 670-71. Accord Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28-29 (1827)
(upholding the constitutionality of an act of Congress in 1795 providing the President
with the ability to call forth the military as he deemed necessary to repel an invasion
or imminent danger of invasion against the United States).
236. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668.
237. See TRIBE, supra note 210, § 4-6, at 659-660. But see Martin, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) at 29 (stating that "[o]ne of the best means to repel invasions is to provide the
requisite force for action, before the invader himself has reached the soil").
238. See TRIBE, supra note 210, § 4-6, at 659-60.
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behind the textual provisions along with the customary practices and
exercises of political power by the President during specific periods in
history.239 Professor Tribe has reasoned, and rightly so, that in a
nuclear age such as the present, waiting for congressional approval
prior to committing military force in anticipation of an enemy attack
rather than for an actual attack "might prove too costly a procedural
luxury."240 The President, and not Congress, is in the better position
to know the "conditions which prevail in foreign countries" during
wartime.241 Because the President is the "sole organ of he federal
government in the field of international relations," he is privy to
confidential sources of information generally unavailable to
Congress.242 The Constitution empowers the President to appoint
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials who are
capable of ascertaining and providing the President with the highly
sensitive information necessary to assist him in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken by the national government with
respect to matters concerning situations in foreign countries and the
effect of those actions upon U.S. foreign relations.243 Finally, the
Constitution provides the President with the exclusive authority to
determine when an exigency has arisen that is of a sufficient
magnitude to require the use of military force to defend against it.244
In light of the President's superior knowledge in the area of foreign
relations, his ability to respond more swiftly in emergency situations
than Congress and the current actual threat of damage and
destruction to the United States and its citizens from the use of
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, requiring the
President as Commander in Chief of the military to obtain
239. See Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19, 25-31
(Special Issue 1970) (contending that history and modern practice has legitimized the
practice of presidential war-making). But see Raoul Berger, War-Making By The
President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 54-58 (1972) (criticizing the "adaptation by usage"
doctrine, a label that Berger contends is designed to legitimize the "disagreeable claim
that the President [can], by his own practices, revise the Constitution" or disrupt the
constitutional balance of powers provided for under a constitutional separation of
powers between the branches of the national government).
240. See TRIBE, supra note 210, § 4-6, at 659-660. This reasoning would also apply
to the modern realities surrounding the use of chemical and biological warfare. Accord
Bickel, supra note 232, at 132 (contending that in modern time it is reasonable that
the President not only have the power to repel attacks but also to "respond to the
threat of attacks against the United States" or its military "when instant action is of
the essence").
241. See Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., 299 U.S. at 320.
242. Id.
243. Id. See also supra note 230 and accompanying text.
244. See Martin, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 30 (noting that every obstacle to an efficient
and immediate compliance with a military order issued by the President after deciding
that an exigency has arisen would tend to jeopardize the public interest).
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congressional approval prior to deploying armed forces to defend
against such threats would likely have grave and devastating
consequences.
Just as disciplining a lawyer-President for professional
misconduct for an abuse of the pardon powers will violate the
delicate balance of powers attributed to the federal and state
governments under principles of federalism, disciplining of the
lawyer-President for conduct resulting from the exercise of the war
powers given to the President under the Constitution would have a
similar result. A brief discussion of a recent exercise of the executive
war powers by President George Walker Bush might be helpful to
illustrate the nature of the problem.245 During the State of the Union
address in January 2003, President George Bush asserted that the
Iraqi government, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, had
purchased uranium from Africa for the production of weapons of
mass destruction, that Iraq possessed such weapons and implied that
Iraq's possession of these weapons was related in some manner to
Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida terrorist network.246 Based upon these
assertions and false intelligence information provided to the
President by high-level national security officials and British
intelligence reports, the President received the approval of Congress
to conduct a pre-emptive war against Iraq in order to defend against
a serious and imminent threat of a domestic attack posed by Iraq's
possession and production of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction.247 Although U.S. military forces were successful in
245. On January 20, 2001, Republican George Walker Bush became the forty-third
President of the United States. Mike Allen, The Dawn of a New Bush Era: After
Inaugural Celebrations, Challenges Await New President, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001,
at Al.
246. See Anne E. Kornblut, Democrats See a Crack in the Bush Armor, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 18, 2003, at Al (discussing the effect of President Bush's decisin to go to
war with Iraq); John Nichols, The Heat is on: as Questions Grow, so Does Bush's
Vulnerability, NATION, Aug. 18, 2003, at 13 (discussing Bush's credibility in relation to
the unreliable evidence regarding Iraq's possession of nuclear material and the
breakdown in U.S. intelligence) ; Reuters, Graham Just Hints at Impeachment, L.A.
TIMES, July 18, 2003, at A37; William M. Stewart, Is Bush a Liar or Is He a Dupe,
SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, July 13, 2003, at Fl; David Wise, If Bush is Lying, He's Not
the First, WASH. POST, June 15, 2003, at B1. Saudi exile Osama bin Laden and alQaida, a terrorist group that reports to him, gained world notoriety after evidence
linked them to the September, 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. See, e.g., David
Johnston and Neil A. Lewis, After The Attacks: The Investigation;F.B.I. Was Seking 2
of the Hijacking Suspects at the Time of the Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, § 1, at
7; Robin Wright and Josh Meyer, America Attacked; Mapping A Response, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
247. See Nichols, supra note 246, at 13. In October 2002, Congress issued a war
resolution authorizing President Bush to use force against Iraq. See Authorization For
Use Of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116

HeinOnline -- 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 898 2004-2005

20051

THE POLITICS OF MISCONDUCT

899

removing Saddam Hussein from office, they have been unsuccessful
in locating any weapons of mass destruction.248
Since the end of the war with Iraq, evidence has surfaced to
indicate that a key portion of President Bush's State of the Union
message was both false and known by senior administration officials
to be false.249 As a result, the news media and some members of
Congress have questioned whether President Bush used false
pretenses to lure the nation into an unwarranted war against Iraq
and if so, whether a manipulation or deliberate misuse of national
security intelligence information, if proven, would constitute a "high
crime" under the Constitution's Impeachment Clause.25o
President Bush is not a lawyer and the recent public concerns
surrounding his alleged failure to disclose accurate national security
information to Congress in support of its approval and declaration of
war against Iraq have yet to be fully investigated. However, this
scenario provides still another situation in which federalism concerns
may arise if a state bar association or court were to discipline a
lawyer-President for acting in a similar manner. The basis for bar
discipline under the Model Rules could be the assertion that the
lawyer-President who either manipulates or falsifies national
security intelligence information relied on by Congress in
determining whether to declare a preemptive war against a foreign
nation has committed acts of professional misconduct and has
violated the public trust placed in the highest political office in the
country. 251

Stat.1498 (2002) (H..J.R. Res. 114, 107th Cong., approved on Oct. 16, 2002).
248. See Wise, supra note 246, at B1. As of the date for completion of this Article,
former chief weapons inspector David A. Kay has definitively concluded that Iraq had
no significant stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons when the U.S. invasion of
Iraq began last March. See Douglas Jehl & David E. Sanger, The Struggle For Iraq:
Intelligence; Powell's Case, a Year Later: Gaps in Picture of Iraq Arms, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2004, § 1, at 1. In response to Kay's conclusion, President Bush had considered
whether to order an investigation into the intelligence failure. Id.
249. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (requiring the President to provide to Congress
information on the State of the Union); Stewart, supra note 246, at Fl (noting that
senior administration officials were aware at the time of the President's January 2003
State of the Union address that key information including a British intelligence report
that was provided to and relied on by the President was false).
250. See Nichols, supra note 246, at 13; Kornblut, supra note 246, at Al. Under the
Constitution, the President is subject to impeachment and removal from office if he is
convicted of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 4; THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 231, at 356.
251. See MODEL RULES R. 8.4(c) (providing that a lawyer commits professional
misconduct when he or she engages in "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation"). See also Philip Gourevitch, Comment, Might and Right, NEW
YORKER, June 16 & 23, 2003, at 70 (asserting the analogy that "in a country where the
previous President's lies about consensual adulterous relations were considered
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Under the Supremacy Clause, the national government
possesses a decided advantage over the States in its handling of
activities related to the war powers provisions of the Constitution.252
As discussed earlier, the Framers of the Constitution exclusively
entrusted matters pertaining to foreign policy such as the declaration
of war and decisions concerning the use of military force to the
national government. The Constitution and modern military
practices have empowered the President as Commander in Chief to
supervise military operations during wars that have been both
congressionally approved prior to the deployment of military forces
and those where prior congressional approval is lacking as long as
Congress eventually acquiesces to the President's conduct or when
the use of force is necessary to defend the nation from attack at home
or its military forces abroad. Implied in this grant of power is the
discretion to determine when an exigency has arisen and is of
sufficient magnitude that the use of force is required.253 Finally, in
the current age of weapons of mass destruction, it is both logical and
reasonable to expect the federal judiciary and Congress to continue to
defer to the judgments of the President in deploying military forces
against foreign nations even in anticipation of attacks rather than
actual attacks because of the severe consequences that could result
from a failure to act expeditiously.
Bar discipline of a lawyer-President when it pertains to his
exercise of the presidential war powers proscribed under the
Constitution and interpreted by the federal courts and modern
practices would seriously run afoul of the Framers' intent to
empower the national government with the exclusive power to act on
behalf of the nation in the area of foreign affairs and international
relations. It would also run contrary to the powers delegated to the
President as the Commander in Chief of the military such as the
authority to make critical decisions as to when the use of military
force is necessary to defend the nation against attacks by foreign
nations and internal rebellions by the States. Consequently, the
magnitude of the discretion provided to the President under the
Constitution would logically shield a President from political
recourse even when the President has erred with regards to
assessing the urgency and severity of a threatened attack on the
United States.254 In short, bar discipline of the lawyer-President in
ground for impeachment, truthtelling about the gravest affair of state-the waging of
war-must stand as a paramount value"); Jefferson, supra note 17, at 1 (noting the
Arkansas State Bar Association disbarment proceedings against President William
Clinton for giving false testimony in Jones v.Clinton).
252. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
253. See Martin, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) at 30.
254. See Curtiss.Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 (holding that the President is
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this instance or judicial inquiry into matters of foreign affairs would
not only circumvent the Constitutional authority delegated to the
President to make such decisions but also wholly disregard both the
realities of the serious dangers present in an age of nuclear, chemical
and biological warfare, and the legitimate need to deploy military
force even in the anticipation of the threat of danger associated with
weapons capable of mass destruction.255
(c) Supreme Court Discipline
In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton commented that the
judiciary branch was "designed to be an intermediate body between
the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority."256 In essence,
Hamilton viewed the Supreme Court, the sole federal Court
expressly contemplated by the Framers at that time of the creation of
the Constitution, to serve primarily as a check on the executive and
legislative branches of the national government for the protection of
the people.257 According to Hamilton, to best protect the people the
judicial offices required a cloak of permanent tenure in order to
create the independent spirit in judges essential for the faithful
performance of the duties of that role.258 He believed that temporary
judicial offices "would have a tendency to throw the administration of
justice into hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with

the constitutional representative of the United States as it relates to foreign nations
and that he is responsible solely to the Constitution for his conduct); Oetjen v. Cent.
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (stating that "[t]he conduct of foreign
relations ... is committed by the Constitution to ... the 'political' departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of such power is
not subject to judicial inquiry"); Martin, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 32 (noting that the
remedy for presidential abuse of the war powers in determining when to call forth the
military "if it should occur, is to be found in the constitution itself').
255. An elimination of bar discipline for an abuse of the presidential war powers as
suggested in this scenario would not result in an absolute shield from public
accountability. As noted earlier, a deliberate manipulation and falsification of national
security information in order to gain Congressional approval for a declaration of war
may constitute conduct sufficient for impeachment and removal of the President from
office. See supra text accompanying note 251. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7
(providing for criminal process to be brought against public officials after
impeachment and removal from office).
256. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey
and James McClellan eds., 2001) [hereinafter FEDERALIST No. 78].
257. See id. at 406-07.
258. Id. at 407 ("That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of
justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary
commission.").
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utility and dignity."259
Hamilton and the Framers envisioned that the most important
and essential requirement in creating the independence necessary for
the operation of the Supreme Court was a tenure provision that
would allow federal judges to serve during "good behavior."260 This
significant safeguard found its way into Article III of the
Constitution, which provides for the creation of the United States
Supreme Court and other inferior federal courts that Congress may
deem necessary and allows judges to hold office during good
behavior.261 The tenure and salary provisions of Article III were not
only designed to provide federal judges with the maximum freedom
from possible coercion or influence by the Executive or Legislative
branches of the national government but serve other institutional
values as well.262 The Framers believed that an independent
judiciary was a critical feature of the new government and provided
clear institutional protections for that independence in the
Constitution.263

259. Id.
260. Id. at 401-02, 408. See also RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note
217, at 66-67 (noting "[tlhe Judiciary hold their places not for a limited time, but
during good behavior.").
261. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
262. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955). See also N. Pipeline Const. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (holding that the primary value of the
tenure and salary provisions of Article III was "to ensure the independence of the
[federal] judiciary from the control of the Executive and Legislative Branches of
government"); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980) (acknowledging that
the independence of the judiciary from external pressures is a highly valued element of
our constitutional system). The tenure and salary provisions serve additional
institutional values as well. For example, judicial independence from the political
forces of the Executive and Legislative branches promotes public confidence in judicial
decisions by helping to secure a steady, upright and impartial administration of the
laws. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 256, at 402 (advising that the "general
liberty of the people can never be endangered from [the judiciary]" because it controls
only society's judgment, not its power or economics). In addition, "the guarantee of life
tenure insulates" federal judges from improper influence from both the other branches
of government and their judicial colleagues and therefore "promotes judicial
individualism." N. Pipeline Const. Co., 458 U.S. at 59 n.10. See also Irving R.
Kaufman, Chilling JudicialIndependence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 713 (1979) (arguing that
judicially enforced discipline against fellow judges would be detrimental to judicial
individualism).
263. See N. Pipeline Const. Co., 458 U.S. at 60 (holding that a fundamental principle
enunciated in the Constitution is that the "judicial power of the United States must be
[placed] in an independent [jiudiciary" and that the Constitution provides "clear
institutional protections for that independence"). For example, when discussing a
motion on the floor at the Constitutional Convention that would have allowed for the
removal of Supreme Court Justices by the Executive on the application by the Senate
and House of Representatives, delegate James Wilson (Pa.) commented that "[t]he
Judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which
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The U.S. Supreme Court is the only federal court specifically
mandated by the Constitution. Today, Justices sitting on the Court
have assumed as their primary responsibilities the tasks of assuring
state compliance with the Constitution and other federal laws and
acting as a check on the exercise of powers by the Executive and
Legislative branches of the national government. As Hamilton and
the others had imagined, Supreme Court Justices are appointed for
lifetime tenures.264
While Article III provides for the creation of the Supreme Court,
it is silent with regards to specific disciplinary actions available when
a Supreme Court justice commits professional misconduct or other
conduct unbecoming of good behavior while in office. However, the
Impeachment Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to
impeach and remove from office all civil officers of the United States
for conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors."265 It empowers the House of Representatives to
begin impeachment proceedings against a civil officer of the United
States and the Senate to try all impeachments.266 By constitutional
design, Supreme Court Justices are civil officers of the United States
thereby making impeachment the only political check on the Judicial
Branch by the Legislature.267

might prevail in the two branches of our Govt." See RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 217, at 428-29 (Statement of James Wilson, Aug. 27, 1787).
264. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The "good Behaviour" provision of Article III has
been interpreted to mean that federal judges serve lifetime tenures unless their
conduct falls below the good behavior threshold. See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493
F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir. 1974) ("The inclusion of the tenure provision does not permit
impeachment for conduct less than that which triggers the impeachment provisions of
Articles I and II.").
265. See id. art. II, § 4. See also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl.6. The Constitution
provides that if impeachment proceedings result in a conviction, the judgment shall
not extend "to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment,
according to Law." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. The U.S. Senate has interpreted this provision
to require that removal from office is an automatic consequence of conviction but that
disqualification from office requires a separate vote. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES &
ADMIN., PROCEDURE AND GUIDELINES FOR IMPEACHMENT TRIALS IN THE UNITED
STATES SENATE, S. DOC. No. 99-33, at 95, 99, 101 (2d. Sess. 1986).
266. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, cl. 5, 3, cl. 6; THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 409-10
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey and James McClellan eds., 2001) (noting that
public officials are liable to be impeached for mal-conduct by the House of
Representatives and tried by the Senate and that impeachment is consistent with the
necessary independence of the judiciary).
267. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
at 15-16. Accord Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline Or Remove Federal Judges? A
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 211, 213-220 (1993). Political checks
entail those mechanisms that are available to the elected branches of government for
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Although legal commentators agree that the Framers viewed
impeachment as the sole political mechanism for federal judicial
discipline,268 some believe that the Framers left open the question of
whether there could be judicially dependent mechanisms for
discipline of federal judges short of impeachment such as criminal
actions brought against a sitting judge for misconduct while in office
or judicial self-regulation.269 Proponents of this viewpoint have taken
an "originalist" approach to interpreting the Constitution, one that
attempts to discern the resolution of specific constitutional issues
according to the Framer's expectations regarding those issues.27o
They have relied primarily on Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution,
which holds that public officials convicted under impeachment are
also subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment under
the criminal law and several U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decisions
allowing for the prosecution of federal judges for misconduct while in
office.271 Opponents of this viewpoint, on the other hand, have taken
a "textualist" approach, one that focuses primarily on a review of the
plain text of the Constitution for answers. Consequently, the
opponents have contended that the literal text of the Constitution
does not expressly authorize any other means for disciplining Article
III judges short of impeachment and removal from office.272 On
October 15, 1980, Congress settled the question concerning judicial
self-regulation of lower-level Article III judges through its approval
and adoption of the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act of 1980 ("Judicial Conduct and Disability Act").273

the removal of federal judges that do not require judicial assistance. See id. at 215.
268. See RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 217, at 428-29
(indicating that the Constitutional Convention firmly defeated a proposal to allow the
removal of judges by the Executive and Legislative Branches).
269. See Shane, supra note 267, at 223-42.
270. See id. at 211, 233.
271. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 7. See also United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d
842, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984) (holding that a sitting
federal judge may be criminally prosecuted aside from impeachment). Accord United
States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710-11 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203
(1983); United States v. Issacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974). Finally, even Supreme Court Justices Douglas and Black
acknowledged that Article III judges were subject to criminal prosecutions if they
violated the law. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 140-42 (1970)
(Douglas, J., and Black, J., dissenting).
272. See Shane, supra note 267, at 211, 233-34.
273. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035, 2036-40 (1980) (codified initially at 28
U.S.C.S. § 372 (c) (Lexis-Nexis 2001). In 2002, Congress revised Section 372(c) of Title
28 and removed the revised provisions concerning judicial discipline to a new section.
See 21st Century Dep't of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, P.L. 107-273, 116
Stat. 1758 (2002). The current version of 28 U.S.C.S. § 372(c) is located in Chapter 16
of Title 28. See 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 351-364 (Lexis-Nexis Supp. 2003). The former version of
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The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act provides that any
person alleging that a federal judge other than a Supreme Court
Justice "has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts" can file a
complaint with the clerk of the federal Court of Appeals for the
respective circuit.274 Under the Act, the clerk of the circuit court is
required to forward the complaint to both the chief judge of the
circuit and the targeted judge.275 After reviewing the complaint, the
chief judge has the discretion to either dismiss the complaint or to
create a panel of judges to investigate the allegation.276 Upon
conclusion of the panel's investigation, the panel is required to file a
report with the judicial council of the circuit.277 The judicial council
may either dismiss the complaint, perform additional investigation
into the matter or issue several disciplinary sanctions including the
refusal to assign cases to the targeted judge for a temporary basis or
278
the issuance of a private or public censure.
The council may also refer a complaint to the Judicial
Conference of the United States along with the record of any
associated proceedings and its recommendations for appropriate
action.279 Upon receiving a complaint, the Judicial Conference can

the Act (28 U.S.C. § 372(c)) continued to survive constitutional challenges even up to
the 2002 amendment. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. at 86 n.7 (holding
that there were no constitutional obstacles that prevented Congress from vesting in
the Circuit Judicial Councils, as administrative bodies, the authority to make all
necessary orders for the effective and expeditious business of the courts within the
circuits). See also McBryde v. Comm. To Review Circuit Council Conduct And
Disability Orders, 264 F.3d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding the Act does not violate
Due Process and the Separation of Powers Doctrine). Accord Hastings v. Judicial
Conference, 829 F.2d 91, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); In re
Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1505, 1513-14 (11th Cir.

1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986).
274. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 351(a), (d)(1). Section 351(d)(1) states: "the term 'judge'
means a circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge .... " See
id. § 351(d)(1). The section specifically excludes Supreme Court Justices from
coverage.
275. See id. § 351(c). If the conduct complained of involves the chief judge, then the
clerk shall forward the complaint to the "circuit judge in regular active service who is
next senior" at the time of commission of the alleged misconduct. Id.
276. See id. §§ 352(b), (d). Section 352(d) requires a five-judge panel including the
Chief Judge, two circuit judges and two district judges. See id. §§ 352(d); 353(a)(1).

277. See id. § 353(c).
278. See id. §§ 354(a)(1)(A)-(B), (2)(A)(i)-(iii). See also In re Certain Complaints
Under Investigation, 783 F.2d at 1508 (discussing other inherent options available to
judicial councils such as: (1) exonerating a judge completely, (2) "issu[ing] a report
which, without personal criticism of (a] judge, (reveals an] institutional or
administrative error, or some good faith mistake," and (3) recommending no sanctions
at all).
279. 28 U.S.C.S. § 354(b)(1) (2005). For example, the council must certify its
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exercise any of the powers available to the judicial council.2o If the
Judicial Conference determines that impeachment is warranted,
however, it is required to transmit its decision along with the record
of the proceedings to the U.S. House of Representatives.281 Finally,
all orders and determinations including denials of petitions for
review made by a chief judge, a judicial council or the Judicial
Conference are final and not subject to any additional judicial review
aside from those provisions for review that are expressly contained in
the Act.282
A major purpose of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act was
to create a mechanism and a set of procedures within the judicial
branch of government to evaluate and respond to complaints against
federal judges.283 In creating the Act, Congress placed the authority
for implementing federal judicial self-regulation exclusively in the
hands of Article III judges, both providing for initial investigatory
proceedings against a judge to be commenced by one panel of such
judges and for review by a different panel. Congress's primary intent
in designing the process in this manner was to protect Article III
judges from the chilling effects of unnecessary complaints on judicial
independence.284
The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act specifically omits
Supreme Court Justices from its list of federal judges that are subject
to discipline by the judicial councils of the several circuits and the
Judicial Conference of the United States.285 Congress has provided

determination together with any complaint and a record of the associated proceedings
to the Judicial Conference of the United States if the council concludes that a sitting
judge has committed conduct worthy of impeachment. Id. § 354(b)(2)(A).
280. See id. § 355(a); see also id. § 331.
281. Id. § 355(b)(1)-(2).
282. Id. §§ 357(a), (c). The Act provides the sole means of recourse for an aggrieved
party. Section 352(c) allows a complainant to petition the judicial council of the circuit
for review of a final order issued by a chief judge. Id. § 352(c). Section 357(a) allows a
complainant to seek review of a judicial council order by petitioning the Judicial
Conference of the United States. Id. § 357(a). Finally, Section 357(c) provides that all
orders and determinations, including denials of petitions for review, are final and
conclusive and are not subject to any further judicial review on appeal or otherwise.
Id. § 357(b).
283. See Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
H.R.REP. No. 96-1313, at 1 (1980). A secondary purpose of the legislation was to revise
the composition of the judicial councils of the federal circuits and to clarify the
authority of judicial councils and the Judicial Conference concerning judicial discipline
and disability. Id.
284. See McBryde, 264 F.3d at 262-63 (referring to H.R. REP. No. 96-1313, at 18
(1979)).
285. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 352(d)(1) (defining "judge" as a circuit judge, district judge,
bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge). See also H.R. REP. No. 96-1313, at 10 n.28.
But see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000) (providing that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate
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two reasons for this omission. First, Congress believed that the high
public visibility of Supreme Court Justices would make it more likely
that impeachment could and would be used to cure egregious
violations.286 Second, Congress believed that it would be unwise to
empower the Judicial Conference, an entity that is chaired by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to sit on cases involving the
highest-ranking judges in the U.S. judicial system.287 In short,
Congress believed that subjecting Supreme Court Justices to the
provisions of the Act would result in diluting the importance and
independence of the Supreme Court within the nation's justice
288
system.
Federalism concerns can arise in situations where a state bar
association attempts to discipline a sitting U.S. Supreme Court
Justice for acts of professional misconduct short of offenses worthy of
impeachment. Technically, because most judges today are lawyers
and are licensed by their respective state bar associations, a bar
association would have the ability to regulate the conduct of judges
as well as its other members.289 Recognizing the unique differences
between the roles of judges and practicing lawyers and the various
ethical concerns confronted by each, the ABA promulgated and
adopted the Model Rules of Judicial Conduct.290 Under Canons 2 and
3 of the judicial conduct rules, disciplinary actions can be taken
against a judge when he or she behaves with impropriety or the
appearance of impropriety or fails to disqualify him or herself in a
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality could reasonably be
questioned.291 Additionally, disciplinary actions may be warranted
judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
286. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1313, at 10 n.28.
287. See id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (specifying the composition and
responsibilities of the Judicial Conference of the United States).
288. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1313, at 10 n.28.
289. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (discussing the bar's ability to
regulate both practicing and non-practicing lawyers who violate provisions of the
ethics rules).
290. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2002), reprinted in JOHN S.
DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES (West

2003) [hereinafter MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT]. The Model Code of Judicial
Conduct was formerly adopted in 1972 and replaced the Canons of Judicial Ethics
adopted in 1924. Nearly all states, as well as the District of Columbia, adopted codes of
judicial conduct modeled after the 1972 ethics code. In 1990, the ABA revised its 1972
version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Currently, approximately 20
jurisdictions have adopted new codes of judicial conduct based on the 1990 ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct. See id. at 621-22.
291. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 290, Canons 2(A)-(B),
3(E)(1)(c), Canon 2(A) provides: "[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law and
shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
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when a judge accepts a gift that is excessive in value in order to avoid
the questions that could be raised concerning the judge's impartiality
and the integrity of the judicial office.292 A brief discussion of recent
ethical issues involving Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg may be useful in illustrating the nature of the
political predicament that a state bar association could face when a
Supreme Court Justice commits professional misconduct.
On January 5, 2004, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and
his daughter accompanied Vice President Dick Cheney as the Vice
President's guests on a duck-hunting trip in southern Louisiana.293
Justice Scalia, an avid hunter and a longtime friend of Vice President
Cheney, traveled with the Vice President on a small government jet
that served as Air Force Two to a private camp owned by Wallace
Carline, a local oil industry businessman and mutual friend of Scalia
and Cheney.294 Ironically, the trip occurred only three weeks after
the Supreme Court had agreed to hear arguments in Cheney v.
United States District Court,295 an appeal from a lower court ruling
requiring the Vice President to turn over documents detailing specific
names of the private individuals who had met with and assisted the
members of the Administration's energy task force in developing a

impartiality of the judiciary." See id. Canon 2(A). Canon 2(B) provides: "[a] judge shall
not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial
conduct or judgment ..." See id. Canon 2(B). Finally, Canon 3(E)(1)(c) provides:
[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:... (c) the judge knows that he or she, individually
or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse... has an economic interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other
more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the
proceeding.
See id. Canon 3(E)(1)(c).
292. See id. Canon 4(D)(5)(d) cmt. 1. Canon 4(D)(5)(d) provides that "[a] judge shall
not accept .... a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except for: ... (d) a gift from a

relative or friend, for a special occasion, such as a wedding, anniversary or birthday, if
the gift is fairly commensurate with the occasion and the relationship .. " Id. Canon
4(D)(5)(d); but see id. 4(D)(5)(e) (noting that a gift from a close personal friend may be
allowed when the friend's appearance or interest in a case would require the
disqualification of a judge under Canon 3(E)).
293. See David G. Savage, Trip With Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia:
Friends Hunt Ducks Together, Even as the Justice is Set to Hear the Vice-President's
Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at A-i; David G. Savage & Richard A. Serrano, Scalia
Was Cheney Hunt Trip Guest; Ethics Concern Grows, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at A-1
[hereinafter Savage & Serrano].
294. See Michael Janofsky, Scalia's Trip With Cheney Raises Questions of
Impartiality, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A-14; see also House Democrats Call for
Hearings on High Court Conflicts of Interest, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004, at A14.
295. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 540 U.S. 1088 (2003).
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national energy policy.296

The Cheney-Scalia trip quickly attracted the attention of the
national media. On January 17, 2004, the public learned of the trip
through an article published in the Los Angeles Times.297 In a formal
response to an inquiry made by the Los Angeles newspaper regarding
the hunting trip, Justice Scalia acknowledged that he was one of a
party of nine who had hunted at the camp with the Vice President
although he did not believe that his impartiality could be reasonably

questioned as a result of this

trip.298

As one might have expected, Justice Scalia's conduct and
remarks sparked congressional inquiries in both the Senate and
296. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20,
24 (D.D.C. 2002), afl'd, In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 958 (2003). Judicial Watch, Inc. involved two law suits brought by the Sierra
Club and Judicial Watch, a Washington-based legal foundation, seeking to discover
information concerning the nature of the role oil companies and other corporate
interests had played in the deliberations that led to the Administration's national
energy policy. See Judicial Watch, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 25. The Vice President
refused to disclose the records of the National Energy Policy Development Group that
he chaired and filed a motion to dismiss the Judicial Watch and Sierra Club
complaints. Id. at 25-26. After hearing arguments by the parties, the District Court
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' request for discovery of
information pertaining to the energy policy development process and the participants
involved, and directed the parties to develop a proposed discovery plan. Id. at 26, 27.
The defendants appealed the District Court judgment and filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus seeking an order that would vacate the District Court discovery orders,
direct the District Court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record,
and direct the court to dismiss the Vice President as a defendant. See In re Cheney,
334 F.3d at 1096. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals dismissed the appellants'
petition for mandamus and granted the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal. Id. at
1109. Shortly afterward, lawyers for the government requested Supreme Court review
of the case on grounds that the lower court ruling against the Vice President
constituted an intrusion into Executive Branch authority. See Savage and Serrano,
supra note 293, at A-1. On December 15, 2003, the Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorarito hear the case. See Cheney, 540 U.S. at 1088. On June 24, 2004, the Court
vacated the judgment of the D.C. Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the
Court of Appeals to reconsider the mandamus petition. Cheney v. United States Dist.
Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2576, 2592-93 (2004) (holding that the Vice President and other
members of the national energy task force were not required to assert executive
privilege before the Separation of Powers arguments raised in the defendants' petition
could be considered).
297. See Savage, supra note 293, at A-1.
298. See id. In a response to the Los Angeles Times inquiry, Justice Scalia stated:
[s]ocial contacts with high-level executive officials (including cabinet officers)
have never been thought improper for judges who may have before them
cases in which those people are involved in their official capacity, as opposed
to their personal capacity. For example, Supreme Court Justices are
regularly invited to dine at the White House, whether or not a suit seeking to
compel or prevent certain presidential action is pending.
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House and prompted national discussions concerning the need for
increased judicial accountability for Supreme Court Justices.299
Ranking Judiciary Committee member Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) and
ranking Governmental Affairs Committee member Joseph I.
Liberman (D-Conn.) sent letters to Chief Justice William Rehnquist
requesting information regarding
Supreme Court
'canons,
procedures and rules' on the recusal of justices" in cases in which
their impartiality could be questionable.300 In a response to these
inquiries, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that there was no formal
procedure for in-house review by the Court of the "decision of a
justice in an individual case" and that it was "ill-considered" for the
senators to suggest that Justice Scalia recuse himself in the pending
case involving the Vice President and the White House energy policy
group. 301
A review of a similar ethical conflict faced by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg during her early tenure on the Court may also be helpful in
understanding the serious ethical problems that result when a
Supreme Court Justice acts improperly. During July 1997, the public
learned that Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had participated
in more than twenty cases before the Supreme Court in which her
husband owned stock in one of the litigating companies.32 Since
1995, Justice Ginsburg had either failed to disqualify or recuse
herself from cases that involved and affected eight companies
included in her husband Martin Ginsburg's rollover individual
retirement account ("IRA").3o3 Ironically, two other Justices who held
stock in the same companies as her husband recused themselves in
cases that Justice Ginsburg had participated in.304 During the 1995299. See Charles Lane, High Court Questioned On Allowing Scalia Trip, WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 2004, at A-4.
300. Id. Representatives Henry A. Waxman (D-Cal.) and John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.)
also sent letters to the Chief Justice and urged him to establish procedures for "formal
review" of the justices' possible conflicts of interests. See David G. Savage, 2 Democrats
Criticize Scalia's Refusal to Quit Cheney Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at A-26.
301. See David G. Savage, High Court Won't Review Scalia's Recusal Decision, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at A-12.
302. See John Berlau, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Fails to Recuse Herself, INSIGHT, July
28, 1997, at 12.
303. See id. Martin Ginsburg owned between $15,001 and $50,000 worth of shares
in NYNEX, American Home Products, Exxon, General Electric, American
International Group, Procter & Gamble, and Johnson & Johnson, and approximately
$15,000 or less in AT&T when Justice Ginsburg participated in Supreme Court review
of cases that may have affected the value of his investment portfolio. Id.
304. See id. According to the Washington Times, Justice Ginsburg had recused
herself from two cases during the 1995-96 term. Id. at 13. During that period, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor had recused herself in eight cases involving AT&T and Justice
Stephen Breyer had disqualified himself in American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996), a case in which he owned stock in both of the
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96 Supreme Court term, Justice Ginsburg had recused herself in only
two cases, the third-lowest number of recusals of any Justice, even
though she and her husband had held more common stock than
almost all of the other justices.305 An analysis conducted by Judicial
Watch, a Washington-based legal foundation, concluded that some of
the cases in which Justice Ginsburg had voted during that period
could have substantially affected the value of her husband's stock.306
For example, Justice Ginsburg had heard arguments and voted in
the Court's decisions in Bankers Trust Company v. Procter & Gamble
Company,307 a complex securities fraud case and Exxon Corporation.
v. Youell,308 both of which had the potential to significantly affect the
value of Procter & Gamble and Exxon Corporation stock.309
Although a failure to recuse herself in order to avoid the
potential for a conflict of interest could affect her ability to be
promoted later to the higher office of Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, Justice Ginsburg faced no immediate reprimand by either her
state bar association or the federal judiciary primarily because the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act expressly excludes Supreme
Court Justices from discipline.31o Justice Ginsburg's conduct also
sparked congressional inquiries and raised concerns for increased
judicial accountability for Supreme Court Justices. However, it was
insufficient to prompt Congress to establish a formal process for the
investigation and discipline of sitting Supreme Court Justices who
engage in conduct deemed unethical but insufficient for

adversarial companies. Id.
305. Justice Ginsburg and her husband owned more common stock than all of the
other justices except for Breyer and O'Connor. Id.
306. Id.
307. 516 U.S. 1041 (1996).
308. 516 U.S. 801 (1995).
309. For a detailed account of even more egregious ethical violations committed by a
Supreme Court Justice, see LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (Yale
University Press 1990) and BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1988). While on the
Supreme Court, Justice Fortas not only engaged in improper business dealings and
consultations with Louis Wolfson, a financier who was later indicted and convicted for
conspiring to violate the securities laws, but also engaged in improper ethical conduct
by continuing to serve as a White House advisor where he communicated with and
advised President Lyndon Johnson on matters ranging from executive and judicial
appointments to social and foreign policy. See KALMAN, supra,at 293-318, 359-66.
310. See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act's exclusion of Supreme Court Justices and congressional
intent for this exclusion). Similar to Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, Supreme Court
Justice Abe Fortas was never disciplined by the bar in any manner and continued to
practice law even after his resignation from the Court for ethical indiscretions. See
KALMAN, supra note 309, at 385-91, 398-400.
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impeachment.311
Bar discipline of a sitting Supreme Court Justice would encroach
upon the specific powers afforded to the national government for
dealing with judicial misconduct committed by members of the Court,
thus frustrating the delicate balance of powers required under
principles of federalism.312 Article III of the Constitution specifically
mandates the establishment of the Supreme Court as the highest
judicial tribunal in the nation.313 In creating the Court, the Framers
believed that independence and autonomy of the Justices was
essential and critical for creating a branch of government capable of
acting as an effective check on the Executive and Legislative
branches. To insure the presence of these features, Article III
provides for lifetime tenures for Justices of the Court with the only
limitation being that they are to serve in good behavior. The sole
political check provided under the Constitution for an abuse by a
Supreme Court Justice of the good behavior limitation is
impeachment and removal from office by Congress.
The Constitution is silent with regards to judicially dependent
mechanisms of discipline for conduct short of that necessary to
subject a Supreme Court Justice to impeachment except that it
expressly provides that a public official can be subject to criminal
proceedings for crimes committed while holding office. Although
Congress has sanctioned and authorized judicial self-regulation of
lower Article III judges, it too has recognized the uniqueness and the
critical role of the Supreme Court in both the national government
structure and the hierarchy of the nation's judicial system. To
preserve the dignity and independence of the Court, Congress
specifically exempted Supreme Court Justices from regulation by the
34
Judicial Conference of the United States in any manner. 1
There would be several problems with allowing either the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act or any separate legislation to
regulate the conduct of Supreme Court Justices. First, any attempt
to hold the Justices accountable under the current Act would result
311. See John Berlau, Ginsburg's Ethical Lapse May Affect Other Justices, INSIGHT,
Aug. 27, 1987, at 32. Although impeachment would be the only political means for
disciplining members of the Supreme Court, this seemingly would not prevent
members of the Court from agreeing to judicial self-regulation. See id. (referring to a
statement by Toni House, the Court's public information officer at that time, regarding
the existence of in-house procedures to prevent conflicts of interest similar to those
arising from Justice Ginsburg's conduct). See also supra notes 268-79 and
accompanying text (discussing judicial self-regulation and the Constitution).
312. See supra notes 191-207 and accompanying text (discussing federalism).
313. U.S. CONST. art. III.
314. See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (stating that "[a]ll the officers of the government, from the
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it").
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in vesting the review of their conduct in the hands of panels
consisting of lower court judges, a process that would result in a
direct dilution of the powers of the Court and one that would be
facially inconsistent with the role of the Court.315
Second, applying the Act to Supreme Court Justices would also
create an inherent conflict of interest where the ultimate review of
judicial council decisions would lie with the Judicial Conference of
the United States, an entity that is chaired by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court.316 Consequently, the Chief Justice could
participate in deliberations and decisions involving judges who are
not only colleagues but also the highest-ranking judges in the nation.
Third, even if Congress were to enact a separate and specific
statute pertaining to the discipline of Supreme Court Justices, the
statute would be subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court.317
Although the Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act, which regulates the conduct of lower
Article III judges, the Court would have the final voice in
determining the constitutionality of any newly enacted statute
notwithstanding the fact that the legislation would directly affect the
Court's own self-interest.318
Finally, subjecting Supreme Court Justices to discipline by state
bar associations would result in circumventing the cloak of protection
awarded to the Justices under the Constitution, which evidences the
Framers' intent to insulate the Justices from discipline for conduct
short of the magnitude of an impeachable offense. The allowance for
state bar discipline in this situation would have the illogical effect of
creating a process where bar associations and lawyers, each of which
are subject to the rulings of the Court, retain the power to punish the
conduct of the ultimate guardians of the Constitution, a power
specifically reserved to Congress through its powers of impeachment
and removal. Such a process would frustrate and dilute not only the
delicate balance of powers between the national and state
governments required under federalism, but also the proper respect
afforded to this structure by the Supremacy Clause.

315. See Shane, supra note 267, at 236.
316. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
317. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (upholding
judicial review of decisions of the Executive and Judicial Branches as a proper function
of the Court under the Constitution).
318. This would not be the case if the Constitution were amended to specifically
provide for the discipline of Supreme Court Justices.
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2. Disciplining Lawyer-Politicians Under the Model Rules
May Disrupt Principles of Federal-State Comity
"Comity" is a term that evades a precise definition and one that
is often included in discussions of federalism.319 In general, legal
commentators and courts have referred to comity as "a blend of
courtesy and expedience."32o In its broadest sense, however, comity
refers to a policy of mutual respect, deference, and recognition by
political entities (e.g. nations, states, or courts of different
jurisdictions) for legislative, executive and judicial acts.321 Although
there is no legal obligation by a sovereignty to recognize or apply the
laws of another, a decision to apply the laws of a foreign sovereignty
is generally based on considerations of utility and mutual
convenience.322
Principles of comity have been applied in several distinct
circumstances. In the international sphere, comity has been used by
one nation as a means for recognizing and affirming the laws and
judicial actions of a foreign nation.323 From a domestic standpoint,
state and federal policymakers have used principles of comity to
justify a state's recognition and respect for the statutes and court
proceedings of a sister state. 324 Finally, in the judicial context, judges

319. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (explaining that comity refers
to a system that recognizes both state and national interests, with minimal
interference by the federal government). Although the Court often has equated the two
terms, legal commentators contend that federalism is a broader concept that includes
the notion of comity. See Jeffrey M. Shaman and Richard C. Turkington, Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd.: The Federal Courthouse Door Closes Further, 56 B.U. L. REV. 907, 910
n.29 (1976).
320. See Canadian Flilters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578
(1st Cir. 1969).
321. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (providing a classic definition
of comity with respect to international sovereignties); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 261 (7th ed. 1999).
322. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 79 (R. Dana 8th ed.
1866); 3 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW § 71 (1935).

323. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64. In Hilton, the Court, although recognizing that
the laws of a foreign nation had no legal effect on the laws of the United States,
provided the following definition of comity:
"[c]omity", in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 37 (1834)

(defining "comity of nations" as the "extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation
within the territories of another").
324. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
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have used and applied the term as a means to further federal-state
harmony by promoting a policy of federal court abstention in state
judicial proceedings where federal laws and rights are at issue.325
Although an early application of comity in the United States
centered on the relations between sovereign nations as opposed to
judicial functions, its modern usage has focused largely on the
judicial realm, where it has been utilized by judges as a vehicle to
further attitudes of respect and deference between federal and state
courts in proceedings involving federal laws and rights. For instance,
in discussing the interplay between equity, comity and federalism,
the Court in Younger v. Harris held that federal courts should
generally refrain from enjoining ongoing state criminal prosecutions
except in those rare instances in which the state court proceeding
would fail to provide a federal plaintiff with the necessary vehicle for
vindicating his or her constitutional rights.326
In Younger, the appellee-defendant was indicted in a California
state court and charged with the violation of the California Penal
Code.327 He filed a complaint in the federal district court requesting
that the court enjoin the district attorney from prosecuting him, and

Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." Id. Implied in this
constitutional provision is the principle of comity. For example, comity provided the
legal foundation behind the leading American federal slavery cases, as well as many of
the state cases, as federal and state courts undertook the task of harmonizing the laws
of the several states in disputes involving the interstate transit of African slaves. See
Jonathan A. Bush, The First Slave (And Why He Matters), 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 599,
620-27 (1996) (discussing the use of comity in leading federal slavery cases); see also
PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 4 (1981)
(contending that interstate comity in the context of American Slavery was
"indispensable in a union of states, for if states refused to recognize and enforce each
other's laws, interstate relations would collapse and the Union would flounder"); Joel
R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 12 (1991) (contending that
Lord Mansfield and Justice Story saw comity as a principle that allowed both "free and
slave states to coexist"). The Framers too were mindful of the need to create harmony
between the states regarding issues of importation and migration of African slaves.
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring the delivery and return of fugitive slaves
to their legal owners).
325. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (relying on principles of
comity in holding that federal courts give effect to the principle that both state and
federal courts have equal "responsibility ... to guard, enforce and protect" the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution). See also Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (holding that a suit
"seeking to enjoin state prosectution under a recently enacted state law that allegedly
interfered with ... interstate commerce" was improperly brought in federal court); Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416-20 (1963) (relying on considerations of comity with respect
to the relations between coordinate judicial systems and holding that federal review
can occur only after the orderly completion of state court proceedings).
326. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.
327. Id. at 38.
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alleging that both the criminal proceeding and the state code
provision inhibited him from exercising his rights of free speech and
press under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.328 The federal
district court held that the penal code provision was "void for
vagueness and overbreath in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments" and restrained the district attorney from any further
prosecution of the defendant.329 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1253,
the district attorney appealed the judgment directly to the Supreme
Court.330 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the district court
judgment on grounds that it violated "the national policy forbidding
federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings
except under special circumstances."331 In recognizing the need for
respecting the appropriate balance of powers between the federal and
state governments under principles of federalism, the Younger Court
considered both principles of comity and federalism and explained
332
the interplay between the two concepts.
In the context of federal-state judicial proceedings, the Court
affirmed that comity was simply a proper respect for state functions,
and that this respect would entail both "a recognition of the fact that
the [United States] is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best" if it allowed state governments and
institutions to perform their separate functions without interference
by the national government.333 The Court then expounded upon the
interplay of principles of comity and federalism by referring to the
concept "Our Federalism," a slogan that originated from the profound
debates and discussions that occurred at the time of the
Constitutional Convention.334 In discussing the meaning of "Our
Federalism," the Court was quick to note that it did not mean that
there should be a "blind deference to States' Rights" nor the
"centralization [or vesting] of control over every important issue in
our National Government and its courts."335 Specifically, the Court
believed that "Our Federalism" represented a political "system in
which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and

328. See id. at 39.
329. See id. at 40.
330. See id. Section 1253 allows for the direct appeal to the Supreme Court from an
order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction in a civil action
required by an act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1253 (Lexis-Nexis 2001).
331. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.
332. Id. at 44.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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National governments . . . ."336
As illustrated in Younger, issues of comity and federalism
naturally intersect. When they cross, both the national and state
governments are required to respect and be sensitive to the
legitimate interests and policies of each other. The respect
traditionally afforded to legitimate state interests under principles of
comity, however, must yield when important federal interests are at
stake.337 In the following subsections, the Article explores the
national and common law policies of granting immunity to executive,
legislative and judicial officials from civil liability for conduct
committed within the functions of their positions in government.
Principles of federal-state comity will be obstructed when bar
disciplinary boards and courts fail to acknowledge and respect the
historic protections granted to politicians under immunity.
(a) Public Official Immunity
Immunity is the exemption from liability provided to one who
has committed a legal wrong. In civil actions, immunity shields an
actor from liability under circumstances where the public interest is
greater served by allowing the wrongdoer to evade liability at the
expense of those injured by her tortious conduct.338 The immunity
provided to public officers originated from the public policy
"considerations that generated the doctrine of sovereign" or
governmental immunity, a doctrine that evolved during a period in
English history when two generally recognized principles concerning
the liability of the monarch were controlling: that it was "a
contradiction of the sovereignty" of the King "to allow him to be sued
as of right in his own courts," and later "that the King could do no
wrong."39 The immunity historically provided to the King was

336. Id. In further explaining the role of the national government within the "Our
Federalism" interplay, the Court noted the national government, although anxious to
vindicate and protect federal rights and interests, "always endeavors to do so in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id.
337. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373 (1980) (holding that a
Tennessee evidentiary privilege afforded to members of the state legislature for their
legislative acts must yield when balanced against the need of enforcing federal
criminal statutes).
338. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751-52 (7th ed. 1999). See generally DAN B.
DOBBS,THE LAW OF TORTS § 260 (2000) (providing a brief discussion of the evolution
of immunities in America); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Ch. 45A introductory
note (1979).
339. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 (1974). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Ch. 45A, at 394 (1979). See also DOBBS, supra note 338; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 231 (2d ed. 1879) (providing that the
doctrine holding that the King could do no wrong was created for the benefit of the
people and therefore could not be exerted to their prejudice).
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eventually extended to his servants and ministers as they carried out
the King's commands.40 The parliamentary system of early England,
however, had barred the extension of this protection to his officials
when their actions were illegal and outside of the scope of carrying
out the King's commands.341 Upon severing their ties with England,
the American colonies soon replaced the King with the creation of a
national and state government system. Once established, the newly
created government took over the functions of the monarch and
inherited his immunity.342
Public official immunity in America has been the product of
constitutional provisions, the legislative and judicial processes, and
the common law. Today, the protection from liability historically
provided to the King has been broadened to include public officials
functioning within the three branches of American government and
is designed to facilitate and insure their effective administration.
Public officials, however, are provided only with immunity from the
consequences of discretionary decisions that fall within the general
scope of their official authority. They are not protected from liability
for decisions and actions that are not permitted under the authority
granted to their offices.343
The policy concern for extending immunity to these public
officers is rooted in the injustice of subjecting public officers to
liability when the function of their offices require the exercise of
discretion and the danger that the threat of future liability would
deter a public official's willingness to execute the duties of her office
with the independent judgment necessary to protect the public.344
Because a threat of personal liability may inhibit a public official's
performance of her duties, American courts have provided public
officials with either an absolute or qualified immunity.345

340. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(D) cmt. a (1979).
341. Id.
342. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 239 (explaining that "the common law soon recognized
the [need for] permitting [government officers] to perform their official functions free
from the threat of law suits for personal liability"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Ch. 45A (1979); DOBBS, supra note 338.
343. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692-93 (1997) (explaining that "[tihe
principal rationale for affording certain public servants immunity from suits for money
damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.").
344. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
895D cmt. b (1979) (noting that "public officers and employees would be unduly
hampered, deterred and intimidated in the discharge of their duties, and as a result
undesirable shackles would be imposed upon agencies of government, if those who act
improperly or even exceed the authority given them were not protected in some
reasonable degree by being relieved from private liability.").
345. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223-24 (1988). See also Jennifer L.
Long, How to Sue the President:A Proposal for Legislation Establishing the Extent of
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In the following subsections, the Article briefly discusses the
types of immunity generally provided to public officers within the
executive, legislative and judicial branches and the policy concerns
for shielding these employees from civil liability. Two important
considerations in determining whether to grant immunity in specific
instances are the nature of the conduct by the public official in
question and the important societal interest to be furthered by
extending protection from liability. As a result of a lesser public
interest at stake in actions for civil damages as compared to criminal
proceedings, absolute immunity is not extended where judicial action
is necessary to serve a broader public interest such as the need to
vindicate the public good in ongoing criminal prosecutions.346
(b) Scope of Immunity
In general, absolute immunity has been granted to protect
Executive Branch officials, the adjudicative functions required by
judges and the legislative process.347 Public officials will receive
absolute immunity from liability when their job functions and duties
are of such importance that as a matter of policy, the public would be
better served by allowing them to avoid being burdened with the
threat of future lawsuits.348 Providing complete immunity to these
officers forestalls an atmosphere of intimidation that could conflict
with the ability to perform their designated job functions in a
principled fashion.349
The Supreme Court has applied a functional approach in
determining whether a public official's conduct is deserving of
absolute immunity.350 Generally, public officials will receive absolute
immunity when they are required to exercise significant discretion in

Presidential Immunity, 30 VAL. U.L. REV. 282, 294-302 (discussing absolute and
qualified immunity).
346. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 372-73; Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 n.37
(1982).
347. See Forrester,484 U.S. at 224-25.
348. See Long, supra note 345, at 295. See also Jones, 520 U.S. at 693-94 (citing
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 752 n.32, and explaining that giving the President
absolute immunity "was to avoid rendering the President 'unduly cautious in the
discharge of his official duties'). Generally, absolute immunity is provided to protect
the adjudicative functions required by judges and aspects of both the legislative
process and criminal prosecutions.
349. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979) (explaining "[t]he societal
interest in providing such public officials with the maximum ability to deal fearlessly
and impartially with the public at large has long been recognized as an acceptable
justification for official immunity").
350. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224 ("Running through our cases, with fair
consistency, is a 'functional' approach to immunity questions other than those that
have been decided by express constitutional or statutory enactment.").
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the performance of their official duties.351 Under a functional
approach, "immunity is justified and defined by the functions it
protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches."352 It
requires a court to consider the nature of the functions entrusted to
the public official in order to assess the effect that exposure to
specific liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of
those functions.353 Immunity protection under this approach extends
3
no further than its justification warrants. 54
Public officials who exercise lesser degrees of discretion in the
performance of their duties are normally given only qualified
immunity. Providing qualified immunity from liability in this
instance is a compromise. It is a means for balancing several
competing interests: the importance of providing a damage remedy to
protect the rights of those individuals who have been injured by a
public official's conduct, the need to provide some level of protection
for those public officials whose position requires an exercise of their
discretion, and the public interest in encouraging the vigorous
exercise of official authority.355 The Court has applied an objective
test when determining whether a public official's conduct warrants a
qualified immunity. Under this test, public officials will be liable for
conduct that they either knew or should have known would violate
the statutory or constitutional rights of others.356 In situations where
the officials' job functions legitimately require actions in which
clearly established rights of others are not implicated, however,
courts have held that the public interest may be better served by
allowing the official to act with independence and without the fear of
legal consequences.357

351. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) ("We consider here.., the
need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related
public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.").
352. Forrester,484 U.S. at 227.
353. Id. at 224.
354. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1982).
355. Id. at 807.

356. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1992) (discussing qualified immunity
and the objective standard used by the Court). The Wyatt Court held qualified
immunity is only appropriate when the public official's conduct does not violate
"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Id. at 166 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). The Court has
applied a two-part test in determining when qualified immunity is inappropriate.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, a court must determine whether the
alleged facts, if taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the
public official's conduct has violated a constitutional right. Id. If so, a court must then
decide whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Id.
357. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
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Presidential immunity is rooted in both the national government
structure and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the duties and
responsibilities of the President under the Constitution. Because the
Presidency did not exist during most of the development of the
common law, judicial inquiries concerning presidential immunity
have centered on a review of the policies and principles implicit in
the nature of the Presidency and the restraint mandated by the
separation of powers required by the Constitution.358 Although not
expressly provided for in the literal language of the Constitution, the
separations of powers doctrine is implied in its construction.359 As a
result of the expressed structural divisions of the Executive,
Legislative and Judicial branches of government contained in the
Constitution, courts have exercised deference and restraint from
infringing upon the President's exercise of the powers and functions
specifically given to him under the Constitution.360
Due to the President's unique position in the constitutional
scheme, he is given absolute immunity from civil liability for acts
within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities.361 The
Framers envisioned that the President would be disciplined by the
constitutional mechanisms of impeachment and removal from office

358. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 748. For example, Article II, § 1 of the Constitution provides
that "[tihe executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States .... "
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. This provision "establishes the President as the chief
constitutional officer of the Executive Branch" and entrusts the President "with
supervisory and policy responsibilities" involving discretion and sensitivity. Nixon, 457
U.S. at 750. Other constitutional powers vested in the President include the
enforcement of federal law, the carrying out of foreign affairs, and the management of
the Executive Branch. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (requiring the President to enforce
federal laws); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; (requiring the President to act as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (allowing the
President to enter into treaties and to appoint and receive ambassadors). See supra
Part IV.B.1(b) (discussing in greater detail the President's constitutional powers in the
areas of foreign policy and war).
359. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-23 (1976). In general, the
separation of powers doctrine precludes any single branch of the federal government
from encroaching upon the powers entrusted to the other branches by the Constitution
to such an extent that the encroached upon branch is unable to perform its
constitutionally mandated duties. See id. at 122 ("[T]he checks and balances that [the
Framers] had built into the tripartite Federal Government [w]as a self-executing
safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense
of the other.").
360. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (stating that courts should refrain
from hearing and ruling in cases involving political questions-issues that fall within
the powers and domain of the Legislative and Executive branches of the federal
government).
361. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 749, 756; Clinton, 520 U.S. at 693-94.
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rather than by private lawsuits for civil damages arising from his
official acts. The President, however, remains subject to the laws for
purely private actions.362
A primary concern for granting the President absolute immunity
for his official acts was to avoid requiring the President to be "unduly
cautious in the discharge of his official duties."363 Full immunity
protection provides the President with the flexibility necessary to
deal fearlessly and impartially with the public-at large.364 Because
the decision to provide absolute immunity to the President is not
based upon his identity but upon the particular functions of his
office, federal courts have been cautious in extending absolute
immunity to all Executive Branch employees. For example, absolute
immunity is not required for either the President's personal aides or
lower-level cabinet officers, nor is it required for the highest
executive officials in state governments.36 5 Finally, although the
special functions of some public officers might require absolute
immunity, federal officials seeking absolute immunity from personal
liability must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires
it.366

(ii) Judicial Immunity
Judicial immunity is the common-law protection from civil
liability extended to the judicial process.367 It has been a settled
doctrine in the English judicial system for centuries and one that has
continued to survive today in American courts.368 Judicial immunity
first appeared during medieval times as a mechanism for inhibiting
collateral attacks on English court decisions and was helpful in
establishing appellate procedure as the standard process for

362. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 696.
363. Id. at 693-94 (quoting Nixon, 457 U.S. at 752 n.32).
364. Id. at 693 ('The societal interest in providing such public officials with the
maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the public at large has long
been recognized as an acceptable justification for official immunity."') (quoting Ferri,
444 U.S. at 203).
365. See, e.g., Butz. v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (holding that high
federal officials of the Executive Branch were entitled only to qualified immunity);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (holding that a governor and his aides
were only entitled to qualified immunity). But see Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 49899 (1896) (holding that executive department heads such as the Postmaster General
required absolute immunity from suits arising from official acts when engaged in the
discharge of duties imposed upon them by law).
366. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 506.
367. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871) (citing Chancellor Kant who
observed that judicial immunity has a "deep root in the common law").
368. See id. at 347.
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correcting judicial error. 369
American judges have long enjoyed absolute immunity from
liability for damages arising from acts committed within their
jurisdiction primarily because threats of personal liability would
provide powerful incentives for judges to refrain from rendering
judgments likely to incite lawsuits against them.370 As a result of the
important societal interests in providing judges with the freedom to
perform their functions with independence and without the fear of
legal consequences, the protections provided to judges extend even
when they are "accused of acting maliciously and corruptly . ."371
However, because immunity is defined by the functions it protects
and not the person to whom it attaches, absolute immunity will
extend only to judicial functions and not to the administrative,
legislative, or executive functions routinely performed by judges.372
In light of the important societal concerns in providing public officials
with the maximum ability to function with independence and
impartiality, the immunity given to judges has been extended to
other participants in the judicial system such as prosecutors, grand
jurors, petit jurors, advocates, and witnesses.373

369. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at 225 (citing J. Randolph Block, Stump v.
Sparkman and the History of JudicialImmunity, 1980 Duke L.J. 879, 880).
370. See Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351-54; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20
(1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
371. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. Judicial immunity will not protect a judge for
acting in the absence of jurisdiction or from public prosecution for impeachable
offenses. See Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351-52, 354; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356-57 (1978).
372. See Forrester,484 U.S. at 227, 229-30 (refusing to extend absolute immunity to
a judge for demoting and dismissing a court employee because the judge's decision was
not a judicial act). See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879) (refusing to
extend judicial immunity to a county judge charged in a criminal indictment with
discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county's courts);
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734-36 (1980) (finding
that although the Virginia court and its members were immune from suit when acting
in their legislative capacity, the court and its chief justice were properly held liable
when acting in their enforcement capacities with respect to promulgating a code of
conduct for attorneys).
373. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509 (1978) (citing Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S.
503 (1927)) (referencing common law precedent "extending absolute immunity to party
participants in the judicial process .. "); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202-03
(1979) (discussing the extension of immunity to various federal officers including
judges, prosecutors, and grand jurors by virtue of their office). Courts that have
extended judicial immunity to prosecutors have noted that judges, prosecutors and
grand jurors exercise discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence presented to
them. Because of the functional comparability of the judgments of prosecutors and
grand jurors to those of judges, they are sometimes referred to as "quasi-judicial"
officers and their immunities as "quasi-judicial." See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 420 n.17 (1976).
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(iii) Legislative Immunity
Legislative immunity is the privilege of legislators to be free
from arrest and civil process for statements made or actions taken in
legislative proceedings. The doctrine grew out of the political
struggles of England in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
where actions and statements made in Parliament against the Crown
were deemed seditious and worthy of prosecution.374 The
prosecutions of members of Parliament for such unpopular conduct
directed towards the Crown ultimately lead to the creation of
statutory safeguards protecting the freedom of speech and debates in
Parliament.375 As the American Colonies severed ties with the
Crown, the immunity from arrests and civil actions for speech
secured by Parliament was incorporated into the American
376
government structure.
Today, members of the legislature enjoy absolute immunity from
civil actions for statements or conduct within the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity.377 The privilege is designed to shield legislators
from those deterrents that could inhibit the discharge of their
legislative duties and will extend only to those activities that fall
within the legislative activities of Congress. Additionally, because the
privilege is for the public good and not for private indulgence, it is
not destroyed by claims that a legislator's actions are prompted by
improper motives.378 Finally, absolute immunity will be provided to
persons or entities acting on behalf of the legislature such as
374. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
375. See id. (citing 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, c. II; Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 1,
113-14 (1839)).
376. Id. at 372-73. See Articles of Confederation, art. V (providing that "Freedom of
speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or
place out of Congress ..
"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing that "for any Speech or
Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in
any other Place"). The Framers believed that providing a legislator with the fullest
liberty of speech would enable him to "discharge [the] public trust with firmness and
success." Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372 (citing II Works of James Wilson 38 (Andrews ed.
1896)).
377. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376-77, 379. Members of the legislature, however,
"may not ... acquire power by an unwarranted extension of privilege." The Supreme
Court has not hesitated to uphold the rights of private litigants when it has found that
Congress has acted outside its legislative role. See id. at 377. See, e.g., Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196-200 (1880); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 545-46,
548 (1917) (refusing to extend the legislative privilege to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the
House of Representatives for executing an arrest warrant issued by the House in a
contempt proceeding when the House did not have the power to punish for the acts
committed by the appellant).
378. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377. See also Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 10 U.S. 87,
130 (1810) (holding that it is not consonant with the national government structure
"for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators").
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legislative committees or where the legislature seeks the affirmative
aid of the judiciary to assert the privilege.379
V. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO REGULATING LAWYER-POLITICIANS
Applying the Model Rules to lawyer-politicians fails to
acknowledge and account for the significant changes in the roles and
functions of the modern lawyer and the constitutional safeguards
inherent in the political process. In addition, as the nation witnessed
during the impeachment hearings of lawyer-politician President
William Clinton, bar disciplinary actions against these lawyers often
risk the danger of becoming entangled in the politics and biases of
the decision-makers.380 As a way to insure that lawyer-politicians are
provided with the necessary independence to perform their public
duties while protecting the administration of justice and the integrity
of the bar,381 the Article advocates the adoption and use of a
functional approach in determining when to discipline lawyerpoliticians for misconduct occurring outside the practice of law.382
Bar associations or courts should consider three significant
factors when utilizing and applying a functional approach: (A) office
(position held or job function of the lawyer-politician at the time of
the misconduct), (B) forum or place where the misconduct occurred
(e.g. within or outside the parameters of the office) and (C) nature of
the misconduct (e.g. civil or criminal) along with the prevailing
respective interests of the political process, the judicial system and
the bar in the discipline of lawyer-politicians who commit acts of
misconduct within court proceedings or while serving in public office.
The factors of office and forum are relevant primarily because
379. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378-79 (extending absolute immunity to legislative
committees as long as the committees do not exceed the bounds of legislative power).
Cf. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 196-200 (refusing to extend immunity to the Sergeant-atArms of the House of Representatives because the House acted outside its legislative
role).
380. For example, a legitimate issue to be addressed in the Clinton disbarment
proceeding would have been the severity of punishment and whether disbarment
would have been disproportionate to the punishment that the bar had meted out to
other lawyers who may have provided false testimony while under oath. The Arkansas
Bar disciplines approximately 100 lawyers each year and disbarment has been used
almost exclusively in cases involving the theft of client monies. See Neil A. Lewis,
Clinton is Angry and Dispirited Over Disbarment Fight, Friends Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2000, at 1-22.
381. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary, bar and
public interests behind lawyer discipline).
382. The functional approach suggested in Part V is rooted in both the legal-realist
approach to lawyer discipline, advocated and followed by many disciplinary boards
within the past few decades, and in the functional approach adopted by courts in
extending absolute immunity to public officials. See supra Parts W.A., IV.B.2(b)
(discussing legal realism and absolute immunity).
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politicians within the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
the federal and state governments have long enjoyed absolute or
complete immunity from civil liability for acts committed within the
discretion of their position as a way to provide them with the
necessary autonomy to function without the fear of subsequent legal
consequences. 38 3 The nature of the misconduct is relevant because of
the different degrees of public interest at stake in civil and criminal
cases. 38 4 For example, courts have consistently declined to extend
immunity to executive, legislative, and judicial officers for criminal
conduct or criminal deprivations of constitutional rights.385
Although bar associations generally operate as arms of the state
judiciaries, the respective interests of these entities can and often do
differ.3S6 Therefore, in evaluating the respective interests of the bar,
the judiciary, and the political process in regulating the conduct of
lawyer-politicians, Part V separates the important and mutually
shared interests of bar associations and the judiciary in lawyer
disciplinary actions-such as the protection of the public from unfit
lawyers and the preservation of both the reputation and integrity of
the legal profession-from the essential judicial interest in the
administration of justice through the mechanisms and procedures of
the judicial process. 38 7 Finally, in evaluating the political interest at
stake, Part V considers the important public interest in providing
public officials with the necessary autonomy to perform the
discretionary functions of their jobs.388
Additionally, the variables and competing interests must be

383. See supra Part IV.B.2(b)(i)-(iii) (discussing executive, legislative and judicial
immunity).
384. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 371-73 (1980); Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731, 754 n.37 (1982) (holding "that there is a lesser public interest [at stake]
in actions for civil damages than criminal prosecutions").
385. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 372 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503
(1974)).
386. Compare supra text accompanying notes 124-126 (discussing the bar's interest
in self-regulation and the ABA's response to the misconduct committed by lawyers and
lawyer-politicians during the Watergate scandal), with Button v. Day, 132 S.E.2d 292,
297 (Va. 1963) (noting the judiciary's "special and peculiar interest" in the efficient
administration of justice).
387. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74. See generally United States v.
Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1982) (recognizing the judiciary's interest
in the fair administration of the criminal justice system); United States v. DiBernardo,
552 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (recognizing that "[tihe untainted
administration of justice is certainly one of the most cherished aspects" of the courts).
See also In re Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. 2001) (noting the bar's responsibility to
impose appropriate discipline in order to protect the public from "unfit attorneys and
to improve the reputation and integrity of the legal profession").
388. See supra text accompanying notes 344-51 (discussing the policy behind
extending immunity to public officials).
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evaluated within a specific ethical context. For example, the
variables could be evaluated within the following ethical situations:
(1) questionable or improper conduct falling within the function and
parameters of the public office, (2) criminal conduct; (3) improper
conduct committed within judicial proceedings; and (4) improper
conduct committed while functioning in lawyer roles. The following
chart and subsequent discussions explain the mechanics of a
functional approach to disciplining federal lawyer-politicians.
IllustrationI
FUNCTIONAL ZONES
ZONE I
QUESTIONABLE OR
IMPROPER CONDUCT
COMMITTED WITHIN THE
FUNCTIONS OF OFFICE

ZONE II
CRIMINAL CONDUCT

*

*

*
*

Legislative/Executive/
Judicial
Alleged misconduct occurs
within function of job/duties
Misconduct civil in nature

•

"

Legislative/Executive/
Judicial
Misconduct occurs within or
outside the function of
job/duties
Misconduct criminal in
nature

* Political Process (highest

*

interest-e.g. public trust and
accountability, and constitutional
safeguards)

interest-e.g. no protection
(immunity) or constitutional
safeguards for unofficial or
criminal conduct)

** Judiciary (lowest interest-e.g.
administration of justice)

** Judiciary (highest intereste.g. administration of justice)

*** Bar (qualified interest-e.g.
protecting the integrity of the
bar)

*** Bar (qualified interest-e.g
protecting the integrity of the
bar)

Political Process (lowest
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ZONE III
IMPROPER CONDUCT
COMMITTED WITHIN
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

*
*

*

*

Legislative/Executive/
Judicial
Misconduct occurring outside
the function of job/duties and
within a judicial or quasijudicial proceeding
Misconduct either criminal or
civil in nature (e.g. perjury,
obstruction of justice)
Political Process (lowest

interest-e.g. absence of concerns
for public trust and
accountability, and constitutional
safeguards)

** Judiciary (highest intereste.g. administration of justice)
*** Bar (qualified interest-e.g.
protecting the integrity of the
bar)

[Vol. 57:3
ZONE LV

QUESTIONABLE OR
IMPROPER CONDUCT
COMMITTED WHILE
FUNCTIONING IN LAWYER
ROLES
* Quasi-judicial
* Misconduct occurs within or
outside the function of
job/duties and within or
outside a judicial or quasijudicial proceeding
" Misconduct civil or criminal
in nature (e.g. civil wrong or
crime)
* Political

Process (highest-e.g.
public trust and accountability,
and constitutional safeguards,
and lowest-e.g. no protection
(immunity) or constitutional
safeguards for unofficial or
criminal conduct)
** Judiciary (highest interest-

e.g. administration of justice)
*** Bar (highest interest-e.g.
fitness to practice law and
protecting the integrity of the
bar)

A functional approach in regulating lawyer-politicians has
several advantages over the current one-size-fits-all approach to
regulating most lawyer conduct under the Model Rules. First, using a
functional analysis in disciplining lawyer-politicians would begin the
process of acknowledging and accounting for the vast differences in
the roles and functions of practicing and non-practicing lawyers.
Additionally, inherent in a functional approach to regulating lawyer-
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politicians is the consideration and inclusion of specific constitutional
safeguards designed to protect public officials when carrying out the
discretionary functions of high public offices in the Executive,
Legislative and Judicial branches of the national government. Thus,
applying a functional approach in this instance would eliminate the
need for amending the current ethics rules or creating a separate
code of ethics for non-practicing lawyers who serve as public officers.
Second, because of the general biases inherent in human nature,
a functional approach to disciplining lawyer-politicians could help to
eliminate or neutralize the inevitable opportunities for bias,
prejudice or political allegiances that can arise during the
disciplinary process. 38 9 For example, after the announcement of the
Arkansas Bar Association's decision to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against President Clinton for his conduct in Jones v.
Clinton, eight out of fourteen members of the disciplinary panel had
recused themselves from participating in the proceedings primarily
because they had either business or personal relationships with the
President.90 In reality, the recusals of these panel members
undoubtedly contributed to the creation of an Arkansas Bar
Association disciplinary panel that could much more easily conclude
that disbarment proceedings should begin against the President.
Because of the intense political atmosphere in similar situations
involving misconduct committed by high-ranking lawyer-politicians,
disciplinary panels consisting primarily or exclusively of members
with political affiliations adverse to the national party of the lawyerpolitician under review could result in biased decision-making. At the
very least, such panels could create an appearance of unfairness in
the proceedings.
Third, a functional approach would have cost-saving benefits.
The creation of a process where the interests of the bar are weighed
against other competing interests, such as those of the judiciary and
the political process, would likely result in the deferral of discipline
by the bar, in many cases, to those entities that possess an equal or
389. See supra notes 110-20 (discussing instances in which the ABA's exercise of its
powers of self-governance has been influenced by the popular religious, racial and
national prejudices of middle-class America).
390. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Panel Advises That Clinton Be Disbarred,N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2000, at A-1 (noting that eight members of a fourteen member disciplinary
panel had recused themselves from hearing the President's case on the basis that they
had either business or personal relationships with the President); I Fought the law . .,
THE ECONOMIST, May 27, 2000 (noting that eight members of the Arkansas Bar
Association's disciplinary committee on professional conduct had recused themselves
in the name of unbiased justice). See Lewis, supra note 380, at 1-22 (noting that
several judges of the Circuit Court had also recused themselves from consideration for
presiding over the Clinton disbarment proceedings because they had been active in
Arkansas politics).
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greater interest in the discipline of the lawyer-politician.
Consequently, the bar would be spared the costs, expenses and time
for conducting a separate and independent investigation into some
disciplinary matters. In addition, a deferral of power in disciplinary
cases where the respective competing interests are higher than the
bar's own interest could help to minimize current public perceptions
and criticisms that bar discipline is too often repetitive, excessive,
and disproportionate to the actual conduct committed by the lawyerpolitician.391
Finally, utilizing a functional approach could help to facilitate
even greater public respect for the judicial system. For instance,
deferring the discipline of the lawyer-politician to the political
process or to the judiciary in cases where the bar's interest in the
matter is minimal would create the opportunity for an even greater
level of public accountability because such a deferral would provide
the public with a genuine opportunity to witness and monitor the
disciplinary process. Currently, bar disciplinary proceedings in all
cases are closed to the public and once a disciplinary decision has
been made, members of the public often experience difficulties in
determining what if any discipline of the attorney was actually
taken.392 In the remaining subsections, this Article discusses the
applicability of the variables and competing interests discussed above
within the context of four categories of questionable or unethical
behavior.
A. Questionable or Improper Actions Committed Within the
Functions of Office (Zone I)
Zone I includes situations where the public office held by the
lawyer-politician is one that is executive (e.g. President or Vice
President), legislative (e.g. Senator or Representative) or judicial (e.g.
Supreme Court Justice), the misconduct or questionable behavior
committed by the politician has occurred within the function of the
duties of the office, and the misconduct or questionable behavior is
civil in nature. For example, Zone I would include such actions as the
lawyer-Senator who votes on legislation in which she may have a
pecuniary stake in the outcome,393 a lawyer-President who grants a
questionable pardon or abuses the foreign affairs powers,394 and a
391. See, e.g., Jefferson, supra note 17, at 1 (discussing three forms of punishment
taken against President Clinton for giving false testimony in the Jones case).
392. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing a few of the hurdles
facing the public when attempting to discover attorney discipline by the bar).
393. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14 (referring to an example of a possible
conflict of interest concern lodged against lawyer-politician Senator Hillary R. Clinton
(D-N.Y.) on the eve of her induction into the Senate).
394. See supra text accompanying notes 224-29, 245-55 (discussing as an example
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Supreme Court Justice who commits an act of professional
misconduct short of an impeachable offense.395
As discussed earlier in this Article, public official immunity is a
policy that is firmly rooted in both the Constitution and common
law.396 Federal and state judiciaries have continued to recognize it as
a necessary protection against subsequent legal liability for
controversial actions taken by the politician that fall within the
discretionary functions of the public office.397 The doctrine of
federalism would prevent any state agency or institution from
obstructing the constitutional latitude provided to these officers in
the performance of their official duties while the political doctrine of
comity would require state government organizations to recognize
and respect the statutes, judgments and policies of the national
government. Thus, a bar association's failure to acknowledge and
respect the discretion provided to a lawyer-Senator while functioning
within the legislative decision-making process, the lawyer-President
while exercising his constitutionally given pardon and foreign affairs
powers or a Supreme Court Justice who commits an act of
misconduct that does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense,
would patently violate and evade the proper balance of powers
between the federal and state governments required under the
Constitution and the respect for each sovereign under the political
doctrine of comity.
In assessing the competing concerns, the interest of the political
process to provide public officials with the necessary freedom to
perform their job functions in a principled fashion without the fear of
lawsuits is at its highest. Unlike the legal practitioner, the lawyerpolitician is not engaged in the practice of law but functions solely as
a public servant. Neither does her conduct threaten the effective
administration of justice. Her position and job responsibilities are not
law-related as defined by the ABA.398 The interest of the judiciary is
at its lowest since the questionable or improper conduct at issue has
lawyer-politician and former President William Clinton's controversial pardons at the
end of his last term in office and current President George W. Bush's controversial
exercise of the presidential war powers in sending troops to invade Iraq).
395. See supra text accompanying notes 293-309 (discussing Justice Antonin
Scalia's duck hunting trip with Vice President Cheney within a few days after the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear arguments in a case involving the Vice
President and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's ethical indiscretion in participating in
decisions involving corporate parties in which her husband owned stock in one of the
litigating companies).
396. See supra Part IV.B.2(a) (discussing the history of public official immunity).
397. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223 (noting that because the threat of personal
liability for damages can inhibit government officials in the proper performance of
their duties, various forms of immunity from civil actions were created).
398. See MODEL RULES R. 5.7(a), (b) (defining law-related activities).
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occurred within the functions of her office and not within the context
of a judicial proceeding. Finally, because the lawyer-politician is not
engaged in the daily practice of law, the concerns of the bar is limited
to preserving the integrity and reputation of the legal profession and
must yield to the important safeguards inherent in the Constitution
and the political process for insuring public accountability.
Because the lawyer-politician's activities under Zone I would be
constitutionally protected and not subject to subsequent civil
lawsuits, they would also be protected against disciplinary actions by
bar associations as long as the conduct falls within the discretionary
functions of the office and are civil in nature. Similar to the
functional approach taken by courts when applying immunity to
public officers, this would be the case even when the lawyerpolitician acts with an improper motive. For instance, in cases where
absolute immunity is provided to executive, legislative and judicial
officers, the motives underlying any actions taken within the
authority of their positions are irrelevant and do not nullify the
privilege.399
In short, factual situations that fall under Zone I would require
state bar associations to refrain from any attempt to discipline the
federal lawyer-politicians at issue and to defer to the disciplinary
measures provided by the Constitution and the political process for
misconduct committed by public officials serving within the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of the national
government.40 0 The Framers envisioned that these checks and
safeguards would be sufficient to police the important public
interests in holding public officials accountable for their actions while
providing these officers with the freedom to effectively execute the
functions of their position.

399. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 756 (noting the broad areas of the President's
discretionary responsibilities and holding that an inquiry into the motives of the
President could be highly intrusive); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (holding that absolute
immunity provided for judges "applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly"); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377 (holding that the absolute
immunity provided for legislators is not destroyed by the claim of unworthy purpose
and that courts are not the place for inquiries concerning legislative motive).
400. See, e.g., Clinton, 520 U.S. at 695 (noting that the President is not immune
from liability for unofficial actions and could be subject to impeachment); Tenney, 341
U.S. at 378 (noting that self-discipline and the voters are the ultimate mechanisms for
discouraging or correcting improper legislative conduct resulting from dishonest or
vindictive motives); Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350 (noting that judges of the
superior courts who act maliciously, corruptly, arbitrarily or oppressively can be held
accountable to the public by the political sanctions of impeachment, suspension or
removal from office). See supra text accompanying notes 218-22 (discussing the
political checks for an abuse of the presidential pardon powers).
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B. Criminal Conduct (Zone II)
Zone II covers situations where the public office held by the
lawyer-politician is one that is executive (e.g. President or Vice
President), legislative (e.g. Senator or Representative), or judicial
(e.g. Supreme Court Justice), the misconduct or questionable
behavior committed by the public official has occurred either within
or outside the functions of the office, and the misconduct is criminal.
For example, Zone II would include the lawyer-President who
attempts to obstruct a criminal investigation or conceal evidence
relating to the unlawful activities of his staff4Ol and the lawyer-Vice
President who commits federal income tax evasion.402
Because the societal interest in granting immunity to public
officials in order to provide them with the necessary autonomy to
effectively carry out the functions of their positions is not a concern
when the lawyer-politician acts in her unofficial or private capacities,
the interest of the political process under Zone II is at its lowest
level. Thus, it is insignificant in the analysis. Public officials have
never enjoyed absolute or qualified immunity protection for their
unofficial acts or criminal conduct. For instance, under the
Constitution, the President is not protected from liability for his
unofficial acts and is subject to trial, impeachment and removal from
office for criminal conduct.403 Neither are judges who commit crimes
shielded from criminal liability.404
The judiciary interest in protecting the administration of justice,
however, is at its highest. Inherent in the American legal system is
the notion that no man is above the law. All public officials are

401. See In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S. 2d at 305, 306-307 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(discussing the disbarment of lawyer-President Richard Nixon for his involvement in
the commission of several crimes during the Watergate investigation). President Nixon
was disbarred for obstructing an FBI investigation of the "unlawful entry into the
headquarters of the Democratic National Committee" and for improperly concealing
and encouraging others to "conceal evidence relating to unlawful activities of members
of his staff and of the Committee to Re-elect the President." See id. at 306.
402. See Md. State Bar Assoc., Inc. v. Agnew, 318 A.2d 811, 812 n.2, 813 (Md. 1974)
(discussing the conviction of lawyer-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew in the U.S. District
Court for federal income tax evasion and his subsequent disbarment). In Agnew, the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the respondent's act of willful tax evasion was a
crime of moral turpitude involving fraud and dishonesty, and constituted "conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice." Id. at 813, 815.
403. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 696; see also Proclamation 4311, supra note 210, at
1103 (noting President Gerald Ford's pardon of President Richard M. Nixon after
Nixon's resignation from office for all crimes that Nixon may have committed during
the Watergate cover-up).
404. See supra note 271 (discussing cases permitting the prosecution of sitting
federal judges for breaking the law in addition to the political disciplinary measures of
impeachment and removal from office).
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creatures of the law and are obligated to obey it.4o5 The literal
language of the Constitution preserves criminal prosecution for all
persons guilty of committing crimes.4o6 Lawyers and laypersons are
no different in this respect. Both groups are responsible for obeying
the law and will be subjected to legal recourse for violating the
criminal and civil laws of the country.
Finally, the bar's interest under Zone II is limited. The Model
Rules were developed with an eye towards the legal practitioner.
From an ethical standpoint, the practicing lawyer would be subject to
professional discipline only when she violates or attempts to violate
the lawyer ethics rules.407 For instance, in discussing the liability of
the practicing lawyer for criminal conduct, Rule 8.4(b) and (c)
prohibit the lawyer from committing criminal acts that reflect
adversely on her "honesty, trustworthiness or fitness" to practice
law.40 It also prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is
"prejudicial to the administration of justice."409 In explaining these
rules, Comment 2 of Rule 8.4 notes that the professional discipline of
the practitioner is limited to offenses that indicate a lack of those
characteristics relevant to law practice.410 For example, offenses
involving fraud and the willful failure to file an income tax return
would be sufficient to prompt disciplinary actions under Model Rule
8.4. In addition, offenses involving violence, dishonesty or serious
interference with the administration of justice would also provide
grounds for bar discipline.411
Given that the lawyer-politician is not engaged in the practice of
law or law-related activities, the bar's primary interest in her fitness
for practice is not directly implicated. However, protection of the
reputation and integrity of the legal profession, a secondary yet
important goal of lawyer discipline, has been repeatedly drawn into
the national spotlight when high-ranking government officials with
law licenses commit crimes.412 In fact, this was the case both during
405. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 220 (holding that no man is so high that he is above the
law and that "all officers of the government," despite their rank, "are creatures of the
law" and must obey it).
406. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.7 (providing that "the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment,
according to Law").
407. See MODEL RULES, R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (noting a traditional distinction between
illegal conduct that reflected adversely on fitness to practice law and offenses involving
moral turpitude).
408. Id. R. 8.4(b), (c).
409. Id. R. 8.4(d).
410. Id. cmt. 2
411. Id.
412. See, e.g., Agnew, 318 A.2d at 815 (holding that "[a] willful and serious
malefaction committed by a lawyer-public servant brings dishonor to both the bar and
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and after the impeachment hearings of lawyer-President William
Clinton for providing false deposition testimony during a civil lawsuit
against him and prior to the resignation and pardon of lawyerPresident Richard Nixon for the crimes he committed during the
3
Watergate cover-up.41
The legal profession has long enjoyed the freedom of selfregulation. Autonomy from government intervention, however, has
carried with it corresponding obligations to insure that its members
act ethically. If the legal professions' ability to govern itself indeed
has been successful in insuring the public confidence in the legal
system, which is required to preclude government intervention and
regulation, then the bar's ability to discipline its members who hold
high public offices for misconduct, even when the lawyer is not
engaged in the practice of law, would be necessary to preserve its
self-regulatory status. 414 Undoubtedly, high-profile incidents such as
the lawyer-President who obstructs a criminal investigation or the
lawyer-Vice President who commits tax invasion are newsworthy
events that are of legitimate concern to the public. Consequently,
they fall within the responsibilities of the press for reporting.415
Unfortunately, these events are the most likely to attract public
scrutiny and to shape public attitudes towards lawyers and the legal
profession. A failure by the bar to address these matters in a manner
sufficient to alleviate public concerns for justice could have grave
consequences for the future of its self-regulatory status. Given that
the judiciary and the bar possess the greatest interests for imposing
discipline for conduct falling within Zone II and the absence of any
significant political interest, disciplinary sanctions and punishments
imposed by the courts and bar associations for criminal conduct
would be warranted and required.

the democratic institutions of the nation ... '),
413. See President Would Drop High Court Privilege, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2001, at
A3 (referencing President Clinton and the Arkansas Bar Association's agreement for a
five-year suspension of the President's law license, in lieu of disbarment, for providing
false and misleading testimony in a sexual harassment lawsuit against him). See also
In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 307 (holding that President Nixon's criminal conduct in
obstructing the administration of justice, while holding "the highest public office [in
the] country and in a position of trust," warranted disbarment).
414. See supra text accompanying notes 144-48 (suggesting that the legal profession
has been unsuccessful in its attempt to preserve the integrity of the bar in the eyes of
the public). Misconduct most likely to attract public scrutiny would include offenses
involving violence, dishonesty or serious interference with the administration of
justice.
415. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (noting that the
commission of crime and prosecutions resulting from it, along with judicial
proceedings arising from the prosecutions, are events of legitimate concern to the
public and fall within the responsibility of the press for reporting).
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C. Improper Conduct Committed Within JudicialProceedings
(Zone III)
Zone III includes situations where the public office held by the
lawyer-politician is one that is executive (e.g. President or Vice
President), legislative (e.g. Senator or Representative), or judicial
(e.g. Supreme Court Justice), the misconduct has occurred outside
the functions of the office but within a judicial proceeding, and the
misconduct would warrant either civil or criminal sanctions by a
court. Specifically, Zone III would include such conduct as the
lawyer-politician who, while acting as a party or witness in a lawsuit,
provides false and misleading testimony during discovery or who
commits other acts of contempt during trial.416
Given that public officials do not enjoy immunity protection for
unofficial or private conduct, the public interest in granting
immunity to lawyer-politicians for conduct falling within Zone III is
again at its lowest level and thus insignificant for the analysis.
However, because the misconduct under this zone occurs within the
context of a judicial proceeding, the judiciary's interest in promoting
the orderly administration of justice is at its highest. Both federal
and state courts possess the inherent supervisory power to insure
that justice is administered efficiently and fairly in civil and criminal
cases.417 The legal basis for the exercise of this authority is two-fold:
to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and to avoid any
fundamental unfairness in the administration of justice.418 In the
execution of these objectives, the supervisory power provides courts
with the ability to implement remedies for violations of the rights of
parties, to preserve judicial integrity by insuring that convictions and
judgments are the products of strict compliance with evidentiary and
procedural rules, and to formulate remedies to deter illegal
conduct.419 For instance, under its supervisory powers, a court has

416. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1131-32 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (holding
President William Clinton in contempt of court and ordering him to pay plaintiffs
reasonable expenses when he willfully provided false and misleading deposition
testimony in a sexual harassment lawsuit against him).
417. See, e.g., In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 1988). See also
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1931); Thomas v. State, 566 P2d 630,
637-38 (Alaska 1977) (acknowledging the general powers of a court over its judgments,
orders and decrees in both civil and criminal cases).
418. United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting United
States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977)).
419. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983). See also McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (noting that "[]udicial supervision of the
administration of justice implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence"). See AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 45 (1995) (listing
other specific inherent powers of courts).
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the authority to exclude impermissibly obtained evidence, to dismiss
wrongfully obtained indictments, and to discipline attorneys and
parties for acts of contempt committed during judicial proceedings.420
Additionally, in civil cases, both federal and state courts possess
421
statutory authority to impose sanctions for civil contempt.
Finally, because the lawyer-politician under Zone III does not
practice law, the bar's interest is qualified and limited solely to
protecting the reputation and integrity of the legal profession. As
discussed earlier under Zone II, the activities of high-ranking lawyerpoliticians who commit criminal acts are newsworthy and attract
intense public scrutiny of lawyers and the legal profession.422 Similar
to the media's important role of reporting on crimes for the benefit of
the public, it also functions as an overseer in keeping the public
informed and abreast of judicial activities. For example, an
important function of the press is "to guarantee the fairness of trials
and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the
administration of justice."423
Generally, media reports of crimes and judicial proceedings
involving lawyer-politicians have had an adverse effect on the
reputation of lawyers and the legal profession. This was the case a
few years ago when lawyer-President William Clinton provided false
and misleading deposition testimony in a sexual harassment lawsuit
against him during his final term in office.424 Because of the
importance of the office of the Presidency, President Clinton was
immediately thrust into the eyes of the public by the news media,
which prompted numerous public discussions on bar discipline and
the integrity of the legal profession at-large. In such instances, it is
critical that the bar have the ability to sanction its members in order
to minimize the inevitable public outcry for state intervention and
regulation of the legal profession that would result if the bar failed to

420. See, e.g., McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340-41 (referencing the court's power to exclude
impermissibly obtained evidence); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46 (1992)
(referencing the courts power to dismiss impermissibly obtained indictments);
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (noting the inherent powers of courts
to punish for contempt).
421. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(D) (allowing a court to enter an order treating
as a contempt of court, the failure of a party to obey a court order); GA. CODE ANN. § 911-37(b)(2)(D) (1993).
422. See supra Part V.B.
423. See Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 492.
424. See supra notes 23, 404 and accompanying text.
425. See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51-59 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(discussing the charges against and convictions of former U.S. Attorney General John
N. Mitchell for conspiracy and obstruction of justice and former Assistant Attorney
General Robert C. Mardian for conspiracy to obstruct justice along with other acts of
misconduct committed during the Watergate cover-up).

HeinOnline -- 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 937 2004-2005

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:3

impose some level of discipline.
In light of the absence of any significant political concerns and
the significant interests of the judiciary and the bar for imposing
discipline on lawyer-politicians falling within Zone III, discipline by
the courts and bar for misconduct during court proceedings would
also be appropriate and required.
D. Questionable or Improper Conduct Committed While
Functioningin Lawyer Roles (Zone IV)
Finally, Zone IV covers situations where the high public office
held by the lawyer-politician is quasi-judicial (e.g. Attorney General
or Solicitor General), the misconduct or questionable behavior
committed by the politician has occurred within the functions of the
office, and the conduct is civil or criminal in nature. For instance,
Zone TV would include a U.S. Attorney General or Assistant Attorney
General commiting acts of conspiracy, perjury and obstruction of
justice while in office or shortly after leaving office.425 It would also
include the U.S. Solicitor General who in confessing to an error made
in arriving at a lower court judgment that favored the United States,
does so strategically in order to avoid Supreme Court review of an
issue that she fears would be decided against the Government on the
merits rather than to further the efficient administration of
justice.426 Finally, Zone IV would cover the Solicitor General who
either misrepresents the law or facts in briefs submitted to the
Court427 or who compromises the independence and integrity of the
office by allowing political actors and special interest groups to
dictate her positions before the Court.428
The U.S. Attorney General and Solicitor General are the highest426. See David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by
the Solicitor General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2082, 2095-96 (1994) (discussing strategic
confessions of error). A confession of error occurs when the Solicitor General "admits to
the Supreme Court that a lower court has committed an error in a case decided in
favor of the Government." Once a confession is made, the Solicitor General can request
that "the Court reverse the judgment or... argue either that the judgment should
stand despite the error or that the case does not warrant review under the Court's
standards for granting certiorari." Id. at 2080. There are several categories of cases in
which Solicitor Generals have confessed error: (a) errors of law, fact, and procedure; (b)
violations of Justice Department prosecutorial discretion policies; and (c) confessions of
error made strategically to avoid Supreme Court review and decision on the merits of
an issue. Id. at 2092-101.
427. See id. at 2089-91 n.79 (citing LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 235-67 (1987)) (referencing Supreme
Court rejections of arguments made by the Solicitor General in Court opinions and
anecdotal comments made by Justices, clerks and lawyers in the Solicitor General's
office).
428. See id. at 2088-90 (citing CAPLAN, supra note 427, at 70; Jim Mann & Ronald
J. Ostrow, Social Issues Are Lee's 'Albatross,'L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1983, § 1, at 1).
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ranking lawyers in the country. Although Executive Branch
positions, these offices are quasi-judicial in nature and primarily
involve conducting and managing all litigation on behalf of the
United States government in cases before the Supreme Court.429
Lawyers seeking these positions must be appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate.430
When examining the competing interests that are involved in
disciplining federal lawyer-politicians, the interest of the political
process in providing the public official with the autonomy necessary
to effectively carry out the functions of the office is once again at its
highest. The law is settled with respect to granting immunity from
civil liability to the Attorney General while performing the duties of
her office. Because the roles of the Attorney General and Solicitor
General are very similar to the role of the prosecutor, the Attorney
General has enjoyed immunity from civil liability for exercising
discretion when performing the duties and responsibilities imposed
upon her by law.431 The absolute immunity given to the Attorney
General in exercising her prosecutorial functions is based upon the
same considerations that underlie the common law immunity
provided to judges and grand jurors acting within the functions of
their duties.432 In addition, the Attorney General has enjoyed
qualified immunity for conduct involving lesser degrees of discretion
as long as her actions do not violate the clearly established statutory
429. The Judiciary Act of 1789 required the Attorney General to personally conduct
all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States was a party. See Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93. In 1870, as a result of an increase in the
volume of litigation and other duties of the Attorney General, Congress created the
office of the Solicitor General in order to relieve some of the Attorney General's
responsibilities. See Rex E. Lee, William 0. Douglas Lecture: The Advocate's Role in
First Amendment Jurisprudence,31 GONZ. L. REV. 265, 271-72 (1995). Currently, the
Solicitor General assists the Attorney General in the performance of her duties and is
authorized to conduct government litigation before the Supreme Court except when
the Attorney General directs otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 505, 518(a) (2005). The
Attorney General, however, retains the power to overrule any decisions made by the
Solicitor General or to argue any case in the Supreme Court. Id. § 518(b).
430. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 505. In addition to these officers, the President has the
authority to appoint with the advice and consent of the Senate, an Associate Attorney
General and ten Assistant Attorney Generals. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 504(a), 506.
431. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23 (citing Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d, 396, 406 (2d Cir.
1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (holding that the special assistant to the Attorney
General enjoyed absolute immunity in the performance of the duties imposed upon
him by law)). Accord McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1987). See
also supra note 366 (discussing the quasi-judicial nature of prosecutors and the
policies for extending immunity to prosecutors and grand jurors).
432. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23. These considerations include the concern that
the harassment of unjustified litigation would not only create a distraction of the
prosecutor's attention from her public duties but also result in a possible compromise
in the exercise of her independent judgment. Id.
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or constitutional rights of others.433
In light of the immunity provided to the Attorney General and
Solicitor General, a Solicitor General's strategic confession of an
error made by a lower court judgment in favor of the government in
order to avoid Supreme Court review and reversal on the merits of
the case or her potential compromise of the integrity and
independence of her office by allowing the President or special
interest groups to dictate or influence her legal positions in cases
pending in the Supreme Court would fall within the discretionary
parameters of the respective offices. Thus, these actions would be
immune from subsequent civil ramifications. As discussed earlier
under Zone I, principles of federalism would prohibit the state
judiciary or bar association from intruding upon the constitutional
latitude provided to public officials such as the Attorney General and
Solicitor General while carrying out their official duties and
responsibilities. This would be the case even when the actual motives
underlying their conduct are improper.434 Finally, principles of
comity would require state judiciary and bar associations to
recognize and respect the national policy of granting immunity to
public officials.435
Under Zone IV, the judiciary's interest in protecting the
administration of justice remains at its highest when the lawyerpolitician's conduct is criminal. First, it is generally recognized in
both the United States and England that lawyers are officers of the
court who perform fundamental roles in the administration of
justice.436 As an officer of the court, a lawyer can require a person to
cease whatever she may be doing and to appear as a witness in a
court proceeding or for depositions and other pretrial processes that
can be conducted outside a courtroom. 437 Additionally, lawyers are
given the authority to "sign writs and subpoenas... [and to]
administer oaths."438 Second, because immunity only operates to
shield the lawyer-politician from subsequent civil liability when
performing the functions of her office, she remains subject to liability

433. See Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 997 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that former
Attorney General Janet Reno, in her supervisory capacity, enjoyed qualified immunity
from civil liability for the alleged misconduct committed by federal law enforcement
agents in the carrying out of an Immigration and Naturalization Service
administrative arrest warrant for the seizure and return of six-year-old Elian
Gonzalez back to his natural father). See supra text accompanying notes 363-64
(discussing qualified immunity).
434. See supranote 409 and accompanying text.
435. See supra Part IV.B.2. (discussing comity and public official immunity).
436. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 524 n.4 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
437. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985).
438. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 723 (1973).
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and punishment for her criminal actions.439 Third, the federal
judiciary possesses both the inherent and statutory powers to insure
that justice is efficiently administered in judicial proceedings.440
Thus, the U.S. Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General who
commits crimes such as conspiracy, perjury or obstruction of justice
while in office or shortly afterwards, or who misrepresents the law or
facts in briefs submitted in a federal court will always be subject to
punishment under both federal and state criminal law and the
judiciary's supervisory and statutory powers to discipline a party or
attorney for improper conduct during judicial proceedings.
Finally, the bar's interests in protecting the public from unfit
lawyers and preserving the reputation and integrity of the legal
system are also at their highest under Zone IV. The Model Rules
where primarily created to assist the legal practitioner in resolving
ethical problems arising from conflicts between her responsibilities to
clients, the legal system and her individual interest in remaining
ethical while earning a respectable living.441 The lawyer ethics rules
are directly applicable and controlling when the Attorney General
and Solicitor General conduct and manage the legal representation of
the United States in the federal courts.
For instance, the Model Rules specifically provide that a lawyer
has committed professional misconduct when she commits criminal
acts that reflect adversely on her fitness to practice law or when she
engages in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.442 In addition, it is unethical for a lawyer functioning in the
role of a prosecutor to prosecute a charge that she knows is not
supported by probable cause. 443 Finally, lawyer ethics rules require
the legal practitioner to demonstrate candor towards a court by
refraining from making an intentional false statement of fact or law
to a court.444 Thus, under principles of federalism, the bar would be
required to forego any discipline of the U.S. Solicitor General for a
confession of an error made in arriving at a lower court judgment
that favors the United States even when done primarily to avoid
439. See supra Part V.B. (discussing public officials and criminal liability).
440. See supra notes 427-30 and accompanying text (discussing the court's
supervisory powers). See also FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b)(2), (c)(2) (providing federal courts
with the authority to issue sanctions against an attorney for advocating a pleading
where the claims, defenses and other legal contentions contained within the pleading
are unwarranted by existing law).
441. See MODEL RULES, Preamble 9 (noting that a function of the Model Rules is
to assist legal practitioners in resolving the ethical conflicts that arise from the nature
of law practice).
442. See supra notes 409-11 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of the
court to discipline attorneys).
443. See MODEL RULES, R. 3.8 (a).

444. See id. R. 3.3(a).
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Supreme Court review and likely reversal if the issue were decided
on the merits. The bar, however, would retain its ability to discipline
the Attorney General and Solicitor General for misrepresentations of
445
law or facts in briefs submitted in the federal courts.
In addition, the bar's interest in protecting the reputation and
integrity of the legal profession is also triggered when lawyerpoliticians holding the public offices of Attorney General and Solicitor
General commit crimes or unethical conduct in the representation of
the United States in the federal courts. Lawyers who hold the
highest legal offices in the nation are certainly newsworthy and
capable of attracting major media coverage. Unfortunately, the
negative media publicity surrounding the improper conduct
committed by these lawyers usually results in tremendous public
scrutiny of all lawyers and the legal profession. Thus, it is critical
that bar associations have the ability to sanction their members in a
manner that is both effective and sufficient to address these
concerns.
Because of the constitutional protection provided to public
officials when exercising the discretionary functions of their offices,
the judiciary and bar's interest under Zone IV in disciplining lawyerpoliticians who function in the positions of Attorney General and
Solicitor General must yield to the more important public interest in
providing these officers with immunity from civil liability. This is not
the case, however, when the officer acts outside the authority of the
office or when her conduct is criminal. In such instances, the political
interest in insuring that public officials have the necessary freedom
to function in their positions without the constant fear of civil
liability for their actions is at its lowest. Therefore, in the absence of
any significant political concerns, the important interests of the
judiciary in promoting the administration of justice and the bar's
dual interest in protecting both the public from unfit lawyers and the
reputation and integrity of the legal system would not only permit
but require discipline by the courts and bar for conduct falling within
Zone IV.
CONCLUSION

Legal realism has become increasingly important in lawyer
disciplinary matters today. Its value continues to be recognized by
members of the Academy, judges, and even the Supreme Court when
considering and applying the rule of law to specific legal issues and
controversies. Just as law cannot be effectively studied or applied in
a vacuum, this too is the case when applying lawyer ethics rules.

445. See id. R. 8.4(d) (providing that it is professional misconduct to engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).
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Currently, persons with law degrees occupy approximately one half
of the state governorships, more than half of the seats in the United
States Senate and more than a third of the seats in the House of
Representatives. Yet, the Model Rules have been construed to govern
lawyers from all walks of life without considering or accounting for
the diverse roles and functions performed by modern lawyers and the
competing public and professional interests that arise when nonpracticing lawyers commit improper conduct. A one-size-fits-all
approach to regulating high-ranking federal officials who possess law
licenses fails to respect and account for several of the inherent
safeguards governing public officials and the political process. A
failure to recognize and consider these unique protections can raise
serious constitutional concerns.
Politicians are creatures of political parties and too often the
victims of partisan politics. As society has witnessed during periods
surrounding improper conduct committed by high-ranking public
officials such as the lawyer-President, lawyer-Vice President, and
Supreme Court Justices, bar disciplinary actions or discussions can
and often run the inherent risks of becoming dominated by the
prevailing political viewpoints and biases of society and the
respective decision-makers. One remedy for addressing this concern
is to create a more standardized procedure for applying discipline to
lawyer-politicians. Adopting a functional approach that requires
decision-makers to consider the specific contextual factors
surrounding the alleged misconduct along with the various
competing interests of those entities that share a significant nexus to
the lawyer-politician when determining whether to impose discipline
on him or her would eliminate many of the opportunities for the
inevitable political influences and personal biases that often enter
into the decision-making process. Additionally, taking a functional
approach to regulating lawyer-politicians could provide a way to
bridge the present gap that exists in applying the Model Rules to
these lawyers and therefore, eliminate the need to propose either the
adoption of additional amendments to the current ethics rules or the
creation of new and separate ethics codes.
Finally, a functional approach to regulating lawyer-politicians
who commit misconduct could help in restoring the public's respect
and confidence in the legal profession as it would encourage bar
associations to defer and forego discipline in instances where the
disciplinary measures imposed by either the political process or the
federal judiciary would serve the same or similar purpose.
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